Table of Contents Introduction The Offense-Defense Balance How Are Russia’s Defenses Organized? What Obstacles Could a Ukrainian Offensive Face? Lessons for Ukraine: Shifting the Advantage to the Offense Next Steps: Chapter Three: What Obstacles Could a Ukrainian Offensive Face? The Russian defensive system consists of multiple types of anti-vehicle barriers, infantry trenches, and prepared firing positions for artillery and fighting vehicles. These fieldworks are arranged in layers to form defensive positions 1 to 2 kilometers deep. Russian doctrine suggests that these systems are intended to be held by motorized rifle battalions, which are assigned to defend areas 3 to 5 kilometers wide and 2 to 2.5 kilometers deep, and motorized rifle companies, which are assigned to defend areas up to 1.5 kilometers wide and 1 kilometer deep.[17]
A defensive system outside of the occupied town of Mykhailivka is representative. It consists of four layers of defenses. First, about 2 kilometers from the town itself, Russia has constructed a trench to disrupt the movement of Ukrainian vehicles toward the front line. Approximately 500 meters behind that ditch is a barrier of “dragon’s teeth.” These concrete barriers are densely packed into three rows and serve as a second barrier to any Ukrainian vehicles that cross the ditch to the north.
Roughly 250 meters behind the dragon’s teeth is an infantry trench system. Soldiers in this trench would be able to engage vehicles attempting to approach or bypass the barriers with recoilless rifles, rocket propelled grenades, or anti-tank guided missiles; fire on accompanying infantry and engineers with small arms; and use indirect fire to target Ukrainians north of the ditch. Russian doctrine dictates that tactical commanders would have created integrated fire plans for their areas of responsibility.[18] These plans would in theory increase the defensive advantage by maximizing the defenders’ familiarity with the terrain, creating zones in which the defenders will concentrate fire, and allowing for planned maneuvers during combat including both withdrawals and counterattacks.
Behind the trench is a second set of counter-mobility barriers: an anti-vehicle ditch and another set of dragon’s teeth. These are supported by a smaller set of trenches and vehicle emplacements located on the two roads leading into the town from the north. These smaller fieldworks can provide command positions from which the wider defensive effort would be led. These positions can also be used for direct and indirect fire on Ukrainian forces north of the first anti-vehicle ditch, as well as covering fire for any effort to withdraw into the town or further south.
These defenses are part of a longer defensive line that stretches from the town of Yasna to the Molochna River, covering a defensive front of approximately 30 kilometers. The northernmost line of dragon’s teeth stretches for more than 6 kilometers to the east, where it meets another set of multilayered defenses near the town of Trudovyk. The southernmost line wraps around the town of Mykhailivka and measures approximately 45 kilometers.
Similar layered defenses are visible across the span of the front line. Another example is visible near the town of Verbove. These fortifications are less extensive, although they have been the location of more recent construction. East of the road leading into the town, the defenses consist of three layers, as illustrated in Figure 10. An anti-vehicle ditch sits north of a set of dragon’s teeth, which is itself north of a trench system with two layers. West of the road, the ditch has been extended since the initial image was taken, but satellite imagery available at the time of writing is not sufficiently clear to determine whether the line of dragon’s teeth has been extended.
Farther west, Russian fieldworks serve as a reminder that these defenses are not intended to be static, but rather that they are part of a larger system incorporating mobile and positional defense. Figure 11 shows a trench leading to an opening in the dragon’s teeth barrier. This construction is relatively unusual. Trenches are usually placed parallel to counter-mobility barriers in order to maximize firepower onto forces trying to cross or breach those barriers, something these trenches would not allow the soldiers manning them to do. What they could do, however, is provide cover to forces withdrawing through the gap in the dragon’s teeth just north of the trench or provide interlocking fire onto an attempt to advance down the road less than 800 meters to the east. These trenches are therefore likely part of a tactical commander’s prepared system of fire and maneuver. https://www.csis.org/analysis/ukraines-offensive-operations-shifting-offense-defense-balance
