Chinese organised crime in the Netherlands

V.4.1. A look at the recent past
It was previously stated that in (inter)national literature the Chinese community in the Netherlands is considered a hotbed of Chinese organised crime in Europe, if not in the West, at least in the area of ??heroin trafficking. However, one must realise that the reports on this subject mainly concern the events that took place in Amsterdam in the sixties and seventies. On the one hand, the authors concerned ignore the (subordinate) role that Dutch Chinese certainly played before the war in the smuggling of (Turkish) opium to the Netherlands and the Dutch East Indies; the wholesale trade was then mainly in the hands of Jews and Greeks (Kallenborn, 1953; Block, 1994). On the other hand, in any case in the international literature little or no attention is paid to the current development of Chinese organised crime in the Netherlands. While there is absolutely no reason to trivialise this development, as will be demonstrated below. The events that took place in Amsterdam in the sixties and seventies form the background to what is happening today.

What events are we actually talking about? The 14K triad was already active in Amsterdam before the war. They ran two illegal gambling houses and a prostitution ring. After the war, in the fifties, their business came into the hands of Chung Mon. He did everything he could to organize both the gambling industry and the opium trade on a larger scale, internationally too - even in Germany. In 1969, the 14K in Hong Kong decided that Chung Mon would become their main dealer for heroin in Europe. From that moment on, he also started trading heroin, often delivered via the port of Rotterdam, to France, England, Spain, Italy, etc. In 1973 - this was inevitable - he arranged his first heroin transports to America. This rise of the international heroin trade in Amsterdam not only attracted the attention of the American federal police services and - in their wake - the Amsterdam police, but also that of other Chinese criminal organizations, in particular the Wo Lee Kwan - connected to the triad of the same name in Hong Kong, then already firmly positioned in Belgium - and the Singaporean triad Ah Kong. These triads tried with an iron fist to get hold of a share of the Amsterdam heroin trade. And because the 14K did not want to give up any of its position of power, this violent competition ended with the murder of Chung Mon on March 3, 1975. His successor did not fare much better, as was already mentioned in the introduction. He was murdered on March 3, 1976. The 14K, weakened by all kinds of developments in Hong Kong itself in the meantime, decided to largely leave Amsterdam and move to The Hague and Rotterdam, and further: Antwerp and London. The Ah Kong then gained complete control in Amsterdam. Other triads - not only the Wo Lee Kwan, but gradually also the Sun Yee On and the Wo Shing Wo - had to comply with her instructions (Booth, 1990; Posner, 1988; Robertson, 1977; Chu,
1994).
One side of this triad war that has attracted more attention in the Netherlands for many years than the shootings mentioned, is of course the story that Chung Mon was only able to build his empire because the top man of the Amsterdam Central Detective Agency, G. Toorenaar, and his Chinese experts, had been corrupted by him. This is said to have happened according to the usual pattern: in exchange for money and goods, and of course tips about other - preferably rival - heroin traders, they are said to have left Chung Mon's businesses alone. Despite long and intensive investigations, the (criminal) evidence that this was the case has never been provided. Nevertheless, Toorenaar has been sidelined within the force. Only five officers from the Warmoesstraat police station were sentenced to a fine by the Amsterdam court for accepting money and goods from Chinese hands (De Vries, 1985).

In the mid-eighties, unrest broke out in the Chinese world again. This time it was caused by the violent actions of the Tai Huen Chai. The police were confronted with this criminal group for the first time in 1986, and a few years later had to conclude that in the meantime it had not only grown from 20 to around 100 permanent supporters, but that it had also nested in many large and small cities in our country. The units of the Tai Huen Chai - cells, if you like - were soon fully involved in the trade and distribution of narcotics. But within no time they were also controlling illegal gambling houses and were extorting Chinese businessmen with great force. Fears were repeatedly expressed that this development would sooner or later result in a bloody power struggle between the Tai Huen Chai, the Ah Kong and, in the background, the 14K, especially since the 14K tried to regain a foothold in the mid-eighties. The big clash that was expected time and again has not yet materialized. However, all sorts of shootings and murders in recent years have indicated that the struggle for power could apparently no longer be controlled by consultation at times (Van der Roer, 1989).

V.4.2. The current situation: a general outline
In a recent publication by the Chinese side in Amsterdam itself about the position of the Chinese community, in the Dutch community, there is open writing about (organised) crime in its ranks. More specifically, it is stated that Chinese criminals, some of whom have come to the Netherlands (illegally), are guilty of extortion, drug trafficking, hostage-taking and fraud with credit cards. Without directly mentioning names, these criminal activities are partly attributed to triads that originate on the one hand from the People's Republic of China annex Hong Kong, and on the other hand from Singapore and Malaysia; the latter triads in particular are accused of ruthless actions. As a result of these practices, and in particular the de facto impunity of those who commit them, according to the present report, there is enormous fear among the Chinese community. And, it continues, this is why the Chinese, already an invisible group, go through life even more inconspicuously and as anonymously as possible. They take a secret phone number, have no nameplate on the door and do not show off expensive cars or expensive clothes. They visit school, family or work addresses via ever different routes (Amsterdam Centre for Foreigners, 1994). Does this image of terror correspond with what we actually know about the illegal activities of criminal Chinese groups?

V.4.2.1. A picture of the illegal activities
Let us start with the robberies of Chinese companies, especially restaurants, and of the homes of their owners/operators, and also with the extortion and attempted extortion of the latter. This category of crimes causes the most fear in the Chinese community. In August 1992, the CRI first attempted to sketch a picture of the cases that had occurred up to that time. Since the start of the ZOA project (June 1994), this picture has been meticulously kept up to date by the project staff. Their list of incidents includes a total of 35 robberies (one of which was fatal) and three attempted robberies over the period from 28 October 1990 to 26 March 1995, on the one hand, and 15 (attempted) extortions and one burglary on the other. These crimes were committed in the West, the North, the Middle, the East and the South of the country. It is certain that this list of incidents is far from complete. On the one hand, this can be deduced from the available police background information: it refers several times to robberies and extortion cases that are not on the list. On the other hand, this was also demonstrated in a small study that the Royal Dutch Hospitality Association had conducted in 1993 into the nature and extent of aggressive property crime to the detriment of Chinese hospitality entrepreneurs. This study - in which unfortunately only 15% (73) of the 500 companies contacted participated - showed that respectively 17% (12) and 19% (13) of them
had been extorted or robbed in 1992. The (13) companies that were robbed, this happened only once. Of the (12) companies that indicated that they had been extorted, 5 indicated that this had happened twice, and two that they had been visited 3 times or more. The entrepreneurs involved also stated that they had not always reported the crime. The main reason they gave for this was the fear of reprisals from the robbers or extortionists. Even in the event that a report was filed, the entrepreneurs in question did not always provide the police with the names of the known assailants for this reason. The sense of security of the entrepreneurs who had participated in this study was therefore under pressure. Quite a few respondents did not feel at ease in their business or at home (11% and 10% respectively) or only occasionally (44% and 33% respectively).

Anyone who has read how these robberies and extortions are committed can easily imagine their fear. Robberies are usually heavily threatened with firearms and knives, people (men and women) who resist are certainly tackled roughly, normally everyone is tied up with rope and/or tape, and when the perpetrators have the loot - usually money and/or jewellery - inside, they often leave the building with the threat that reporting the robbery to the police will be paid for with their lives. In extortions, death threats are also often made (by telephone) in the event that the victim does not want to pay. In other cases, this threat is given in a silent manner. The infamous telephone call is then accompanied by a white envelope containing, depending on the case, one or two bullets. This message also leaves nothing to be desired in terms of clarity. The amounts of money stolen in these robberies and extortions vary greatly. They vary from a few hundred or thousands of guilders to several tens of thousands of guilders. Of course, the differences between these will have something to do with the differences in wealth between the victims, or at least the differences in their willingness to defend this against their assailants. On the other hand, they probably also go back to the (lack of) insight of the perpetrators into the financial position of their victims, and, of course, to differences in willingness on their part to get the most out of it. We have already seen that many Chinese entrepreneurs - out of distrust of the banking system and out of aversion to the tax authorities - keep all their money in cash at home. On the one hand, this makes it tempting to rob or extort them, but on the other hand, this custom makes it difficult to estimate the size of the loot correctly. It is probably for this reason that in many of the known robberies and extortions a (former) employee of the company in question plays a role. He had to look in advance at what turnover would be achieved and what the profit percentage would be.

The use of (ex-)employees brings us to a second category of illegal activities: the various forms of human trafficking, or, perhaps better, human smuggling. How does this work? The details are not known, but the available data indicate that it broadly goes as follows. Chinese who want to go to the West illegally, make contact in South China, or in Hong Kong or Bangkok, with human smugglers ( snakeheads ), who belong to an organisation that also has accomplices in Western Europe, in this case the Netherlands, and/or North America. The latter is not only important with a view to the reception and employment of the people who may be smuggled across the border, but also with a view to obtaining the necessary identity documents. For example, in recent years, Dutch passports that had been stolen from private individuals in the Netherlands or that had been stolen from town halls here have repeatedly turned up in Hong Kong and Bangkok, apparently intended for the smuggling of illegal immigrants into our country. In order to obtain one of these passports and to ensure their transport to the Netherlands, the candidates must pay a high price. In political circles, amounts ranging from 10,000 to 50,000 guilders are mentioned. Those who can pay this amount in their country of origin do so immediately, those who cannot or cannot do so in full, are obliged to earn back the remaining amount in the country of destination. The immigrant is then transported by train or plane to Europe, often to Eastern Europe and nowadays: Russia, Poland, but also Southern Europe, especially Italy and Spain. From here they continue by car, bus or plane. To Prague, Vienna, Munich, Berlin, Cologne and Brussels. Finally, they end up in the Netherlands by train or car (van). These illegal immigrants usually travel in small groups of 4.5 to 8 people; sometimes they number 10-11 people. It has also repeatedly come to light that both Chinese and Dutch people - probably for payment - act as supervisors of such groups, sometimes from South-East Asia. It is estimated that several hundred Chinese are smuggled into our country illegally in this way each year.

Once they arrive in the Netherlands, these illegal immigrants normally have to hand in their passports to the smugglers immediately, supposedly to further sort out their papers, but they never see them again. Then - as is assumed on the basis of numerous reports and experiences - the Chinese based in the Netherlands who act as trading partners of the smugglers in China, Hong Kong or Thailand, take possession of these people. This means that they place them as much as possible via their network of contacts with Chinese companies where they - as illegal immigrants - work for a pittance and just have to see how they
can pay off the debt that was incurred in the country of origin. The immigrants for whom this is not possible or who otherwise get into trouble, often report to the asylum seekers' centres in desperation. This is the normal course of events. However, it also happens on some scale that Chinese people who are brought into the Netherlands illegally, fall into the hands of Chinese people here who employ them at Chinese companies that do not ask for this at all. On the contrary! They are simply forced to work one or more of these illegal immigrants - as a cook, as a babysitter, as a waiter. There is no such thing as refusing! Neither for the company nor for the illegal immigrant. The latter must then not only hand over part of his meagre wages to the Chinese criminal who has placed him (or her, this also happens sporadically), but must also inform this person of the company's turnover, of the places where the money is hidden, of the jewellery that members of the family possess, and so on. If he is unlucky, he must also participate in the robbery or in the extortion of the company where he worked. Otherwise, he leaves the company just before or just after this criminal intervention, with the excuse that the immigration police are on his trail. Incidentally, research has repeatedly shown in recent years that Chinese people who were staying in asylum centres were also specifically deployed to commit robberies. The figures who drive these illegal immigrants/asylum seekers down the criminal path will be discussed in more detail below.

There is also a link between the robberies and extortions and an illegal activity in which the Chinese in our country have traditionally been involved: the drug trade, and in particular the heroin trade. In one of the robberies referred to above, the restaurant owner involved was possibly robbed of both 25 kg of heroin and a huge sum of drug money. The reason why he was robbed was probably not that he had so much money at home, but that he had recently been obtaining heroin from another, competing Chinese organisation. In another case, a huge sum of money was found at the victims' homes, which, according to reports, may have originated from drug trafficking and/or human trafficking. Incidents like these naturally raise the question of how the Chinese heroin trade in general has evolved in recent years. Because little or no in-depth research has been conducted into this trade in recent years - nationally - this question cannot be answered in general terms. The available information only allows an impression to be given of some facets of this illegal activity.

To begin with, it should be emphasized that there are still many direct connections between criminal organizations in Hong Kong in particular and various Chinese drug (wholesaler) dealers in the Netherlands, more specifically in the Randstad. These individuals have large quantities of heroin (hundreds of kilos) shipped from Bangkok to the Netherlands. They send smaller quantities (40-60 kg) by plane, sometimes hidden among goods that are (preferably) first flown to Poland and then picked up here by car, sometimes in smaller quantities, hidden in the clothing and luggage of preferably non-Chinese (i.e. Dutch, Belgian, German, French, English) couriers who, under the supervision of Chinese controllers , fly directly to Schiphol, Zaventem, Frankfurt. There are also reports that non-Chinese, and in particular Dutch, also play a more important role in the heroin trade from South-East Asia. More specifically, this involves co-financing and arranging the transport of larger quantities. For example, one of the reports sent to us by a police force on the edge of the Randstad contains the story of a Chinese man who, in collaboration with a Dutchman, imports frozen fish from Asia containing heroin; he then distributes this heroin, together with the Dutchman, in one of the discos he owns. Even more remarkable is the finding that Ghanaian networks, which also have their bases in the Netherlands, in Brabant or Amsterdam, have their own people collect large quantities of heroin by plane in Hong Kong and Bangkok, and then have these quantities transported back to North America by couriers, also via the Netherlands.

The heroin that the Chinese bring to the Netherlands is not all intended for the Dutch market! Some of it is. This is distributed throughout the Netherlands - to cities as well as villages - via their own (Chinese) channels (restaurants, video stores, gambling houses), but also via Dutch dealers who have gained trust after long-term contacts. The remaining (largest?) part is exported again. This goes to other Western European countries: Germany, France, Belgium, Spain, Italy and England, but also to the United States and Canada. The Chinese heroin trade in the Netherlands is therefore still very internationally oriented. And for this reason it should come as no surprise that there are lively relationships between Chinese dealers in the Netherlands and Chinese dealers in those other countries. Nor is it, in light of this, strange that there is also talk of heroin import into the Netherlands by Chinese wholesalers who are established in the surrounding countries. The unification of the European internal market is also felt in this respect.

It should not be forgotten that the Chinese drug trade in the Netherlands - when all is said and done - involves more than just the trade in heroin by Chinese people with connections in Hong Kong and Bangkok. Police information shows that a single Chinese group based in the Netherlands is (also) involved in the cocaine trade. This trade is conducted via Dutch people, families, who
are of Antillean or Surinamese origin, but who still have the right contacts in Suriname or the Netherlands Antilles. However, there are also direct connections between Chinese drug dealers in the Netherlands and members of a Chinese criminal organisation that is based on one of the Antillean islands. Finally, there are two categories of illegal activities, of which very little is generally known at a national level. One activity concerns the production of counterfeit credit cards . It has become apparent that Chinese people in the Netherlands currently also have the equipment to make such cards; they are therefore no longer dependent on the counterfeiters in China and Hong Kong. And of course these cards are also used, also in the Netherlands. Mainly to obtain jewellery and other valuable goods that are partly traded both within the Chinese community in this country and in Chinese circles abroad. The other activity is related to the illegal and legal gambling industry. The Chinese have traditionally been known as avid gamblers. It is therefore to be expected that at a national level all kinds of reports will be discussed about the existence of illegal gambling houses, which are, as it were, reserved for the Chinese. Not only in the large cities of the Randstad, but also in less and less urban municipalities in the province. An analysis of this extensive - apparently - illegal gambling circuit was never made, however. But this does not say everything about the role of the Chinese in the gambling industry. After all, where there is talk of illegal gambling houses, there is also talk of loan sharking : lending money at usurious interest rates to (gambling addicted) players. What is important now is that it is said that Chinese groups not only play an important role in taking out usurious loans in illegal gambling houses, but have also built up a position of power in and around (some? all?) legal gambling houses, the houses of Holland Casino, in this respect. And that is apparently so lucrative that groups fight with violence to acquire or defend this position. Further investigation is in order, because this shows that the legalization of certain gambling games does not mean the end of all the illegality that previously accompanied these games.

V.4.2.2. The triads and gangs involved
Now that the nature and, within limits, the extent of the main illegal activities of Chinese people in our country have been described, it is important to provide an image of the groups that are guilty of the forms of crime in question. Before sketching this image, it is advisable - precisely because of the lack of proper data on Chinese organised crime - to recall the main insights that have been gained abroad with regard to the organisation of this crime. Firstly, there was the insight that triads certainly still exist, but that these societies - also in Hong Kong - no longer form all-powerful, hierarchically structured criminal organisations, but rather small criminal core groups around which numerous larger and smaller gangs, including youth gangs, circle in relative autonomy. Secondly, that - as in the United States - other Chinese criminal organisations can function very well alongside new-fangled triads, while their mutual relations are very opaque to outsiders. And thirdly, that an equally complicated situation has developed, especially in Western Europe: on the one hand, battles for power on certain markets are taking place between the more or less established triads, on the other hand, criminal organisations are emerging that originate from the growing stream of (illegal) Chinese immigrants. In short, a mix of foreign and immigrant criminal groups will increasingly be active in Chinese organised crime.

Anyone looking for an answer to the question addressed in this subparagraph with this relatively complex picture in mind may first raise the sub-question to what extent the more traditional Chinese criminal organisations still play a significant role in the Netherlands. That this question is certainly not misplaced can already be deduced from the conversations that were held two years ago by representatives of CRI with members of the special organised crime units of the police services in South-East Asia. These conversations revealed that not only subgroups of the 14K are still active in the Netherlands from Hong Kong, and especially in Amsterdam, but also members of the Shui Fong triad; moreover, it was established in Hong Kong that - in contrast to the past - the 14K and the Wo Shing Wo now also work closely together in our country. As far as the Ah Kong is concerned, it was indicated that its members are recruited in both Malaysia and Singapore, with the proviso that in these countries the trade in narcotics is not nearly as organised as in Europe, in this case the Netherlands. In other words, Ah Kong as a recognizable criminal organization originated in Europe itself. It would even owe its name to the Dutch police.

This foreign picture of the situation does correspond in some respects with the insight that has been gradually built up in this country in recent years, but it is certainly not complete and not entirely up to date. Based on domestic reporting, it can be stated that three groups currently still dominate the battlefield in the Netherlands: the 14K, the Ah Kong and Tai Huen Chai. However, it appears
that the mutual power relations have turned out somewhat differently than some expected around 1990. The general impression is that the Ah Kong has won the battle, particularly for control over the heroin trade, and that both the 14K and the Tai Huen Chai certainly have to settle for second place in this area. It should be noted immediately that the establishment of these relations was not achieved without a struggle and is still not an established and accepted fact for the parties involved. This is proven above all by the fact that of the 13 assassinations (with 14 dead, 3 wounded, and 1 unharmed victim) that have taken place in the Chinese environment since May 1991, several have been direct consequences of the power struggle between the groups in question. The shooting that took place in Utrecht in November 1991, in which one Chinese man was killed, is generally attributed to the Ah Kong; its motive is said to have been that the victim, one of the leading figures of the Tai Huen Chai, was not prepared to sell heroin at a reduced price to the Ah Kong. The Chinese man who was murdered in a restaurant in Duiven in April 1995 was a man who was involved in providing usurious loans to gamblers in and around legal gambling houses. He was affiliated with the Ah Kong and therefore an acceptable target for the Tai Huen Chai, which is trying to acquire a monopoly on the activity that this Chinese man was developing. And then we are only talking about the attacks that are more or less officially known. Because there is also information about other attacks. For example, in December 1990 a top man of the Tai Huen Chai was stabbed, almost killed, during a conversation with a prominent member of the Ah Kong in Amsterdam. The police authorities in Hong Kong state - as we have seen - that the 14K is probably represented in our country by about two groups. In Dutch political circles it is assumed, however, that there are about 20 tai lo's for the 14K(bosses) are active in our country. How these data can be reconciled is not yet known. In any case, the fact is that the same municipalities are consistently mentioned as the same meeting places of the 14K, in particular Amsterdam, The Hague and Eindhoven. Here are restaurants, video stores, (illegal) gambling houses and other places where its members frequently meet. Until the end of the eighties, the Tai Huen Chai had its headquarters in Amsterdam and there were also cells active in numerous (medium) large municipalities: Rotterdam, Eindhoven, Arnhem and Leeuwarden. After its defeat against the Ah Kong, this group moved its headquarters to Utrecht. In addition, there is a feeling that its operational units have since decreased significantly in number. Experts believe that there are currently about 7 groups (with a strength of between 6 and 20 men) that are really active here and there in the country. The Ah Kong is - as expected - currently completely branched out across our country. The police are certain that in the Netherlands they are led by two gangs who in turn manage at least 70 underbosses, who each work with a group of Chinese criminals that can vary in strength from 5 to 25-30 men. In the big cities their organization can look quite different than in smaller municipalities or rural areas. For example, in Rotterdam all activities are controlled by a single member of the Ah Kong. Under him is at least one boss - a Surinamese Chinese by the way - who is specifically responsible for the drug trade. And these bosses can then call on five groups to carry out all kinds of crimes. At the current stage of the investigation it is not possible to say whether a certain division of tasks has not developed territorially or in terms of illegal activity within and/or between the three groups in question. However, there is not much evidence of such a division of tasks at the moment. The available information rather indicates that their units, depending on the possibilities, are involved in all the activities discussed above. Just as with heroin trafficking as with human trafficking, and with robbery and extortion just as easily as with the conclusion of loan sharking. However, this does not alter the fact that it can be said on the basis of research that in certain Dutch cities - such as The Hague, Arnhem, Nijmegen, Eindhoven, Rotterdam and Amsterdam - there are Chinese criminals who are active in the scenein the region and maintain close contacts with leading Chinese criminals elsewhere in the country. Their businesses - restaurants, gambling houses, video stores - really function as operational bases for the gangs that actually get their hands dirty with human trafficking, heroin trafficking, loan sharking, robberies, extortion and the use of counterfeit credit cards. The affiliation of these local bosses with this or that group is not always clear.

In connection with the above, it should also be noted that not all crimes committed by or against Chinese people are related to the groups discussed above, not by a long shot. These are not the only ones responsible for (organised) Chinese crime in our country. In recent years - somewhat in the wake of the Tai Huen Chai - all kinds of crimes have been committed in the Netherlands by Chinese people who are sent here directly from abroad - particularly France. This is particularly the case in the area of ??robberies and extortion, but it cannot be ruled out that this development also occurs in other sectors, such as the use of false credit cards or the import of heroin. Nevertheless, some people still wonder whether these foreign Chinese gangs can really operate completely separately from the more established groups.
Could it not be that they are, as it were, tolerated by these groups in return for payment of a certain price? Or even more so: that they are brought here by these groups themselves? The fact that the members of these French-Chinese gangs are now being changed very quickly does not contradict the assumption of a certain policy of tolerance. The rapid change of people need only be a measure to avoid their arrest, especially in the country where the crimes are committed, in this case the Netherlands. In addition to the actions of these foreign gangs, there is also, in Amsterdam, a Chinese gang that partly consists of young people who grew up in the Netherlands and partly consists of asylum seekers. The members of this gang are said to be guilty of robbery and extortion of Chinese companies in an extremely violent manner and are also involved in the heroin trade and the trade in stolen and false checks. This could mean that a development will now also occur in the Netherlands that has already manifested itself much earlier in the United States: the rise of Chinese youth gangs.

Finally, it cannot be ignored that there is only one report from the past few years about a Chinese who has specifically tried to cripple the functioning of the Dutch police and justice system through corruption. This concerns an important leader of the Ah Kong who bribed police officers in two smaller municipalities. The only other indication that exists in this connection concerns Schiphol. Here the Ah Kong is said to have several people flattened. For payment, these people are prepared to help it with the smuggling of goods (herone and other things) and people. No mention is made of other counter-strategies - for example counter-surveillance or intimidation.

What is also striking is that the information used for this paragraph does not mention any lawyers or notaries, neither Dutch nor foreign. Apparently the Chinese we have in mind here can handle their illegal business perfectly well themselves. Whether they invest a significant part of their income in the Netherlands has never really been investigated properly. This much does become clear when reading the documents, namely that sometimes large sums of money, also via a Chinese bank in this country, are transferred to Hong Kong, and from there to Bangkok. This money is certainly used to a certain extent to finance new heroin transports to the Netherlands. But there is also reason to assume that the profits from the heroin trade in particular are invested in construction projects and real estate in Hong Kong and southern China.

V.4.3. Some examples of Chinese organised crime
In order to make the general picture of Chinese organised crime sketched above somewhat more concrete, we can refer to some of the fourteen - to put it mildly - relevant reports that were submitted to the CRI by the police forces at our request. One of these reports shows that conducting investigations into Chinese organised crime - unlike robberies - is not always easy. This concerns an investigation into a Chinese man in a large city who has no regular and/or legal income, but who does have a high status; for example, he always has two Chinese drivers drive him at the same time. It is also striking that he not only talks very cautiously about money transactions on the phone, but that he also keeps a very close eye on his immediate surroundings when he is on the road. It is plausible that he is involved in one or more known criminal activities, but this could only be demonstrated by means of long-term and constant observation. However, the resources for this were lacking and so the project was stopped. An investigation, however, which was initiated in 1989-1990 in the east of the country into large-scale extortion of Chinese restaurants by a Chinese who was probably affiliated with the 14K, shows that investigation into such a difficult form of organised crime is also possible, if one can gain the trust within the Chinese community. In this case, this was gained by the prospect that the main suspect in the same case would be punished fairly severely for a heroin trade. Incidentally, he invested part of the money that the person concerned earned from extortion in this trade. He spent the rest on satisfying his insatiable gambling addiction.

In order to provide a concrete picture of the most recent developments, we can first refer to the investigation by the so-called Asia team into a number of violent robberies that took place throughout the Netherlands in 1994 (Wijchen, Groningen, Putten, Hoofddorp, Ter Aar and Udenhout). The available reports show that the group that carried out the robberies was always relatively small (3-5 men) and changed frequently in composition. The fact that quite a few of these robbers came from France naturally quickly gave rise to the idea that this would also be a gang sent to the Netherlands by a Chinese organisation from France. There were certainly connections to Chinese criminal groups in Paris and elsewhere, but at least as important is that further analysis of the data shows that a Chinese criminal who had been living in the Netherlands for some time had bailed out the actual leader of the gang in China and helped him find shelter in the Netherlands, so that he
was then obliged to do something in return for his patron. This patron, however, was not alone, but was part of a small network of Chinese who apparently only ran a restaurant and operated slot machines, but who - precisely through the contacts they had in the industry - were involved in human trafficking and - partly on the basis of the tips provided by the chefs they had placed - had robberies carried out. The robbers received nothing, or next to nothing, of the loot. It had to be handed over to the man who had actually given the order to commit a robbery, the so-called patron. But it is suspected that this man in turn was controlled by a Chinese top figure who holds an influential position in criminality in the middle of the country. What we see in this case is not so much that Chinese criminal groups from abroad are making the Netherlands unsafe, but rather that Chinese criminal groups in the Netherlands, in collaboration with similar groups abroad, are internationalising the execution of part of their illegal activities. Also with the aim of obstructing their clarification as much as possible.

Secondly, the example of the investigation that the so-called Master team recently completed into the smuggling of heroin and other illegal activities by a circle of ten to twenty Chinese, mainly living in the central and southern Netherlands, can be cited here. This case came to light after a tip from customs that heroin was hidden in packages of clothing, originating from Thailand, that were to be delivered by EMS to Chinese people in Vollenhove and Oude Tonge. This indeed turned out to be the case, in the buttons of the coats! Further investigation showed that heroin was regularly sent to Western Europe in this way, not only to the Netherlands, but also to Germany (Frankfurt). It also became clear that at least some of the Chinese people living in the Netherlands were most likely involved in shoplifting or in buying expensive clothing using false credit cards. As for the organisational context of these activities, it soon became clear from the movements and telephone conversations of some suspects that they were not working for their own account in the Netherlands, but under the direction of Chinese people in Paris who apparently had closer contacts with the bosses in Hong Kong than they did themselves. In Paris it was largely decided what had to happen to the goods; sometimes meetings were also held about this in Utrecht. Furthermore, there were all kinds of business contacts with Chinese people in Germany, France and Belgium. Some of the 13 suspects who were later arrested in the Netherlands have Dutch nationality and had - at first glance - settled here reasonably well: one owned a restaurant, another a travel agency, a third a trading company, a fourth a fashion house and the rest consisted mainly of asylum seekers who had come into contact with the aforementioned Chinese people through various channels. It cannot be determined whether this gang is (also) affiliated with one of the larger criminal groups in the Netherlands. For the time being, therefore, one can only conclude that this example once again underlines how difficult it is to place specific criminal activities in a specific organizational framework, and on the other hand, it shows once again how internationally the execution of these activities is set up. It is becoming increasingly difficult to view Chinese organized crime in the Netherlands separately from the phenomenology of this crime in the whole of Western Europe.

Chung Mon, who regularly donated to charity, was known as a respected businessman and was decorated by both the Dutch and Taiwanese governments, controlled the Chinese heroin trade from Amsterdam, and more specifically the Zeedijk , earning him nicknames such as the "Godfather of Amsterdam/Europe", "Mister Big", the "Unicorn of 14K" and "Fokkie Lang" . (Chinese for "afraid of no one"). Chung became so successful that he expanded his empire to the United States in 1973 and came under the scrutiny of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). In the Netherlands, he enjoyed the protection of Gerard Toorenaar , head of the Central Criminal Investigation Department in Amsterdam, to whom he provided important information about other drug dealers in return.

Chung Mon is buried on Friday 8 March, 1975 amid great interest at the Zorgvlied cemetery on the Amsteldijk. The funeral procession departs from the Prins Hendrikkade and includes some 60 following cars. Traffic chaos ensues and the police step in to keep everything on track. Several hundred Chinese gather around the grave for the ceremony and several Dutch relations also make an appearance. There is a sea of ??flowers and a lot of incense is burned. Chung's Dutch widow speaks at the coffin.

The disillusionment follows when it comes out after the funeral that the triad boss lived from hand to mouth and leaves behind a debt of millions.