Wagner Turns Over 2,000 Heavy Weapons Including Tanks, SAM Systems
In the wake of his aborted mutiny last month, Yevgeny Prigozhin and his Wagner Private Military Company turned over more than 2,000 weapons and pieces of equipment more than 2,500 tons of ammunition and over 20,000 small arms, the Russian Defense Ministry (MoD) said on its Telegram channel Wednesday. A video showing turned over Wagner tanks and other armor, artillery pieces, land mines and boxes apparently full of munitions has also been distributed.
This list of equipment provided by the Russian MoD includes "hundreds of heavy weapons like T-90, T-80, T-72B3 tanks, Grad and Uragan multiple-launch rocket systems, Pantsir surface-to-air missile systems, 2S1 Gvozdika 122 mm self-propelled artillery systems, 2S3 Akatsiya 152 mm, 2S5 Giatsint 152 mm, 2S4 Tulpan 240 mm, howitzers and anti-tank guns, mortar systems, multipurpose armored tractors, armored personnel carriers, as well as motor vehicles."

Among other items, the video released by the Russian MoD shows:

MT-LB light armored vehicles
2B9 Vasilek semi-automatic 82mm gun-mortars
TM-62 anti-tank land mines
120mm 2S9 Nona self-propelled gun-mortars
152mm D-1 towed howitzers
152mm 2S5 Giatsint-S self-propelled field guns
152mm 2A36 Giatsint-B towed field guns
trucks with 57mm S-60 anti-aircraft guns
towed anti-tank guns
AK-series rifles
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zo...eavy-weapons-including-tanks-sam-systems

Funny thing the Wagner group is called after Richard Wagner.

"I love the smell of napalm in the morning, it's like, victory."

Why not send some of these to Ukraine???

U.S. Marines Has a New Ship-Killing Weapon Can Destroy a Warship 100 Miles Away

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ef8sQhKiYzs

It is not known exactly where Wagner boss Yevgeny Prigozhin is at the moment. But the smear campaign against him is in full swing. A photo of Prigozhin in his underpants is currently circulating on the internet.

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/F0_J63jXwAEWmyY?format=jpg&name=medium

New mysterious death in Moscow
Putin supporter's daughter found dead in her apartment
Updated Yesterday, 20:25
Yesterday, 6:30 PM
MOSCOW - Once again there is a mysterious death among the Russian elite. Natalia Bochkareva, 44, the daughter of the late Russian politician Vasily Bochkaryov, was recently found dead in her Moscow apartment.
The woman would have felt bad the day before. The woman's body was found by the janitor, who called the police after the woman stopped opening her door. According to the Daily Mail, initial reports indicate that the death was not a violent one.
According to sources, the woman had a heart problem. Still, her death is suspicious. She is not the first of the Russian elite to die suddenly.
Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, many generals, politicians or oligarchs have died under mysterious circumstances.

21:20 Yesterday
The Russian intelligence service FSB has arrested seven people suspected of trying to kill two prominent journalists. The five minors and two adult men allegedly planned to kill Margarita Simonyan, the editor-in-chief of Russian state television RT, and Ksenia Sobchak, a well-known TV presenter.

Russia says Ukraine is behind the assassination plot . Interfax, Russia's state news agency, claims those arrested admitted to the FSB that the order for the killings came from Kyiv and that they would receive 1.5 million Russian rubles (just under $15,000) per murder.

A court in Moscow has given permission to detain the seven at least until September 14. They are suspected of 'attempted murder motivated by nationalistic hatred'.

It would not be the first time that Russian media figures have been targeted . Earlier, a well-known journalist and a blogger were killed in bomb attacks. Both openly supported the invasion of Ukraine. A nationalist writer narrowly survived an attack on his car.

Moscow repeatedly blamed Ukraine. Kyiv denies any involvement, saying the incidents are a result of internal settlements in Russia. The Ukrainian authorities have not yet responded to these arrests.

Update from the Institute for the Study of War
Russian sources reported on July 15 that the Russian military command dismissed 106th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division Commander Major General Vladimir Seliverstov.[
Russian sources stated that the reason for Seliverstov’s dismissal is currently unknown but speculated that it could be associated with Seliverstov’s reputation for speaking up on behalf of his soldiers.

Seliverstov’s dismissal may be a part of an ongoing purge of insubordinate commanders by the Russian military command and may suggest that the corrosion of the Russian chain of command in Ukraine is accelerating
The Russian military command recently dismissed 58th Combined Arms Army (Southern Military District) Commander Major General Ivan Popov after he reportedly attempted to bypass Chief of the Russian General Staff and overall theater commander Army General Valery Gerasimov and bring his complaints about the situation in western Zaporizhia Oblast directly to Putin.

The Russian military leadership is likely attempting to dissuade commanders from emulating recent cases of insubordination by punishing those involved in leaking Popov’s message of complaints.
Shoigu is also likely attempting to mitigate the aftermath of Popov’s leaked audio recording within the Russian government and punish Russian State Duma Deputy and former Deputy Commander of the Southern Military District (SMD) Lieutenant General Andrei Gurulev for the leak.
Growing insubordination will likely exacerbate existing factional divides within the Russian military and the wider Russian security sphere.
A Russian source claimed that Dyumin unsuccessfully attempted to intercede to prevent Seliverstov’s dismissal in a trip to Moscow on July 14.
Polyakov’s arrest suggests that different factions within the Kremlin and Russian security entities are exploiting the Russian information space and secret information to advance their political and financial objectives against the backdrop of Russia’s war in Ukraine.

If Polyakov’s affiliation with numerous insider Telegram channels is true, then it is evident that Russian officials see the Russian information space as an important source of authority that allows them to promote their interests and discredit their opponents in the eyes of their constituencies.
Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on June 15 and reportedly made limited gains.

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces made limited gains south of Bakhmut near Andriivka (10km south of Bakhmut) and crossed the Siverskyi Donetsk Canal in the area.

Key Takeaways:
Russian sources reported on July 15 that the Russian military command dismissed 106th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division Commander Major General Vladimir Seliverstov.
Seliverstov’s dismissal may be a part of an ongoing purge of insubordinate commanders by the Russian military command and may suggest that the corrosion of the Russian chain of command in Ukraine is accelerating.
The Russian military leadership is likely attempting to dissuade commanders from emulating recent cases of insubordination by punishing those involved in leaking Popov’s message of complaints.
Growing insubordination will likely exacerbate existing factional divides within the Russian military and the wider Russian security sphere.
Factions within the Russian security forces and the Kremlin appear to be fighting for control over the Russian insider information space.
Polyakov’s arrest suggests that different factions within the Kremlin and Russian security entities are exploiting the Russian information space and secret information to advance their political and financial objectives against the backdrop of Russia’s war in Ukraine.
Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on June 15 and reportedly made limited gains.
The New York Times (NYT) reported that the Ukrainian military has adjusted its strategy to minimize Ukrainian casualties while continuing to attrit Russian forces, supporting ISW’s previous assessments.
The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced that it developed a plan for Wagner Group personnel to train Belarusian forces as Ukrainian, Russian, and Belarusian sources continue to report that Wagner forces are moving to Belarus.
Russian authorities likely continue to forcibly integrate Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) dioceses into the Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) as part of a wider religious persecution campaign in occupied Ukraine.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations and made limited territorial gains near Svatove.
Ukrainian forces reportedly made limited territorial gains on Bakhmut’s southern flank, while Russian sources claimed that Russian forces made limited advances on Bakhmut’s northern and southern flanks.
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations on the Donetsk City-Avdiivka line but did not make any territorial gains.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations along the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border and reportedly made limited gains.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations and reportedly made limited advances in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced the completion of Russia’s spring 2023 conscription cycle on July 15.
The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that the Kremlin launched a program to recruit young adults in Russia for service in occupation administrations in Ukraine.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-updates

F-16's and other european jets in a few months Ukraine will get them.

Ukraine war latest: Putin control hit as attack sends 'shockwaves' across Russia
A couple has been killed and their daughter injured after explosions were reported on the bridge linking Crimea and Russia. Ukraine attacked the bridge overnight using unmanned drones on the water surface, Russia's Anti-Terrorist Committee claims.

This is a severe blow for Putin he must react relentless.

[/b]Update from The Institute for the Study of War.
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JULY 17, 2023
Jul 17, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF










Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 17, 2023

Grace Mappes, Karolina Hird, Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, and Frederick W. Kagan

July 17, 2023, 8:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 2:30pm ET on July 17. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 18 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.


[b]The July 17 attack on the Kerch Strait Bridge will likely have continuing ramifications on Russian logistics in southern Ukraine. [/b
Russian authorities accused Ukrainian special services of conducting an unmanned surface vehicle strike against the Kerch Strait Bridge between Russia and occupied Crimea on the morning of July 17.[1] Footage of the aftermath shows that one Kerch Strait Bridge road span had collapsed and another span suffered damage but remains intact.[2] The Russian Ministry of Transport claimed that the strikes did not damage the rail bridge or supports of the road bridge, and rail traffic across the Kerch Strait Bridge resumed several hours after the strike.[3] Russian occupation authorities rerouted heavy civilian traffic from occupied Crimea to Russia through occupied southern Ukraine, and Russian sources reported extensive traffic jams in Crimea’s Dzhankoy Raion and occupied Kherson Oblast towards Melitopol.[
[b]The Russian government’s continued failure to put Russian society on a war-time footing will have significant impacts on Russian logistics as traffic from Russian tourism to occupied Crimea jams Russian logistics to southern Ukraine in the midst of the ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive in the south.
The Kerch Strait Bridge is along one of two ground lines of communication (GLOCs) supporting Russia’s southern force grouping, with the other route passing through occupied Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts.
Russian logistics to southern Ukraine will likely suffer in the short and medium-term, likely exacerbating recent and significant complaints about inadequate Russian supplies in southern Ukraine.

Former Russian 58th Combined Arms Army (Southern Military District) Commander Major General Ivan Popov’s recent complaints about the Russian military command’s mistreatment of Russian forces defending against the Ukrainian counteroffensive in southern Ukraine sparked great ire in the Russian information space.
Russian and occupation authorities appear to be consumed with mitigating the consequences of the attack rather than leveraging the incident to levy heavy informational attacks with rhetorical inflections.
Russian President Vladimir Putin held a meeting instructing Russian Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin to lead a headquarters and develop solutions to mitigate traffic issues across the bridge.
The Russian milblogger response to the Kerch Strait Bridge attack largely criticized Russian authorities for failing to secure the bridge.
Some milbloggers, including former Russian officer and critical pro-war nationalist Igor Girkin, offered the critique that Russian authorities have focused too heavily on road security and not enough on maritime security, thereby allowing the most recent attack on the bridge to occur.[
The Wagner Group continues to prepare to establish a permanent presence in Belarus.
Independent Belarusian monitoring group “The Hajun Project” reported on July 17 that another Wagner vehicle convoy traveled towards the Tsel village tent camp near Asipovichy, Mogilev Oblast, Belarus, and that two other Wagner columns had traveled along this same route between July 11 and July 17.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front over the backdrop of increased Russian offensive operations along the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border on July 17.
Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces have launched active offensive operations and advanced in the Kupyansk area (between northeastern Kharkiv Oblast and northwestern Luhansk Oblast) in the past several days.

Key Takeaways:

The July 17 attack on the Kerch Strait Bridge will likely have significant and sustained impacts on Russian logistics as traffic from tourism to occupied Crimea jams Russian logistics to southern Ukraine in the midst of the ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive in the south.
Russian and occupation authorities appear to be consumed with mitigating the consequences of the attack rather than leveraging the incident to levy heavy informational attacks with rhetorical inflections.
The Russian milblogger response to the Kerch Strait Bridge attack largely criticized Russian authorities for failing to secure the bridge.
The Wagner Group continues to prepare to establish a permanent presence in Belarus.
Russia continues efforts to reorganize its domestic security apparatus in the wake of the Wagner Group’s armed rebellion.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front over the backdrop of increased Russian offensive operations along the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border on July 17.
Russian forces conducted active offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line and have likely made marginal tactical gains in this direction.
Russian forces continued limited ground attacks southwest and south of Kreminna, around Bakhmut, and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in the Bakhmut area and advanced near the Donetsk-Zaporizhia administrative border.
Russian forces conducted limited counterattacks in western Donetsk Oblast.
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued unsuccessful ground attacks in the Orikhiv area in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported that Russian authorities have removed at least eight Russian military commanders without reappointing them to new positions since the start of the war, which is largely consistent with ISW’s previous assessments.
Russian occupation authorities continue to artificially increase the number of Russian citizens in occupied Ukraine ahead of the September regional elections.

Follow the link to observe terrain maps
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-17-2023

Ukraine will never give up Odesa !

Odesa port infrastructure damaged in Russian air strikes

Russia launched missile and drone strikes on southern and eastern Ukraine overnight that damaged infrastructure in the Black Sea port of Odesa, Ukrainian officials said on Tuesday.

The attack on Odesa, one of Ukraine's main ports for exporting grain, followed a pledge of retaliation by Russia after a blast on a bridge linking Russia to the Crimean Peninsula on Monday that Moscow blamed on Ukraine.

Where in the world is Yevgeny Prigozhin.
In a video segment appearing online Wednesday from a Wagner related source shows the Wagner Commander welcoming Wagner troops to their training camp in Belarus.
"The decision is made to stay here in Belarus for some time. During this this time, I'm sure we will make the Belarusian Army the second army in the world and we will stand up for them if necessary." He is heard shouting to the cheers of the Wagner mercenaries, promising a new beginning not in Ukraine but in Africa.

Poland moves troops to border with Belarus over Wagner's presence

Poland moves military troops from the west to the east of the country. Poland sees a possible threat due to the presence of Wagner's mercenary army on the border with Belarus. The country speaks of a provocation. It is still unclear how many troops are involved.

Wagner's mercenaries have begun exercises on the Polish border and will move with the army there, the Belarusian defense ministry said. They would be only a few miles from the border, training close to NATO territory.

Last week, more than 2,000 Wagner mercenaries arrived in Belarus. In all, some 10,000 mercenaries should be given refuge in Belarus, a Wagner commander said.

It was unclear for a long time whether the mercenaries would leave for Belarus in the wake of their leader Prigozhin, who had already left Russia. After the mutiny of the Wagner boss, it was agreed with President Putin that he will move to Belarus, where ally Lukashenko has been in power for 30 years.

For a while it was a mystery where Prigozhin was and whether he was actually in Belarus. The day before yesterday, a video surfaced in which the leader can be heard addressing his troops, but in which he is difficult to see.

In the video, the leader can be heard welcoming his mercenaries to the country and declaring that they will no longer be part of the war in Ukraine. He also says he wants to make the Belarusian army the second strongest in the world and to defend the country if it were attacked.

'MH17 perpetrator Igor Girkin arrested by Russian services'
Modified: 14 min ago 30 minutes ago
abroad _

MOSCOW - Igor Girkin has been arrested by the Russian authorities, according to his wife. This is confirmed by his lawyer. It is still unclear why he would be detained. Girkin, also known as Igor Strelkov, was involved in the 2014 annexation of Crimea, the subsequent uprising in eastern Ukraine and the downing of flight MH17. Lately he has been critical of the regime of Russian President Vladimir Putin.
The former intelligence officer is wanted internationally for involvement in the downing of MH17. He was sentenced to life in prison in November for the murder of 298 people on the plane. The judge considered him ultimately responsible as the highest-ranking soldier there.

Girkin was arrested by Russian authorities on charges of extremism.

Unlike the liberal and pro-democracy opposition to Vladimir Putin and independent journalists who are persecuted for criticizing the war in Ukraine or Putin, ultra-nationalists and pro-war activists like Girkin are considered untouchable because they are protected by high-ranking members of the military and intelligence services.

After large Ukrainian conteroffensives in September 2022, he predicted a complete defeat for Russian troops in Ukraine.[142] He said that full mobilization in Russia was the "last chance" for victory.[143] On 12 September, he called the Russian attacks on Ukrainian power plants "very useful".[144] He also said that Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu should be executed by firing squad and called for the use of tactical nuclear weapons in order "to drive 20 million refugees to Europe."[137]

Putin knows he has been lied to by many people he wants to get out of this mess.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 21, 2023

Click here to read the full report.

Kateryna Stepanenko, Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, George Barros, Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, and Frederick W. Kagan

July 21, 2023, 8:00pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 12:00pm ET on July 21. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 22 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.


The arrest of former Russian officer and ardent ultranationalist Igor Girkin (Strelkov) on July 21 may be the public manifestation of a shifting balance of power among Kremlin factions, possibly to the detriment of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), in which Girkin had served. The Russian Investigative Committee arrested Girkin on July 21, and Girkin will be held until September 18 on extremism changes.
Girkin’s arrest follows other criminal charges against ultranationalists with past ties to Russian security services and indicates that unknown Russian officials may be targeting prominent ultranationalists who routinely reveal insider information about the Kremlin. ISW has consistently assessed that Girkin likely has the backing of an unknown silovik – possibly within the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) – who promoted their interests by using Girkin as a conduit to reveal select information to Russia’s online ultranationalist community.
Wagner’s rebellion likely shifted the balance of power in the Kremlin, potentially depriving some patrons – including Girkin’s patron – of Putin’s favor and, therefore, of some of their power.
Girkin claimed on July 12 that Prigozhin’s rebellion shifted the balance of power within the Kremlin in favor of the group that reportedly includes Kiriyenko.
Russian forces conducted missile and drone strikes against southern Ukraine for a fourth night on July 21 following Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces shot down two of three Kaliber missiles, three of four Iskander missiles, and 13 of 19 Shahed UAVs launched at areas in southern Ukraine and that Russian forces also launched one Kh-22, one S-300 surface-to-air, and six Onyx missiles.
The Kremlin appears to be attempting to soften the Russian Ministry of Defense's July 19 announcement about viewing civilian ships in the Black Sea as legitimate military targets. Russian Deputy Foreign Ministry Sergei Vershinin stated on July 21 that the Russian MoD’s July 19 announcement that the Russian military will consider all ships en route to Ukrainian ports as potential military cargo vessels meant that Russian forces will inspect the ships.Russia is maneuvering to retain the option of modifying the current agreement rather than negotiating an entirely new one as it seeks to extract extensive concessions from the West.
Vershinin also argued that the July 22, 2022 memorandum underpinning the Black Sea Grain Initiative remains valid because neither Russia nor the United Nations (UN) gave notification about the termination of the memorandum that the UN, Turkey, Russia, and Ukraine signed.
Putin continued efforts to sow intra-NATO and Ukrainian-NATO divisions likely aimed at supporting the Kremlin’s Black Sea Grain Initiative effort and undermining long-term Western support for Ukraine. Putin’s rhetoric heavily drew upon historical parallels meant to evoke fear and distrust between European countries and the United States as well as between Ukraine and Poland. Putin’s rhetoric is consistent with prior rhetoric from Russian senior officials meant to sow distrust between Ukraine and its allies, undermine ongoing Western security assistance to Ukraine, and encourage Western states to push Ukraine prematurely into negotiations with Russia.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 21 and made gains in some areas. Geolocated footage published on July 21 indicates that Ukrainian forces made gains northeast of Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut) and closer to Pryyutne (12km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).
Pro-Wagner Group sources continue to express loyalty to Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin as the future of the Wagner Group and Prigozhin’s role in the organization remains unclear. A Wagner-affiliated milblogger released an interview with an alleged unnamed Wagner platoon commander on July 21. The platoon commander claimed that none of the Wagner personnel he knows signed contracts with the Russian MoD except for fighters whom Wagner fired for drunkenness and looting and a Wagner commander with the surname Troshev (callsign “Seda”).
French Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Emmanuel Bonne was likely referring to dual-use technology and non-lethal aid when speaking about Chinese supplied equipment to Russia on July 21. Bonn told a CNN journalist at the Aspen Security Forum on July 21 that China is supplying “massively [sic] military capabilities to Russia.”[44] CNN later quoted unspecified French officials as clarifying Bonne’s intent to speak of non-lethal aid, however.
A Russian milblogger affiliated with the Russian Airborne Forces claimed that recent speculations about the dismissal of 7th Guards Mountain VDV Division Commander Major General Alexander Kornev are false. The milblogger amplified footage of alleged personnel of the 7th VDV division denying Kornev’s dismissal as well as speculations that Russian authorities may intend to arrest VDV commander Mikhail Teplinsky.[47] ISW cannot confirm Kornev’s dismissal.


Key Takeaways:



The arrest of former Russian officer and ardent ultranationalist Igor Girkin (Strelkov) on July 21 may be the public manifestation of a shifting balance of power among Kremlin factions, possibly to the detriment of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), in which Girkin had served.
Russian insider sources claimed that Girkin’s arrest is part of the Russian Presidential Administration’s efforts to crack down on select high-profile Russian ultranationalists following Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s armed rebellion on June 24.
Girkin’s arrest follows other criminal charges against ultranationalists with past ties to Russian security services and indicates that unknown Russian officials may be targeting prominent ultranationalists who routinely reveal insider information about the Kremlin.
Wagner’s rebellion likely shifted the balance of power in the Kremlin, potentially depriving some patrons – including Girkin’s patron – of Putin’s favor and, therefore, of some of their power.
Russian forces conducted missile and drone strikes against southern Ukraine for a fourth night on July 21 following Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative.
The Kremlin appears to be attempting to soften the Russian Ministry of Defense's July 19 announcement about viewing civilian ships in the Black Sea as legitimate military targets.
Russia is maneuvering to retain the option of modifying the current agreement rather than negotiating an entirely new one as it seeks to extract extensive concessions from the West.
Russian President Vladimir Putin continued efforts to sow intra-NATO and Ukrainian-NATO divisions likely aimed at supporting the Kremlin’s Black Sea Grain Initiative effort and undermining long-term Western support for Ukraine.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 21 and made gains in some areas.
Pro-Wagner Group sources continue to express loyalty to Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin as the future of the Wagner Group and Prigozhin’s role in the organization remains unclear.
French Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Emmanuel Bonne was likely referring to dual-use technology and non-lethal aid when speaking about Chinese supplied equipment to Russia on July 21.
A Russian milblogger affiliated with the Russian Airborne Forces claimed that recent speculations about the dismissal of 7th Guards Mountain VDV Division Commander Major General Alexander Kornev are false.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Kupyansk, Kreminna, Bakhmut areas, and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line and reportedly advanced in the Kupyansk and Kreminna areas.
Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in the Bakhmut area, and along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna and Avdiivka Donetsk City lines, and advanced in the Bakhmut area.
Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast, the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast area, and south of Orikhiv, and reportedly advanced south of Orikhiv.
Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast area and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and made gains in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast area.
Russian officials announced that they will amend a Russian State Duma bill originally aimed at incrementally raising the conscription age so that there is an immediate increase of the upper age limit for the spring 2024 conscription cycle.
Russian occupation authorities continue to relocate Ukrainian children in occupied Ukraine to Russia.
A Wagner-linked source reported that Wagner temporarily relocated its headquarters from Molkino, Krasnodar Krai, to Belarus and that Wagner’s work to transfer combat experience to the Belarusian military is in full swing.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-updates

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JULY 23, 2023
Jul 23, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 23, 2023

George Barros, Nicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, Riley Bailey, Thomas Bergeron, and Frederick W. Kagan

July 23, 2023, 7:15pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 12:30pm ET on July 23. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 24 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian President Vladimir Putin revealed his continuing concern over the potential threats that the Wagner Group and Yevgeny Prigozhin may pose to him through symbolism and posturing during a meeting with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko in St. Petersburg, Russia. Putin made several significant symbolic gestures during his July 23 meeting with Lukashenko, suggesting that Putin sought to project power and confidence in his own supremacy over the Prigozhin-aligned St. Petersburg-based faction. Putin took Lukashenko to visit Kronstadt in St. Petersburg – the historically significant island fortress where Russian soldiers and sailors conducted a famous unsuccessful anti-Bolshevik insurrection in early 1921 that the Soviet government ultimately suppressed.

Lukashenko told Putin that the Wagner Group in Belarus will remain in central Belarus likely subtly reminding Putin of the threat the Wagner military organization still poses to him and underlining Lukashenko’s control over that power. Lukashenko’s statements were likely meant to make Putin reflect on the uncomfortable (for Putin) fact that Wagner’s new garrison in Belarus puts its forces half as far from Moscow as Wagner’s previous base in southern Russia. The Wagner Group’s previous base in Krasnodar Krai was about 1,370 km from Moscow, whereas its new base in Belarus is about 720 km along an excellent military highway.

Putin and Lukashenko also amplified information operations targeting the West. The leaders amplified their false claims that Ukraine’s counteroffensive has failed.[6] Senior Western and Ukrainian leaders--and ISW--continue to assess that it is too early to evaluate Ukraine’s counteroffensive since Ukraine still has significant uncommitted prepared forces and retains the ability to launch decisive operations at times and places of its choosing.

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken told CNN on July 23 that Ukrainian forces have liberated approximately 50 percent of the territory that Russian forces captured since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. This figure is largely consistent with ISW’s current assessment of control of terrain. Analysts can employ several methods to calculate control of terrain with varying results depending on the cartographical projection used and other factors. An estimate using ISW’s control of terrain data and the Mercator projection indicates that Ukrainian forces liberated about 53 percent of the land that Russian forces captured since February 2022. Estimates made using different data sources, measurement methods, or projections will generate different numbers. Factors, such as higher confidence about unconfirmed Russian claimed territorial gains, can impact such estimations as well. ISW appreciates and closely studies government officials’ statements about control of terrain geometry to cross-reference, confirm, and where necessary correct assessments.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front line and advanced on July 23. Geolocated footage published on July 22 shows that Ukrainian forces made some advances in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area near Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka), and some Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces also advanced near Pryyutne (14km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).

Russian forces conducted another series of missile strikes against port infrastructure and the city center in Odesa City overnight on July 22 to 23, severely damaging civilian areas. General Staff reported that Russian forces launched 19 missiles, including five Onyx, five Iskander-K, four Kalibr, two Kh-22, and two Iskander-M missiles, and that Ukrainian forces shot down four Kalibr and five Iskander-K missiles.

Further speculation about former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin’s arrest and the public posturing of Girkin’s affiliates suggests that a limited section of the pro-war community may have been contemplating political action in opposition to the Kremlin. Angry Patriots Club member and leader of the “Civil Solidarity” movement Georgy Fedorov claimed on July 22 that the Club developed a strategy and specific action plan for a campaign to defend Girkin and will be reaching out to grassroots supporters for help.

Angry Patriots members likely view Girkin’s arrest as an existential threat to the segment of the ultranationalist community he represents and will likely intensify their campaign to cast Girkin as an opposition figure. Angry Patriots Club member Yevgeny Mikhailov continued to criticize the Kremlin, calling Girkin’s arrest a ”gross mistake” and highlighting the double standards that Russian authorities use for prominent Russian officials who have criticized Russian forces’ conduct in the war in Ukraine.

The Kremlin may be attempting to censor an isolated segment of the Russian ultranationalist community that is consistently vocally hostile to the Kremlin. Russian news outlet Kommersant reported on July 21 that Russian law enforcement is investigating Angry Patriots Club Chair Pavel Gubarev for extremism because of his Telegram posts.

The head of one of the largest suppliers of surveillance equipment to Russian special services died on July 22. Russian law enforcement found “IKS Holding” Head Anton Cherepennikov dead in his office on July 22 and later claimed that Cherepennikov suffocated during a xenon gas therapy session.


Key Takeaways:

Russian President Vladimir Putin revealed his continuing concern over the potential threats that the Wagner Group and Yevgeny Prigozhin may pose to him through symbolism and posturing during a meeting with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko in St. Petersburg, Russia.
Lukashenko told Putin that the Wagner Group in Belarus will remain in central Belarus likely subtly reminding Putin of the threat the Wagner military organization still poses to him and underlining Lukashenko’s control over that power.
Putin and Lukashenko also amplified information operations targeting the West.
US Secretary of State Antony Blinken told CNN on July 23 that Ukrainian forces have liberated approximately 50 percent of the territory that Russian forces captured since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front line and advanced on July 23.
Russian forces conducted another series of missile strikes against port infrastructure and the city center in Odesa City overnight on July 22 to 23, severely damaging civilian areas.
Further speculation about former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin’s arrest and the public posturing of Girkin’s affiliates suggests that a limited section of the pro-war community may have been contemplating political action in opposition to the Kremlin.
Angry Patriots members likely view Girkin’s arrest as an existential threat to the segment of the ultranationalist community he represents and will likely intensify their campaign to cast Girkin as an opposition figure.
The Kremlin may be attempting to censor an isolated segment of the Russian ultranationalist community that is consistently vocally hostile to the Kremlin.
The head of one of the largest suppliers of surveillance equipment to Russian special services died on July 22.
Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line and reportedly made tactically significant gains.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line and in the Bakhmut area, and reportedly made gains near Bakhmut.
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut and Avdiivka-Donetsk City areas but did not advance.
Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia oblasts border area and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced.
Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia oblasts border area.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to recruit prisoners to fight in Ukraine.
Russian occupation authorities are bringing foreign citizens to occupied Ukraine to artificially alter demographics.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-updates

Update from the Institute for the Study of War.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 25, 2023

Click here to read the full report

Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Riley Bailey, Karolina Hird, Christina Harward, and Frederick W. Kagan

July 25, 2023, 7:20pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 12:30pm ET on July 25. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 26 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian President Vladimir Putin continued to manifest concern over potential threats that the Wagner Group and its financier Yevgeny Prigozhin may pose during an impromptu two-day extension of Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko’s visit to St. Petersburg. BBC’s Russian Service reported on July 25 that Putin told Lukashenko at the beginning of their July 23 meeting that Putin was ready to adjust his schedule to prolong Lukashenko’s visit and “discuss important topics in more detail.”[1] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov reported on July 25 that Putin and Lukashenko intended to “’synchronize watches’ and exchange views” but not sign any agreements during their prolonged meeting.[2] Peskov also reported that Putin and Lukashenko discussed the Wagner Group, the Union State, and external threats on the borders of Russia and Belarus.[3] Putin’s decision to prolong his meeting with Lukashenko likely shows Putin’s continued concerns about Wagner, which it appears that Lukashenko did not allay.

Lukashenko likely seeks to leverage his power over the Wagner Group to gain concessions from Putin. A Russian insider source claimed that the Wagner Group was the most important topic during the Putin-Lukashenko meeting, and that Lukashenko sought more economic assistance to Belarus through Union State programs.[4] The insider source also claimed that Putin wanted Belarus to be more involved in the war in Ukraine and rejected Lukashenko’s compromise offer to have Belarusian forces conduct a show of force on Belarus’ border with Ukraine.[5] Lukashenko was likely trying to leverage Putin’s concern over the Wagner Group throughout the entire visit to Russia to gain favorable conditions in Belarusian-Russian relations while deflecting Putin’s demands for closer integration into the Union State and support for Russia’s war in Ukraine.

Russian leadership is attempting to mitigate the security vacuum left by the Wagner Group’s departure by creating formalized but decentralized military “enterprises” on the basis of federal subjects (regions). The Russian State Duma adopted the second and third readings of amendments to the federal law regulating the circulation of weapons in constituent entities of the Russian Federation on July 25 that will allow heads of Russian federal subjects to create specialized state unitary enterprises.[6] Russian opposition media noted that certain intricacies in the amendments allow regional heads to create regionally based militarized state enterprises that are analogous to private military companies (PMCs) during a period of mobilization under martial law.[7] The amendments notably require regional and local budgets to finance the special enterprises, which will be equipped with small arms by the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and will assist the Russian State Security Service (FSB), Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and other military authorities in ensuring public order and border security.[8] The amendments would allow Russian President Vladimir Putin to create the enterprises on a temporary basis and later abolish them, after which these enterprises would have to transfer all small arms and other weapons back to the Russian MoD within a month.The Kremlin is likely trying to balance two competing security requirements—the need for combat capable formations that can fulfill roles left by the Wagner Group following their armed rebellion and relocation to Belarus and the desire not to recreate the systemic threats to the Russian state that Wagner’s independence posed. The creation of formal militarized state enterprises that will fulfill border security and domestic law enforcement tasks is likely intended in part to remedy the gap left by Wagner. However, the fact that these enterprises are so heavily decentralized and will operate under the auspices of internal security organs on the basis and expense of regional and local governments suggests that the Russian military leadership is very alive to the risk of recreating a powerful Wagner analogue and is therefore trying to limit the scale and power each individual enterprise can obtain. These state enterprises also appear to be a renewed iteration of the failed volunteer battalion model that Russian regions employed throughout the summer of 2022, but these enterprises will operate under formalized and consolidated domestic security organs such as the FSB, likely to mitigate many of the weaknesses in the old volunteer battalion system.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and advanced on July 25. Geolocated footage published on July 25 shows that Ukrainian forces have made tactically significant gains south of Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).[11] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in the Bakhmut, Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast), and Berdyansk (Zaporizhia-Donetsk Oblast border area) directions.[12] Ukrainian sources reported that Ukrainian forces advanced up to 750 meters in the direction of Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka), and Russian sources claimed Ukrainian forces made marginal advances west of Orikhiv.[13] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Russian forces are dying at a rate eight times higher than Ukrainian forces in the Bakhmut area and 5.3 times higher in the Berdyansk and Melitopol directions.[14] ISW has previously assessed that Ukrainian counteroffensive operations aim to create an asymmetrical attrition gradient that conserves Ukrainian manpower at the cost of a slower rate of territorial gains, while gradually wearing down Russian manpower and equipment.

Russian forces conducted another series of Shahed drone strikes on rear areas of Ukraine overnight on July 24-25. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reported on July 25 that Ukrainian forces recorded the launch of about 10 Shahed drones, five of which Ukrainian forces destroyed.[16] Ukrainian military sources reported drones over Kyiv City and Cherkasy, Sumy, Poltava, and Zhytomyr oblasts.[17] The Kyiv City Military Administration noted that this was the sixth drone strike on the capital city in July alone.[18] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources claimed that the strikes targeted Ukrainian concentration areas, Western-provided military equipment and other military infrastructure, but Ukrainian sources noted that many of the drones struck open fields and empty hangars.

The Angry Patriots Club continues efforts to cast former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin (Strelkov) as an opposition figure and may be attempting to appeal to Russian President Vladimir Putin through rhetoric about the illegality of Girkin’s arrest. The Angry Patriots Club, known in the Russian information space for its virulent pro-war, ultranationalist rhetoric and willingness to criticize the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), the Kremlin, and even Putin himself, has unexpectedly postured itself as an organization concerned about the rule of law following Girkin’s arrest.[20] The organization is attempting to cast Girkin as an opposition figure in Russian politics by arguing that his arrest is unlawful and by launching the social media campaign “#FreedomtoStrelkov.”[21] The Angry Patriots Club may be employing rhetoric about the illegality of Girkin’s arrest as an appeal to Putin, who has historically (and ironically) portrayed himself as a defender of Russian democracy and has seemingly been hesitant to abandon the veil of legitimacy that Russia’s democratic institutions provide his authoritarian and corrupt rule.[22] The Angry Patriots Club may believe that the veneer of legality in Russia is personally important to Putin and that Putin might feel compelled to intervene if he believes Girkin’s arrest and detention is illegal. It is a further irony that Girkin’s statements seem straightforwardly to violate Russia’s repressive laws prohibiting criticism of the war and its leaders.[23] Russian opposition figures Alexei Navalny and Mikhail Khodorkovsky amplified the Angry Patriots Club’s framing of Girkin as a political prisoner and his arrest as illegal, though it is unclear how Navalny and Khodorkovsky intend for their support to affect Girkin’s detention and eventual sentencing.

Putin and the Kremlin reportedly failed to respond promptly to the Wagner Group’s June 24 rebellion, leaving local Russian officials to make decisions concerning the group’s drive on Moscow. The Washington Post reported on July 25 that Ukrainian and European security officials stated that Putin did not issue orders for most of June 24 despite warnings from Russian security services about the likelihood of the rebellion at least two or three days beforehand.[25] Russian security services reportedly increased security at several strategic locations, including the Kremlin, in the days before the rebellion but took no other actions.[26] Regional Russian officials reportedly had to decide how to respond to the rebellion, and regional military and security officials were reportedly the ones that decided not to try to stop Wagner convoys by force.[27] The Kremlin’s and Putin’s alleged lack of response indicates that the Russian security apparatus had likely not prepared for a direct challenge to the Russian military leadership and likely did not have the capacity to quickly bring the rebellion to an end. The Kremlin is likely aware that its paralysis highlighted a degree of regime instability and appears to be consolidating Russia’s internal security apparatus in the Rosgvardia (Russian National Guard) to prepare for further internal threats and to signal resolve.[28] Putin’s failure to act quickly also suggests that he is uncertain about his ability to rally the Russian elite around him and may indicate how factional internal Kremlin politics have become. A senior NATO official reportedly stated that unspecified senior Russian political figures in Moscow appeared ready to rally behind Prigozhin in the event that Wagner’s rebellion succeeded.[29] The Kremlin is likely trying to identify Russian elites who may have been prepared to side with Prigozhin and likely views regional officials’ decisions not to stop Wagner's advance as an indicator of disloyalty. Tula Oblast Governor and former head of Russia’s Special Operations Forces Alexei Dyumin has likely drawn further suspicion due to his previous affiliations with Prigozhin and his role in the negotiations that ended the rebellion.


Key Takeaways:

Russian President Vladimir Putin continued to manifest concern over potential threats that the Wagner Group and its financier Yevgeny Prigozhin may pose during an impromptu two-day extension of Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko’s visit to St. Petersburg. Lukashenko likely seeks to leverage his power over the Wagner Group to gain concessions from Putin.
Russian leadership is attempting to mitigate the security vacuum left by the Wagner Group’s departure by creating formalized but decentralized military “enterprises” on the basis of federal subjects (regions).
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and advanced on July 25.
Russian forces conducted another series of Shahed drone strikes on rear areas of Ukraine overnight on July 24-25.
The Angry Patriots Club continues efforts to cast former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin (Strelkov) as an opposition figure and may be attempting to appeal to Russian President Vladimir Putin through rhetoric about the illegality of Girkin’s arrest.
Putin and the Kremlin reportedly failed to respond promptly to the Wagner Group’s June 24 rebellion, leaving local Russian officials to make decisions concerning the group’s drive on Moscow.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Svatove, Kreminna, the Bakhmut area, the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area, and the Zaporizhia-Donetsk Oblast border area and made claimed advances near Svatove, Kreminna, and Bakhmut.
Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations near Kreminna, the Bakhmut area, the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area, along the administrative border between Zaporizhia and Donetsk oblasts, and western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in the Bakhmut area, in some areas along the administrative border between Zaporizhia and Donetsk oblasts, and west of Orikhiv.
US intelligence officials warned on July 25 that Russia’s drone supply will dramatically increase as a result of continued bilateral Russo-Iranian cooperation.
Russian officials continue efforts to deconflict legal discrepancies as part of the incorporation of occupied territories.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-updates

Update from the Russian advance in the Luhansk Oblast.
A concentration of up to 100,000 Russian troops in the Luhansk Oblast has been able to create a salient into Ukrainian territory capturing three Ukrainian villages and penetrating eight kilometers up to the Kharkiv Oblast border.

Ukraine has thousands of new soldiers now in the south trained by the best in the West, Russians still have the numbers but, without Wagner, those soldiers are no match.

Russia downs Ukrainian drone in Moscow region, says defence ministry

https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20230728-%F0%9F%94%B4-live-russia-downs-ukrainian-drone-in-moscow-region-says-defence-ministry

I wonder how long it will be until Moscow is reporting downing F-16s in the Moscow region??

Update from the Institute for the Study of War.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 27, 2023

Click here to read the full report.

Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, and Frederick W. Kagan

July 27, 2023, 7:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 1pm ET on July 27. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 28 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 27 and made gains in some areas, although Ukrainian forces appear not to have continued significant mechanized assaults south of Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky posted footage on July 27 showing that Ukrainian forces liberated Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) in western Donetsk Oblast following heavy fighting in the area.[1] Geolocated footage published on July 26 indicates that Ukrainian forces also made marginal advances north of Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).[2] Geolocated footage published on July 26 suggests that Ukrainian forces made additional advances east of Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv) during offensive operations on July 26.[3] Ukrainian Director of the Department of Application Planning at the Main Command of the National Guard Mykola Urshalovych stated on July 27 that Ukrainian forces achieved tactical victories in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction.[4] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued assaults at a lower tempo and with far less manpower near Robotyne on July 27 after Ukrainian forces launched an intense mechanized frontal assault that broke through Russian defensive positions northeast of the settlement on July 26.[5] Geolocated footage published on July 27 suggests that Ukrainian forces may be operating in areas well forward of where ISW assesses Ukrainian advances to be as a result of ISW’s intentionally conservative assessments about control of terrain (covered in more detail in Southern Axis text).[6]

The Kremlin and the wider Russian information space are intensifying efforts to portray the Ukrainian counteroffensive as a failed effort. Russian President Vladimir Putin stated to a reporter on July 27 that in recent days Russian forces destroyed 39 armored vehicles out of 50 that Ukrainian forces committed to intensified assaults in the Zaporizhia direction.[7] Putin claimed that Russian forces also killed 60 percent of the Ukrainian personnel that conducted these assaults as well as 40 percent of Ukrainian combat aviation pilots in the area.[8] Putin has previously claimed that Russian forces have destroyed an implausible amount of Ukrainian equipment during Ukrainian counteroffensive operations, although his figures concerning Ukrainian assaults in recent days indicate an inflection in his exaggeration of likely Ukrainian losses.[9] Russian milbloggers similarly claimed that Russian forces destroyed dozens of Ukrainian armored vehicles and celebrated the alleged losses as proof that the Ukrainian counteroffensive is stalling.[10] The Kremlin’s and the Russian information space’s framing of the Ukrainian counteroffensive notably violates a reported Kremlin manual instructing Russian media not to downplay the potential for successful Ukrainian counteroffensive operations.[11] The intensifying portrayal of the Ukrainian counteroffensive as a failed effort suggests that the Kremlin’s policy on the coverage of the war is to bolster efforts to promote itself as an effective manager of the war effort.

Russian President Vladimir Putin used the Russia–Africa Economic and Humanitarian Forum in St. Petersburg on July 27 to continue efforts to posture Russia as a more attractive ally to African partner states than the collective West. Putin met with several African leaders at the forum, including Ugandan President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, President of Zimbabwe Emmerson Dambuzo Mnangagwa, President of the Republic of Burundi Evariste Ndayishimiye, President of Mozambique Filipe Jacinto Nyusi, and President of Comoros Azali Assoumani.[16] During his speech at the plenary session of the forum, Putin emphasized the importance of expanding Russian–African cooperation and Russia’s investment in the development of African nations, notably accusing Ukraine and the West of interfering with Russia’s supply of grain and fertilizers to the African continent and claiming that Russia will provide between 25 and 50 thousand tons of grain free of charge to Burkina Faso, Zimbabwe, Mali, Somali, Central African Republic, and Eritrea over the coming months.[17] Putin announced that Russia is helping to develop over 30 energy infrastructure projects in 16 African states and called for an expansion of cultural and social integration between Russia and the African continent, stating that Russia plans to open branches of Russian universities in Africa and increase enrollment of African students in Russian educational institutions.[18]

Beyond the typical diplomatic platitudes and promises of continued cooperation and development, Putin’s rhetoric during the Russia-Africa forum does not represent a major inflection in the Kremlin’s policy toward the African continent. Putin previously signed an article published on July 24 to posture Russia’s commitment to African development and mitigate damage done to Russia’s position in Africa and his personal reputation with African leaders.[19] Putin’s and the Russian government’s reputations likely suffered due to a number of recent factors: Russia’s recent withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative and strikes on Ukrainian port infrastructure (both of which were critical for grain exports to various African countries) and his inability to attend the upcoming BRICS summit because of the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) arrest warrant against him.

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin was also present in St. Petersburg on July 27 and took the opportunity to informally meet with an unknown number of African leaders, suggesting that the Wagner Group intends to remain a significant player in Africa. Russian milbloggers amplified photos of Prigozhin shaking hands with a Central African Republic official and the “director of Afrique media.”[20] A Russian insider source claimed that Prigozhin held private, informal meetings with representatives of an unknown number of African governments in a hotel close to the Russia–Africa Economic and Humanitarian Forum but did not attend the summit itself.[21] Prigozhin's continued efforts to meet with and message to African leaders are likely part of Wagner's efforts to maintain its profitable military and mining contracts in Africa. An unnamed Wagner commander who recently returned from CAR claimed on July 26 that Wagner is working on increasing its operations in Africa to fund its presence in Belarus.[22] Prigozhin additionally used the backdrop of the Russia-Africa summit to position Wagner as a viable anti-Western partner for post-coup Niger. Wagner-affiliated Telegram channels began circulating an audio recording reportedly of Prigozhin on July 27 wherein Prigozhin praised the Nigerien military’s removal of Nigerien President Mohamed Bazoum and lauded it as an act of “gaining independence,” while accusing Western nations of deliberately destabilizing the situation in Africa and supporting terrorist organizations.[23] Prigozhin suggested that a “thousand fighters” from Wagner would be able to restore order, presumably in post-coup Niger.[24] Several Russian milbloggers responded to Prigozhin’s purported audio recording and suggested that Niger will need “help” from Wagner similar to what Mali needed following its coup in May 2021.[25] Prigozhin is posturing Wagner as a viable security partner for Niger, which is largely consistent with ISW’s and the Critical Threats Project’s (CTP) previous assessment that Wagner is likely to maintain and even expand its presence in the African continent following its July 24 armed rebellion.

The Kremlin reportedly distributed a manual to Russian state media on framing the anniversary of the Baptism of Rus on July 28, likely as part of continued information operations and propaganda narratives to advance Russian military objectives. Russian opposition news outlet Meduza reported on July 27 that it obtained the manual but did not publish the manual itself, which reportedly directs Russian state media to frame the Baptism of Rus as “a key turning point in Russian history” and “the point of formation of statehood.”[27] The manual reportedly emphasized that a “common faith” allowed the “East Slavic tribes” to unify as “one people.”[28] The manual reportedly instructs state media to paint Russian President Vladimir Putin as the one who “brought the mission of defending the Orthodox faith back to Russia” and reportedly labels the Ukrainian government an “apostate regime” and a “satanic regime” that is trying to “destroy” Orthodoxy in Ukraine and “the spiritual ties of the fraternal peoples.”[29] These Kremlin-dictated religion-based narratives come as Russia is itself committing systematic religious repressions and persecutions throughout Ukraine, including against Orthodox Christians, in an effort to destroy Ukrainian cultural and national identity.[30] The Kremlin reportedly issued a similar manual to state media in May aimed at controlling the narratives about a potential upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive, and the distribution of these manuals demonstrates the Kremlin’s use of various information operations to spread propaganda messages and discredit Ukraine in the international arena.

Russia conducted another strike on Ukrainian port infrastructure in Odesa Oblast and rear areas of Ukraine overnight on July 26–27. Ukrainian military sources reported that Russian forces launched two Kalibr cruise missiles that damaged port infrastructure in Odesa City.[32] Ukrainian military sources also reported that Russian forces launched eight Shahed drones and that Ukrainian air defenses shot down all eight.

US President Joe Biden has reportedly ordered the US government in recent days to share evidence of Russian war crimes in Ukraine with the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the Hague. This will be the first time the US will share evidence with the ICC as part of a criminal investigation into a country that is not a part of the ICC.


Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 27 and made gains in some areas, although Ukrainian forces appear not to have continued significant mechanized assaults south of Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
A US official expressed caution about assessing that the July 26 uptick in Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast is part of the Ukrainian main effort, tempering July 26 statements to the contrary.
Russian President Vladimir Putin used the Russia–Africa Economic and Humanitarian Forum in St. Petersburg on July 27 to continue efforts to posture Russia as a more attractive ally to African partner states than the collective West.
Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin was also present in St. Petersburg on July 27 and took the opportunity to informally meet with an unknown number of African leaders, suggesting that the Wagner Group intends to remain a significant player in Africa.
Prigozhin additionally used the backdrop of the Russia-Africa summit to position Wagner as a viable anti-Western partner for post-coup Niger.
The Kremlin reportedly distributed a manual to Russian state media on framing the anniversary of the Baptism of Rus on July 28, likely as part of continued information operations and propaganda narratives to advance Russian military objectives.
Russia conducted another strike on Ukrainian port infrastructure in Odesa Oblast and rear areas of Ukraine overnight on July 26–27.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, in Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on July 27 and did not make any confirmed advances.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 27 and have advanced south of Bakhmut, in the ZaporizhiaDonetsk Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
The Russian State Duma approved measures on July 27 aimed at clarifying confusion surrounding the recently updated laws regarding conscripts and reservists.
Russian authorities are discriminating against Ukrainian refugees in Belgorod Oblast, Russia.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-updates

Significant progress along the Zaporizhzhian Front when Ukranian forces were able to advance to, and liberate Staomaiorske. This sets the stage for advancement to the next objective, Staromlynivka, headquarters for the Russian 5th Combined Arms Army. This promises to be a larger scale engagement which, if successful, opens the way to the Russian main defense lines and open path to the Black Sea and the ports of Yalta or Berdiansk.
Further advances near Robotyne by Ukrranian mechanized units supported by infantry were able to penetrate up to the Russian main defense lines which were unmanned, only lack of trench filling machines hampered advancement past fixed dragon teeth emplacements near Verbove.
Ukrainian forces were able push back the Russian salient in the Luhansk Oblast several kilometers, liberating one of the villages captured by Russian Federation forces yesterday.
.

African Union not only wants Russian grain, but also a ceasefire in Ukraine

Proposals made by President Putin about grain deliveries to Africa are not satisfactory, a ceasefire in Ukraine is needed. African Union President Azali Assoumani said this in a closing statement at the two-day Russia-Africa summit in Saint Petersburg.

On Thursday, Putin reiterated earlier claims that Russia can supply grain to Africa, now that Ukraine can no longer export because the grain deal has ended . He also offered six African countries free grain .

"Yes, this is important, but maybe it's not enough. We need to reach a ceasefire," Assoumani said. African leaders called on the Russian president in St. Petersburg to end the war and presented him with a peace plan.

"This war must stop. And it can only stop on the basis of justice and reason," said African Union Secretariat Chairman Moussa Faki Mahamat. Putin said he respects the proposal and will "study it carefully."

Negotiate
Congolese President Denis Sassou-Nguesso believes that the African initiative should not be underestimated. "We call again urgently for the restoration of peace in Europe." Last month, African leaders also called on Russia to begin peace negotiations .

Putin repeated earlier statements that Russia is ready to negotiate, but that Ukraine is not willing. According to Putin, talks should take into account "new realities on the ground", referring to the Russian-occupied part of Ukraine.

The adviser to Ukrainian President Zelensky, Mychajlo Podoljak, called Putin's remarks "negotiation whimsy." African Union president Assoumani said that Putin had shown willingness to negotiate with Ukraine, and now "the other side" had to be convinced.

Extend grain deal
The African Union is also urging Putin to extend the grain deal, which recently expired as Russia suspended its cooperation . According to Faki Mahamat, an extension would "benefit all the peoples of the world, especially Africans".

After the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, grain exports from that country had come to an almost complete standstill. Global food prices rose sharply. The grain deal allowed Ukraine to export nearly 33 million tons of corn, wheat and other grains last year .

After the deal was closed, prices fell, but after its recent expiry, they rose again sharply. It is feared that the Russian decision will lead to more food insecurity and hunger in African countries.

Putin praised Africa's role in the emerging "multipolar world order." According to him, the era of US dominance is over. He said Russia has plans for increased trade and investment in African countries.

He also wants to strengthen military ties with African countries by training their armies and supplying more military equipment, some of which is free of charge.

Furthermore, Russia and African countries agreed to cooperate on colonialism-caused damage and to strive for the return of cultural artifacts.

The summit was attended by 49 African delegations, 17 of which came with heads of state. At the first Russia-Africa summit in 2019, there were still 43 African heads of state.

Russia downs three Ukrainian drones over Moscow, defence ministry says

https://www.france24.com/en/europe/...drones-over-moscow-defence-ministry-says

Russia’s defence ministry said that three Ukrainian drones attacked Moscow early on Sunday, the TASS news agency reported. One drone was destroyed in the air and two others crashed in Moscow, the ministry said. The attack damaged two buildings and temporarily suspended flights at Vnukovo airport.

Update from the Institute for the Study of War
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 29, 2023

Click here to read the full report.

Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, and Frederick W. Kagan

July 29, 2023, 3:40pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 11:30am ET on July 29. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 30 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Segments of the Russian pro-war ultranationalist information space appear to be coalescing around the Kremlin’s narrative effort to portray the Ukrainian counteroffensive as a failure, increasingly overstating Ukrainian losses and writing less about Russia's losses and challenges than they had been. Prominent Russian milbloggers have been increasingly presenting Ukrainian counteroffensive operations inaccurately as a series of failed Ukrainian assaults along the entire line of contact.[1] Russian milbloggers widely amplified footage on July 29 claiming that it showed a single Russian tank defeating an entire Ukrainian company with armored vehicles as if the event had occurred recently, but the footage is actually from June 7 and shows Russian artillery units striking the Ukrainian column.[2] Russian sources have previously recirculated old footage to support claims that Ukrainian forces are suffering significant armored vehicle losses, and the amplification of the footage on July 29 indicates that Russian sources are deliberately amplifying old footage to support the Kremlin narrative.[3] Russian President Vladimir Putin recently claimed that Ukrainian forces lost 39 armored vehicles in a few days of fighting in western Zaporizhia Oblast, a notable inflection in his exaggeration of Ukrainian losses during the Ukrainian counteroffensive.[4] ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin is likely shifting its policy about the coverage of the war to downplay the possibilities of a successful Ukrainian counteroffensive and to promote itself as an effective manager of the war effort.[5] Russian milbloggers continue to report on localized Ukrainian advances and some issues with Russian defensive operations, but the pro-war Russian information space’s wider operational framing of the Ukrainian counteroffensive aligns with the likely shift in the Kremlin’s portrayal of the counteroffensive.

Select Russian milbloggers may be shaping their depiction of the wider Ukrainian counteroffensive for fear of Kremlin punishment following the arrest of prominent pro-war critic Igor Girkin. A Russian insider source claimed on July 28 that sources within the presidential administration stated that the Kremlin recently encouraged Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers to reduce their coverage of the war in Ukraine in general and to post more positive content on topics of nationalistic pride.[7] ISW has not observed Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers reducing their coverage of the war, although Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers have begun to argue more emphatically that the Ukrainian counteroffensive is a failure.[8] The arrest of notable critics of the Russian war effort in Ukraine such as Girkin along with ongoing Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) efforts to consolidate control over the Russian information space may be prompting select milbloggers to align their portrayal of the war with the Kremlin’s more than they have normally done.

The Kremlin’s ability to establish a more cohesive narrative about the war within the Russian information space remains uncertain, and subsequent Russian failures or significant Ukrainian successes could disrupt the Kremlin’s progress in this effort. Segments of the Russian information space do continue to complain about systemic issues within the Russian war effort in Ukraine, and many Russian milbloggers would likely reverse course on their portrayal of the Ukrainian counteroffensive in the event of significant Ukrainian gains. The milblogger community continues to be highly reactive and motivated by salient topics of outrage, and many milbloggers would likely abandon efforts to align themselves with the Kremlin’s messaging about the war in the event that a controversy about Russian failure prompts renewed intense ire towards the Russian military leadership.[10] A cohesively amplified and unchallenged Kremlin narrative concerning the tactical and operational situation in Ukraine would make accurate coverage of battlefield realities more challenging, particularly in the absence of more detailed reporting from the Ukrainian side.

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and advanced in some areas on July 29. Geolocated footage published on July 28 confirms that Ukrainian forces have advanced close to the northwestern outskirts of Kurdyumivka (13km southwest of Bakhmut).[11] Geolocated footage published on July 29 shows that Ukrainian forces advanced to positions near the northern outskirts of Pryyutne (16km southwest of Velyka Novosilka) in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.[12] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued assaults near Klishchiivka, Kurdyumivka, and Andriivka south of Bakhmut.[13] Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[14] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian ground attacks near Rivnopil, Staromayorske, and Urozhaine in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.[15] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks near Robotyne in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and one milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces captured a forest northeast of Robotyne.[16] A Russian milblogger stated that Russian defensive fortifications will not matter if Ukrainian forces inflict heavy losses on Russian forces to the point that there are not enough Russian personnel to man the fortifications.[17] The milblogger also stated that the depth of Ukrainian advances into Russian defensive lines matters less than the degree to which the balance of forces has shifted to favor Ukraine during the course of the counteroffensive.

Ukrainian forces targeted Russian military and logistics assets in occupied Crimea on July 28 and 29. The Ukrainian Armed Forces reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Chonhar bridge between occupied Crimea and occupied Kherson Oblast on the morning of July 29.[18] Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo claimed Ukrainian forces launched 12 Storm Shadow missiles at the Chonhar rail bridge, but claimed that Russian air defenses intercepted all 12 missiles.[19] Some social media sources stated that locals reported explosions in the Chonhar area, but there is currently no visual evidence of the strike or claims about the consequences of the strike at the time of this publication.[20] The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that saboteurs set explosives against a Russian ammunition depot in Kozacha Bay near Sevastopol, Crimea on July 28 and that locals reported primary and secondary detonations.[21] Sevastopol occupation head Mikhail Razvozhaev claimed on July 28 that any explosions in the Kozacha Bay area were due to Russian military exercises.

Russian forces conducted a missile strike on Dnipro City, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on the evening of July 28. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and the Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces struck a residential building and a Ukrainian Security Services (SBU) building in Dnipro City with two Iskander cruise missiles.

Key Takeaways:

Segments of the Russian pro-war ultranationalist information space appear to be coalescing around a Kremlin narrative effort to portray the Ukrainian counteroffensive as a failure, increasingly overstating Ukrainian losses and writing less about Russia's losses and challenges than they had been.
Select Russian milbloggers may be shaping their depiction of the wider Ukrainian counteroffensive for fear of Kremlin punishment following the arrest of prominent pro-war critic Igor Girkin.
The Kremlin’s ability to establish a more cohesive narrative about the war within the Russian information space remains uncertain, and subsequent Russian failures or significant Ukrainian successes could disrupt the Kremlin’s progress in this effort.
Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and advanced in some areas on July 29.
Ukrainian forces likely targeted Russian military and logistics assets in occupied Crimea on July 28 and 29.
Russian forces conducted a missile strike on Dnipro City, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on the evening of July 28.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line and the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line and made claimed advances along the Svatove-Kreminna line.
Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line, around Bakhmut, and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line and advanced around Bakhmut.
Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations along the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area and south of Orikhiv and advanced along the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area and south of Orikhiv but did not make confirmed or claimed advances.
A Ukrainian report indicates that Russian occupation authorities continue crypto-mobilization efforts in occupied Ukraine to replenish losses from combat casualties.
Russian authorities continue to forcibly deport Ukrainian children in occupied Ukraine to Russia under the guise of rest and rehabilitation programs.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-updates

Does someone knows which drones they use to penetrate so deep they probably have men on the ground no?