RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 28, 2024
Jan 28, 2024 - ISW Press











Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 28, 2024

Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Frederick W. Kagan

January 28, 2024, 8:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on January 28. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 29 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Note: ISW added a new section on Russian air, missile, and drone campaigns to track Russian efforts to target Ukrainian rear and frontline areas, grow its drone and missile arsenals, and adapt its strike packages.

Kremlin officials and mouthpieces continue to set information conditions to destabilize Moldova, likely as part of efforts to prevent Moldova’s integration into the EU and the West among other objectives. Alexei Polishchuk, the director of the Second Department of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Countries at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), claimed in an interview with Kremlin newswire TASS published on January 28 that Moldova has begun to “destroy its ties” with CIS member states and the Russia-led CIS organization as a whole and that there are rumors that Moldova plans to leave the CIS by the end of 2024.[1] Polishchuk claimed that this decision would not benefit Moldovan interests or citizens and would be unprofitable for the Moldovan economy. Polishchuk also claimed that the settlement of the Transnistria issue in Moldova is in a “deep crisis” and that Moldova’s economic pressure on Transnistria since the beginning of 2024 has “further delayed” any solution.[2] Polishchuk claimed that Russia is ready to fix deteriorating relations between Moldova and Transnistria “as a mediator and guarantor” to the settlement.[3] Moldovan Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Serebrian stated on January 28 that Moldova would not return to the 5+2 Transnistria negotiating process that included Russia as long as Russian-Ukrainian relations do not improve and Russia’s war in Ukraine continues.[4]

A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger, who has recently fixated on the Moldova-Transnistria conflict, continued to highlight alleged discontent in Moldova’s breakaway and autonomous regions. The milblogger claimed that about 50,000 people in Transnistria participated in a rally protesting against Moldovan economic pressure on Transnistria on January 24.[5] The milblogger also stated that Sergei Ibrishim, the Head of the Main Directorate of Agro-Industrial Complex of Gagauzia, sent a request recently to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov for Russia to send fertilizer to Gagauzia as humanitarian aid.[6] Ibrishim also reportedly claimed that Gagauzia’s agricultural producers are unable to sell their products to Russia after Moldova’s decision in July 2023 to leave the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly and asked Lavrov to abolish excise taxes and customs duties for Russian imports from Gagauzia.[7] Polishchuk’s and the milblogger’s comments are likely aimed at dissuading Moldova from leaving the CIS and Russia’s wider sphere of influence, setting information conditions to create economic discontent within Moldova, and posturing Russia as an economic and security guarantor in Moldova.

Russia notably accused Ukraine of abandoning and disregarding the Minsk Agreements that had largely frozen the conflict after Russia’s 2014 invasion in the lead up to Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and Russia may be setting information conditions to make similar claims against Moldova.[8] ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin is likely setting information conditions to justify future Russian aggression in Moldova under the guise of protecting its “compatriots abroad” and the “Russian World” (Russkiy Mir) - concepts that are purposely based on vague definitions of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in foreign countries.[9] Russia may attempt to justify its aggression or destabilization efforts in Moldova by claiming that Transnistrian residents are in danger due Moldova’s alleged abandonment of the Transnistria settlement process. ISW recently observed suggestions that the Kremlin may be turning to rhetorical narratives that appeal to a wider audience beyond the “Russian World.”

Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Director Sergei Naryshkin reiterated that the Kremlin is not interested in any settlements short of the complete destruction and eradication of the Ukrainian state, likely in an ongoing effort to justify the long-term and costly Russian war effort to domestic audiences. Naryshkin told Kremlin journalist Pavel Zarubin during a televised “impromptu” interview on January 28 that the Ukrainian state and government have “a very sad fate” and that “Russia will not stop halfway,” presumably in its efforts to destroy Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.[11] Naryshkin made a similar statement on January 27 during the opening of a memorial to the Soviet victims of Nazi genocide in Leningrad Oblast, claiming that “Russia will not stop halfway” in its fight with the current followers of Nazi ideology.[12] The similarity of both statements suggests that Naryshkin may be using pre-approved Kremlin rhetoric to signal to Russian citizens that the Kremlin is not open to negotiating with Ukraine or compromising in any settlement of the war Russia started, despite recent Western reports to the contrary.[13] Russian officials have consistently reiterated Russia‘s commitment to its maximalist objectives in Ukraine - which are tantamount to complete Ukrainian and Western capitulation- and statements by Russian officials suggesting that Russia is or has always been interested in peace negotiations with Ukraine are very likely efforts to feign interest to prompt preemptive Western concessions regarding Ukraine’s sovereignty or territorial integrity.[14]

Naryshkin was notably involved in setting domestic information conditions in the lead-up to the 2022 Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, including furthering Russian claims that perceived Ukrainian aggression prompted by Ukraine’s Western ‘puppet masters’ forced Russia to invade Ukraine and claims that the Ukrainian government is comparable to Nazi Germany.[15] Russian President Vladimir Putin ostentatiously humiliated Naryshkin during a televised Russian Security Council meeting on February 22, 2022, demanding that Naryshkin “speak plainly” when Naryshkin declared his support for the independence of occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.[16] Putin likely humiliated Naryshkin in February 2022 due to Naryshkin‘s failure to set the informational conditions to justify Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in the Russian domestic and international information spaces that Putin desired. Naryshkin’s return to the Russian information space to further the perception of the Kremlin’s commitment to the war in Ukraine could indicate that Putin has given Naryshkin another chance to prove his ability to set informational conditions, this time setting conditions domestically for a long war effort. If this hypothesis is correct, then Naryshkin will presumably be determined not to disappoint Putin again. Zarubin has also previously been involved in a number of Kremlin informational efforts, including filming and conducting interviews wherein Putin threatened Finland and the wider NATO alliance and attempted to portray himself as a gracious leader who cares about the well-being of Russian military personnel and an effective Commander-in-Chief of the Russian armed forces.

The Kremlin also continues to frame and justify a long-term Russian war effort as part of an existential geopolitical confrontation with the West and Nazism. Alexei Polishchuk, the director of the Second Department of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Countries at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), also stated during his interview with TASS that “the West incited neo-Nazi sentiments in Ukraine” and “made [Ukraine] anti-Russia.”[18] Putin, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, Naryshkin, and Russian State Duma Chairman Vyacheslav Volodin during the 80th anniversary of the breaking of the siege of Leningrad on January 27 claimed that Russia is fighting “Nazis” in Ukraine and that a number of Western countries have adopted Nazi ideology.[19] Polishchuk‘s claim that the West incited “neo-Nazi” ideals in Ukraine is likely part of the same coordinated Kremlin informational effort intended to justify geopolitical confrontation with the West and suggests that the Kremlin may increasingly label any perceived adversary and possibly the entire West as “Nazi.”[20] ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin may have decided that the simple narrative that Russia and other states are fighting a geopolitical “Nazi” force is a more effective immediate narrative than Putin’s attempt to appeal to Russian citizens and Russian speakers in the territory of the former Soviet Union and Russian Empire with the ideology of the ”Russian World” (Russkiy Mir), which is based on purposefully amorphous ethnic identities that are not agreed upon and that are at odds with Russia’s multi-ethnic composition.[21] Polishchuk also reiterated long-standing Russian claims that the West controls Ukraine and that Russia has “always remained” open to peace negotiations.

Ukrainian Navy Commander Vice Admiral Oleksiy Neizhpapa emphasized the importance of Ukraine’s ability to technologically adapt and develop as Russian forces continue to adapt to Ukrainian operations in a January 27 Sky News interview.[23] Neizhpapa’s statement is consistent with ISW’s assessment that Russian forces are adapting and learning on certain sectors of the front.[24] Neizhpapa also reiterated the Ukrainian assertion that Ukrainian forces should be able to use Western-provided systems to strike legitimate military targets in Russia.[25] Neizhpapa stated that the Ukrainian Navy would be “very happy” to accept two UK Type 23 frigates that the UK is considering decommissioning due to a shortage of sailors.[26] The Turkish government announced on January 2 that it would not allow the UK to transport two mine hunting ships to Ukraine via the Turkish Straits citing Article 19 of the Montreux Convention Regulating the Regime of the Turkish Straits, which stipulates that “vessels of war belonging to belligerent Powers shall not...pass through the Straits.” Turkey would likely continue to use the Montreux Convention to prevent the UK from potentially transferring these two frigates through the Turkish Straits to Ukraine.[27] Turkey has used the Montreux Convention to deny access to Russian warships wishing to pass through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits since February 28, 2022, to Ukraine’s benefit.

The Kremlin will likely use the withdrawals of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to continue efforts to expand Russian influence in Francophone Africa. The Malian, Burkinabe, and Nigerien juntas announced their immediate withdrawals from ECOWAS in a joint statement on January 28.[29] ECOWAS stated that it had not received “any direct formal notification” from Mali, Burkina Faso, or Niger about their intent to withdraw.[30] Kremlin newswire TASS cited the frustration of these states with ECOWAS’ ”Western influence” as a reason for their withdrawal.[31] Russian milbloggers also celebrated the announcement as evidence of rapidly decreasing French influence in the Sahel.[32] The first contingent of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)-controlled Africa Corps reportedly arrived in Burkina Faso on January 24, and Kremlin officials recently met with Chadian junta officials in Moscow.[33] ISW continues to assess that Russia is attempting to expand its influence in western and central Africa, particularly focusing on Francophone African countries in the Sahel.

Unnamed Indian government sources stated that India wants to distance itself from Russia, its largest arms supplier, because the war in Ukraine has limited Russia’s ability to provide India with munitions. The unnamed Indian government sources told Reuters in a January 28 article that India will act carefully in order to avoid pushing Russia closer to China.[36] Indian think tank Observer Research Foundation’s Russia expert Nandan Unnikrishnan told Reuters that India is unlikely to sign “any major military deal” with Russia because it would cross a red line with the United States.[37] Indian government-run think tank Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses Eurasia expert Svasti Rao stated that the war in Ukraine has caused India to question Russia’s ability to supply India with spare parts.[38] ISW has routinely observed reports that Russia continues to face challenges repairing aircraft and other equipment and has not been able to produce missiles and artillery ammunition at pre-war levels for its own forces to use, making it highly unlikely that Russia will be able to export military equipment to India or its other customers at pre-war levels any time soon.[39] Russian President Vladimir Putin recently highlighted Russian-Indian economic and military-technical cooperation in a meeting with Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar likely in an effort to emphasize positive Russian-Indian relations amid Russian concerns that India is attempting to diversify its defense partners.[40]

Key Takeaways:

• Kremlin officials and mouthpieces continue to set information conditions to destabilize Moldova, likely as part of efforts to prevent Moldova’s integration into the EU and the West among other objectives.
• Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Director Sergei Naryshkin reiterated that the Kremlin is not interested in any settlements short of the complete destruction and eradication of the Ukrainian state, likely in an ongoing effort to justify the long-term and costly Russian war effort to domestic audiences.
• The Kremlin also continues to frame and justify a long-term Russian war effort as part of an existential geopolitical confrontation with the West and Nazism.
• Ukrainian Navy Commander Vice Admiral Oleksiy Neizhpapa emphasized the importance of Ukraine’s ability to technologically adapt and develop as Russian forces continue to adapt to Ukrainian operations in a January 27 Sky News interview.
• The Kremlin will likely use the withdrawals of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to continue efforts to expand Russian influence in Francophone Africa.
• Unnamed Indian government sources stated that India wants to distance itself from Russia, its largest arms supplier, because the war in Ukraine has limited Russia’s ability to provide India with munitions.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Kreminna and Avdiivka amid continued positional fighting throughout the theater.
• A Russian source claimed that Rosgvardia is forming the 1st Volunteer Corps with remaining Wagner Group personnel and newly recruited volunteers (dobrovoltsy) following the Kremlin adoption of the law allowing Rosgvardia to form its own volunteer formations in December 2023.
• Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov stated on January 28 that Ukraine and Russia will conduct a prisoner of war (POW) exchange in the near future.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-28-2024