"Senior" Russian Navy commanders killed in attack on Sevastopol, Kiev says

"Senior" commanders of the Russian Navy were killed or injured in the attack on the headquarters of Russia's Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol, on the annexed Crimean peninsula, on Friday . That's what the Ukrainian army says.

"The details of the attack will be announced as soon as possible," said the army in Kiev, which already reports "dozens" of dead and wounded among the "occupiers" , including "senior" commanders of the Black Sea Fleet. According to the military, the attack took place "during a meeting of leaders of the Russian Navy."

Authorities installed by Russia initially said that anti-aircraft defenses shot down missiles , causing debris to fall from the sky. It later turned out that the attack was a lot more successful than that. Kiev calls the operation a "crab trap" and says it deliberately struck during an important meeting.

On Saturday, the Russian governor of Crimea, Mikhail Razvozhayev, reported again that debris had fallen from the sky because air defenses had shot down missiles. There were explosions on the peninsula and photos of large clouds of smoke were shared on social media. Razvozhayev warned Sevastopol residents to stay indoors because more attacks could come, but later withdrew the warning.

The Crimean peninsula, which is a key logistics hub for Russian forces, was annexed by Moscow in 2014.

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, SEPTEMBER 23, 2023
Sep 23, 2023 - ISW Press

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 23, 2023

George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick W. Kagan

September 23, 2023, 8:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 3pm ET on September 23. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 24 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

ISW is now prepared to assess that Ukrainian forces have broken through Russian field fortifications west of Verbove in western Zaporizhia Oblast. These fortifications are not the final defensive line in Russia’s defense in depth in western Zaporizhia Oblast, but rather a specific series of the best-prepared field fortifications arrayed as part of a near-contiguous belt of an anti-vehicle ditch, dragon's teeth, and fighting positions about 1.7 - 3.5 km west of Verbove.[

Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Commander Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi stated in an interview with CNN published on September 23 that Ukrainian forces achieved a “breakthrough” on the left flank near Verbove and that Ukrainian forces continue advancing.[2] Combat footage posted on September 22 shows a destroyed Ukrainian Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) and BMP-2 operating slightly beyond Russia’s fighting positions trench line near Verbove, indicating continued Ukrainian progress in deploying more heavy equipment beyond Russia’s triune belt of the anti-vehicle ditch, dragon’s teeth, and fighting positions.[3] Commercially available satellite imagery indicates that Ukrainian forces have brought heavy equipment closer to Verbove over the past 96 hours in a manner consistent with Tarnavskyi’s statement.[4] The Wall Street Journal reported on September 21 that Ukrainian forces achieved a “limited breakthrough” west of Verbove citing an unnamed Ukrainian Air Assault Forces officer.

Ukrainian forces have not overcome all of the prepared Russian defensive positions near Verbove. Ukrainian forces’ rate of advance near their breakthrough remains unclear. Russian forces likely still control segments of the long trench line of Russian fighting positions between Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv) and Verbove, especially near the tactical high ground to the south. Russian forces have reportedly established prepared fighting positions in almost every tree line that Ukrainian infantry are slowly and systematically fighting through. Russian forces have more field fortifications beyond Verbove; there are more anti-vehicle trenches and fighting positions north of Ocheretuvate (26km southeast of Orikhiv), for example. It is unclear the extent to which those positions are manned, however. ISW continues to assess that the Russian military does not have sufficient forces deployed to this sector of the front to completely man its defenses in depth and that Ukrainian forces should be able to operate through Russian field fortifications more rapidly if they are not properly manned.

Ukrainian forces are deepening their penetration in Zaporizhia Oblast and are assaulting Novoprokopivka – a frontline village 1.5 km immediately south of Robotyne. Geolocated combat footage posted on September 23 shows elements of the Russian 70th Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) ambushing and killing two Ukrainian infantrymen in Novoprokopivka’s northeastern outskirts, indicating that Ukrainian forces have likely cleared Russian positions between Robotyne and Novoprokopivka.[7] Multiple Russian sources reported that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian attack against northern Novoprokopivka on September 22.[8] This is the first confirmed Ukrainian ground attack in the immediate vicinity of Novoprokopivka.

Ukrainian military officials stated that the Ukrainian counteroffensive would continue in the winter. Tarnavskyi told CNN that he expected a major Ukrainian breakthrough after Ukrainian forces reach Tokmak (a major Russian stronghold in western Zaporizhia) and that it is important that Ukrainian forces not lose the initiative they currently hold.[9] Tarnavskyi also stated that Ukrainian operations will continue through the winter as Ukrainian forces are mostly advancing on foot without vehicles and that inclement weather will thus not have a major negative effect on the Ukrainian counteroffensive.[10] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov echoed a similar assessment about continued Ukrainian winter operations in an interview with The War Zone published on September 22.[11] ISW has previously assessed that, while seasonal weather can slow ground movements and challenge logistics, it will not impose a definite end to Ukrainian counteroffensive operations.[12] The culmination of the Ukrainian counteroffensive will likely depend rather on the Russian and Ukrainian balance of forces as well as on Western aid to Ukraine.

The Ukrainian counteroffensive in western Zaporizhia Oblast has likely destroyed the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet). Budanov stated in his interview with The War Zone published on September 22 that the 810th Brigade was “completely defeated” in southern Ukraine.[13] Budanov stated that the 810th Brigade has withdrawn and that Russian airborne (VDV) units replaced them on the front. Budanov‘s description of the status of the 810th Brigade corresponds most closely to the US military‘s doctrinal definition of the tactical mission task of “destroy”: “physically render[ing] an enemy force combat-ineffective until reconstituted.”[14] Elements of the 810th Brigade have reportedly been operating in the Zaporizhia direction since March 2023 and in western Zaporizhia Oblast since June 2023.[15] ISW previously observed the 810th Brigade in October 2022, when it was reportedly operating in Kherson Oblast, and the unit was likely reconstituting in the rear in the interim before assuming positions in Zaporizhia Oblast.[16] The 810th Brigade has repeatedly suffered significant losses, and Ukrainian forces have destroyed the unit in the past, following which the Russian military has reconstituted it. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 19, 2022, that the 158 soldiers of the 810th Brigade had been killed and about 500 wounded.[17] GUR Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi stated on July 31, 2022, that 200 servicemen of the 810th Brigade refused to return to the war in Ukraine, and the Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 12, 2022, that the 810th Brigade lost more than 85% of its personnel in the Kherson direction and that many again refused to return to combat.

A senior Ukrainian official explicitly confirmed that Ukraine’s objective in Bakhmut is to fix Russian forces. Ukraine’s fixing of Russian forces in Bakhmut may be alleviating pressure on the Kupyansk frontline. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov stated that Ukrainian forces achieved their objective of pinning Russian forces in Bakhmut and preventing their transfer to other areas of the theater – such as southern Ukraine – in a September 22 interview.[19] Budanov also stated that the Russian military deployed the recently created and not fully formed 25th Combined Arms Army (CAA) of the Eastern Military District “roughly north of Bakhmut.”[20] Budanov previously reported on August 31 that the Russian military deployed elements of the 25th CAA to replace elements of the 41st CAA (Central Military District) in the Kupyansk direction as elements of the 41st CAA began a "slow” redeployment to southern Ukraine.[21] The Russian deployment of elements of the 25th CAA to Bakhmut instead of Kupyansk will likely disrupt Russian efforts to fix Ukrainian forces in the Kupyansk direction, as Russian forces need these troops to continue assaults in place of the 41st CAA. Ukrainian officials and Russian sources have indicated that the tempo and the intensity of Russian offensives on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line has significantly decreased in recent weeks as Russian forces are continuing to regroup and rotate personnel in this direction, and the redirection of the deployment of 25th CAA may have alleviated some of the pressure from this frontline.[22] Budanov’s statement supports ISW’s recent assessment that Ukrainian counteroffensive operations on Bakhmut’s southern flank have fixed a large amount of Russian combat power in Bakhmut that would otherwise be available to reinforce Russian defenses in the south — or, in this case, to attempt to force Ukrainian forces to redeploy to defend against Russian assaults around Kupyansk.

Ukraine’s simultaneous counteroffensives in Bakhmut and southern Ukraine are impeding Russia’s long-term force generation efforts as Russia redeploys its new reserves to defend against Ukrainian advances. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) formed a “reserve army” at the end of June, likely referencing the 25th CAA among other formations, which began recruiting personnel from the Russian Far East in mid-May.[24] The formation of the 25th CAA was likely part of Shoigu’s announced intent to conduct large-scale force restructuring by 2026, and the use of these forces in combat and defensive operations will likely expend reserves intended for the long-term reconstitution and expansion of Russia’s military.[25] The Russian military command has also likely been unable to fully staff or properly train the 25th CAA at this time. Budanov specified that the unfinished 25th CAA has about 15,000 troops, whereas the Russian military had reportedly hoped to recruit 30,000 contract personnel for the 25th CAA.[26] Ukrainian military officials assessed that the 25th CAA would not be combat effective until at least 2024.[27] Russia had previously attempted to form the 3rd Army Corps over the summer of 2022 as a reserve force but had deployed and expended much of this ill-prepared formation defending against Ukrainian counteroffensives in the fall of 2022.

A Ukrainian intelligence chief stated that the September 22 Ukrainian strike on the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) Command headquarters in Sevastopol injured senior Russian commanders. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov told Voice of America (VOA) in an interview published on September 23 that the Ukrainian strike on the BSF Command headquarters wounded the commander of the Russian grouping of forces in the Zaporizhia direction, Colonel General Alexander Romanchuk, who is in “very serious condition” and the commander of the 200th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (Northern Fleet), Lieutenant General Oleg Tsekov, who is “unconscious.”[29] Budanov also reported that the strike killed at least nine and injured 16 Russian personnel.[30] VOA reported that the GUR has no information about the alleged death of BSF commander Admiral Viktor Sokolov.[31] Ukrainian Special Operations Forces reported that Ukrainian forces “precisely” struck the BSF Command headquarters during a meeting of senior BSF leadership.[32] Satellite imagery published on September 22 showing the BSF Command headquarters before and after the strike indicates that Ukrainian forces conducted a precision strike.

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of September 22 to 23. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed 14 of 15 Shahed-131/136 drones and that Russian forces launched four missiles.[34] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted a missile attack on Kremenchuk, Poltava Oblast.[35] Several Russian sources claimed that the Russian forces conducted a retaliatory strike on Kremenchuk airfield after the Ukrainian strike on the BSF Command headquarters.

Zaporizhia Oblast occupation governor Yevgeny Balitsky appointed former Roscosmos (Russian space agency) head and ultranationalist figure Dmitry Rogozin as a Russian Federation Council senator representing occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[37] Rogozin is affiliated with the “Tsarskiye Volky” (Tsar’s Wolves) volunteer battalion but has not held a position in the Russian government since his dismissal as head of Roskosmos in July 2022.[38] A Russian insider source claimed that Rogozin has ties to the “Convoy” private military company (PMC) and advocated for its use in Africa and Nagorno-Karabakh to Russian Presidental Administration Head Anton Vaino.[39] ISW previously reported that Crimean occupation head Sergey Aksyonov formed a “Convoy” with Wagner-affiliated Konstantin Pikalov.[40] The insider source claimed that unspecified Russian officials forced Rogozin to go on a “business trip (exile)” to defense industrial base enterprises in Belarus after multiple meetings with Vaino.[41] Rogozin’s appointment as occupied Zaporizhia Oblast Federation Council senator may be indicative of his ties to Russian occupation officials and his attempts to secure a new position in the Russian government.

A Russian insider source argued that the Russian military should reintroduce military officers for political affairs (zampolits) to address the Russian military’s problems with political and ideological commitment — a problem that Russian military thinkers identified in September 2018. The insider source claimed that GRU political officers are using an outdated “Soviet template” to conduct information operations against the enemy and are failing to provide political support to Russian military personnel.[42] The insider source noted that Russian political officers must resolve the contradictions between senior Russian political leaders‘ slogans and reality to ensure that military personnel can distinguish between possible and impossible objectives. The insider source claimed that Russian military-political work encourages blind repetition of phrases and orders, which prevents Russian military personnel from understanding and communicating Russian political decisions to their subordinates or explaining contradictions in political leadership messaging. Chairman of the Russian State Duma Defense Committee Colonel General Andrey Kartapolov identified similar issues in his September 2018 essay justifying the creation of the Russian Military-Political Directorate.[43] Kartapolov stated that Russian military-political leadership should adapt Soviet structures to new content. Kartapolov also argued that Russia must ensure the “information protection” of military personnel and create a stable conviction in both the military and broader society about why they must serve Russia. This insider’s argument suggests that the Russian military has not solved the problem that Kartapolov identified over the past five years.

Disjointed Wagner Group contingents reportedly returning to fight in Ukraine are likely to have a marginal impact on Russian combat capabilities without bringing the full suite of effectiveness Wagner had had as a unitary organization under financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin’s and founder Dmitry Utkin’s leadership. Former Luhansk Oblast Administration Head Serhiy Haidai stated on September 23 that Wagner personnel are operating in Luhansk Oblast and across different sectors of the frontline.[44] Haidai also stated that he did not know the number of Wagner personnel or the organization under which these Wagner personnel are operating in Ukraine.[45] A Wagner-affiliated source claimed that about 500 Wagner personnel including those who refused to participate in the Wagner rebellion on June 24 have joined a new unspecified organization organized by the former Wagner personnel department head and will likely return to Ukraine to fight on the southern flank of Bakhmut.[46] ISW previously observed reports that the Wagner personnel department head (previously referred to as Vadim V. “Khrustal”) is attempting to recruit Wagner fighters for a new PMC for operations in Africa.[47] These reports indicate that Wagner forces are fragmented and are unlikely to organize into a cohesive fighting force or have an impact on Russian combat capabilities if they return to fighting in Ukraine.


Key Takeaways:

ISW is now prepared to assess that Ukrainian forces have broken through Russian field fortifications west of Verbove in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Ukrainian forces have not overcome all prepared Russian defensive positions near Verbove.
Ukrainian forces are deepening their penetration in Zaporizhia Oblast and are assaulting Novoprokopivka – a frontline village 1.5 km immediately south of Robotyne.
Ukrainian military officials stated that the Ukrainian counteroffensive would continue in the winter.
The Ukrainian counteroffensive in western Zaporizhia Oblast has likely destroyed the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet).
A senior Ukrainian official explicitly confirmed that Ukraine’s objective in Bakhmut is to fix Russian forces. Ukraine’s fixing of Russian forces in Bakhmut may be alleviating pressure on the Kupyansk frontline.
Ukraine’s simultaneous counteroffensives in Bakhmut and southern Ukraine are impeding Russia’s long-term force generation efforts as Russia redeploys its new reserves to defend against Ukrainian advances.
A Ukrainian intelligence chief stated that the September 22 Ukrainian strike on the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) Command headquarters in Sevastopol injured senior Russian commanders.
Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of September 22 to 23.
Zaporizhia Oblast occupation governor Yevgeny Balitsky appointed former Roscosmos (Russian space agency) head and ultranationalist figure Dmitry Rogozin as a Russian Federation Council senator representing occupied Zaporizhia Oblast
A Russian insider source argued that the Russian military should reintroduce military officers for political affairs (zampolits) to address the Russian military’s problems with political and ideological commitment– a problem that Russian military thinkers identified in September 2018.
Disjointed Wagner Group contingents reportedly returning to fight in Ukraine are likely to have a marginal impact on Russian combat capabilities without bringing the full suite of effectiveness Wagner had had as a unitary organization under financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin’s and founder Dmitry Utkin’s leadership.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in western Donetsk Oblast, in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make any confirmed advances on September 23.
Russian authorities are reportedly embezzling funds from military facilities near the border of Ukraine.
Russian government programs continue to forcibly deport children in occupied Ukraine to Russia.
https://www.understandingwar.org/ba...ve-campaign-assessment-september-23-2023

The Ukrainian military will review its own reporting on the death of Viktor Sokolov , the commander-in-chief of Russia's Black Sea Fleet. On Tuesday, images of him emerged in which he took part in an online meeting.

"Our troops will re-verify the information," the Ukrainian ministry promised on Tuesday.

The Russian Defense Ministry released images of Sokolov on Tuesday, a day after Kyiv declared him dead . Based on an accompanying press release, the photos appear to have been taken on Tuesday, but this could not yet be confirmed.

Ukraine said 34 Russian officers were killed last Friday during an attack on its headquarters in the occupied city of Sevastopol. Many of them have not yet been identified.

A year after the attack on the Nord Stream pipelines in the Baltic Sea, it is still not clear who is behind the sabotage. Yet there are increasing indications that the attack was carried out by a Ukrainian team . The NOS reports this.

Joint research by various European media, including NOS and Nieuwsuur , managed to identify two people involved. According to the investigation , 41-year-old Ukrainian businessman Rustem A. appears to be behind the Polish company that paid for the rental of the suspect ship .

According to sources, the German investigation team also has the man in their sights. The request for the reservation was allegedly made from the email address of a second person , a 28-year-old man from Mariupol, Ukraine. Sources close to the investigation confirm that the Ukrainian is prominently featured, but say they do not know whether the man was used or was actually involved in the attack.

Sweden , which is also investigating the attack, told the press on Wednesday that the prosecutor hopes to decide before the end of the year whether the country will file charges. However, nothing will happen in the next four weeks, said prosecutor Mats Ljungqvist. He also said the country is cooperating with German authorities.

Russia's former president Dmitry Medvedev said on Tuesday that he visited a military training camp in eastern Ukraine . Since the start of the war, several senior Russian officials have visited Ukraine.

"I visited the training camp near the front line in the Donetsk People's Republic on the orders of Vladimir Putin ," the former president said in a video on the Russian social networking site VKontakte. According to a satisfied Medvedev, the training went "adequately" and the troops showed 'willpower', 'fortitude' and 'a spirit of victory'.

Earlier, in March, President Putin made a surprise visit to the bombed-out city of Mariupol in southern Ukraine. He then also moved to Luhansk . Putin met Russian soldiers taking part in the invasion of Ukraine.

Medvedev, the number two on Russia's Security Council, also stated that the Russian army has recruited 325,000 people since the beginning of this year. Since the spring, the Russian army has been conducting a large-scale recruitment campaign, with extensive advertising on the street and online. They promise attractive salaries and other benefits to entice future soldiers.

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, SEPTEMBER 26, 2023
Sep 26, 2023 - ISW Press









Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 26, 2023

Riley Bailey, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Angelica Evans and Frederick W. Kagan

September 26, 2023, 8:35pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 3pm ET on September 26. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 27 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The tactical situation in Verbove remains unclear as Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 26. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction and offensive actions in the Bakhmut direction.[1] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces reached the northern outskirts of Novoprokopivka (13km south of Orikhiv).[2] Russian sources have still not directly addressed a claim from a source reportedly affiliated with the Russian Airborne (VDV) Forces that Ukrainian forces control half of Verbove (18km southeast of Orikhiv) as of September 24.[3] ISW has not observed evidence of such a Ukrainian advance, and the source reporting it has a very small following. It is still noteworthy that other VDV-connected sources have not responded to these claims.

Russian President Vladimir Putin awarded the Russian 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) the “Guards” honorific on September 26.[4] The Russian 58th CAA (Southern Military District) has been responsible for the ongoing Russian defense against Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in southern Ukraine.

Likely degraded elements of the Russian 58th Combined Arms Army’s 42nd Motorized Rifle Division are increasingly counterattacking in the Novoprokopivka area, suggesting that Ukrainian counteroffensive operations may have degraded relatively more elite Russian Airborne (VDV) elements that were responsible for counterattacking in the area. Elements of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division’s 70th and 71st Guards Motorized Rifle Regiments have increasingly engaged in limited counterattacks near Novoprokopivka in the past week, and a Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division pushed Ukrainian forces from positions near Novoprokopivka on September 25.[6] Elements of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division's 70th, 71st, and 291st Motorized Rifle Regiments routinely engaged in combat engagements and counterattacks against Ukrainian forces at the forwardmost Russian defensive positions in the Orikhiv area before withdrawing behind the Russian defensive layer between Verbove and Solodka Balka (20km south of Orikhiv) in mid-to-late August.[7] Russian forces laterally redeployed elements of the more elite 7th and 76th VDV Divisions to the Orikhiv direction in early-to-mid August to counterattack against a widening Ukrainian breach in the area, which may have provided these elements of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division respite from hostilities.[8] Elements of the 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment may have conducted one of the few unit rotations that ISW has observed on this sector of the front, possibly allowing these elements to partially reconstitute.

The 70th and 71st Motorized Rifle Regiments’ involvement in counterattacks around Novoprokopivka suggests that Ukrainian counteroffensive operations may have significantly degraded the combat capabilities of elements of the 7th and 76th VDV Divisions and that these VDV elements can no longer conduct all counterattacks along the entire Ukrainian breach in the Orikhiv direction. The Russian command may have committed the 70th and 71st Motorized Rifle Regiments to defending and counterattacking in the Novoprokopivka area to allow VDV elements to prioritize defensive operations on the western and eastern flanks of the Ukrainian salient in the Orikhiv direction.[10] It is also possible that elements of the 70th and 71st Motorized Rifle Regiments have held positions near Novoprokopivka since withdrawing from positions further north and are now engaging Ukrainian forces because the Ukrainian advance has reached the outskirts of Novoprokopivka. Roughly a month of respite and possible reconstitution are unlikely to offset the significant degradation that elements of the 70th and 71st Motorized Rifle Regiments suffered while defending earlier in the counteroffensive. Elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) similarly defended to hold forwardmost defensive positions earlier in the counteroffensive, and Ukrainian counteroffensive operations recently reportedly rendered these elements combat ineffective.[11] The Russian command risks rendering the already degraded elements of the 70th and 71st Motorized Rifle Regiments combat ineffective if they heavily commit these elements to counterattacking the Ukrainian advance near Novoprokopivka.

Elements of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division are reportedly deployed as far back as Tokmak, continuing to suggest that the Russian command has not manned the multi-echeloned defense in southern Ukraine in depth. Russian sources reported on September 25 and 26 that elements of the 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment’s 3rd Battalion were involved in an altercation with military police from the 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment in occupied Tokmak.[12] The presence of elements of the 70th and 71st Motorized Rifle Regiments in Tokmak suggests that Russian forces have deployed elements of these regiments throughout the multi-echeloned defense between the current frontline and Tokmak. Russian forces, however, appear to be continuing to deploy most of their combat power in western Zaporizhia Oblast to immediate frontline areas.[13] The deployment of the 70th and 71st Motorized Rifle Regiments as far back as Tokmak suggests that elements of the same Russian formations and units defending at forward positions are holding positions, likely in smaller numbers, in subsequent defensive layers. It is possible that unobserved elements of other Russian units and formations hold positions at rear defensive positions, although the current Russian manpower commitment to holding positions on the frontline indicates that this is unlikely.

Interethnic tensions appear to be sowing division between elements of the Russian 42nd Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment defending against the Ukrainian counteroffensive in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Arsen Temiraev, a mobilized serviceman from the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania serving with the 70th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment, posted a video on September 25 alleging that Russian military police of the 70th Regiment beat Temiraev and two other soldiers of the 71st Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment’s 3rd Battalion in Tokmak on September 24.[14] Temiraev claimed that the military police asked about his ethnicity before telling Temiraev that “Russia is for Russians.” Temiraev claimed that the military police beat him and the other servicemen because a Tokmak local alleged that the soldiers had sexually assaulted children, a crime that Temiraev denied having committed. Temiraev complained that he thought the “Nazis were on the other [Ukrainian] side, [but] it turns out they [the Nazis] are among us.”[15] North Ossetian-Alanian Republic Head Sergey Menyailo responded on September 26, claiming that the elements of the “Storm Ossetia” and “Alania” volunteer battalions in the area verified the incident.[16] Menyailo reported the incident to the Southern Military District command, which informed the commander of the 58th Combined Arms Army, and called the incident unacceptable towards any Russian soldier. Interethnic tensions between Russian units operating in the frontline and near the rear of western Zaporizhia Oblast may threaten the integrity of Russian defenses and unit cohesion amidst recent Ukrainian gains in the area.

Interethnic tensions may also threaten Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov’s broader standing within the Russian political sphere amid an ongoing controversy surrounding Kadyrov’s son. Kadyrov posted footage on September 25 of his son, Adam Kadyrov, beating a detained man accused of burning a Quran, and Ramzan Kadyrov praised his son for the beating.[17] The incident prompted varied condemnation and calls for investigations from Russian officials. Russian Human Rights Council (HRC) Head Valery Fadeev stated that burning the Quran is a serious crime but that officials must follow rules for detaining suspects, while HRC member Eva Merkacheva called for an investigation and called the situation a “challenge to the entire legal system of Russia.”[18] Merkacheva levied a thinly veiled criticism of the Chechen Republic, claiming that “in a particular region [Chechen Republic] they [Chechen officials] have shown that they commit crimes and nothing will happen to them about it.”[19] Other Russian officials, including Human Rights Commissioner Tatyana Moskalkova, called for Adam Kadyrov to answer for his crime in a Russian court.[20] Ramzan Kadyrov reportedly responded to a journalist’s request for a follow up and reportedly claimed that he had not witnessed the attack and that Adam Kadyrov is “independent and temperamental.”[21] Ramzan Kadyrov reportedly praised Adam Kadyrov’s behavior and stated he did not punish his son, but said that Adam Kadyrov will be punished to the fullest extent of Russian law if a Russian court convicts him.[22] ISW has long observed tensions between Chechen and non-Chechen officials and military units, and senior Russian officials’ emotional reactions suggest that Kadyrov’s political standing may be insufficient to protect his son from the consequences of this situation.

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu discussed ongoing Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) efforts to increase Russian Airborne (VDV) Forces’ combat capabilities and add elements similar to those normally found in motorized rifle units to the VDV, likely to better align VDV elements with their current combat roles in Ukraine. Shoigu stated during a speech to the Russian Defense Ministry Board on September 26 that the Russian MoD is implementing measures to increase the Russian VDV’s combat potential by creating new airborne assault formations and increasing the VDV’s reconnaissance, strike, and fire capabilities.[24] Shoigu stated that the Russian MoD has nearly finished forming a fifth Russian VDV division, the 104th Airborne Assault (VDV) Division, and an additional parachute regiment subordinate to the Russian 106th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division.[25] Shoigu stated that the Russian MoD plans for all Russian VDV divisions to have a logistics brigade and repair and restoration battalions by the end of 2023.[26] Shoigu stated that Russian VDV divisions will be “completed” with an artillery brigade but did not specify a time frame for this addition.[27] These additional elements will bring Russian VDV divisions into closer alignment with the force composition of a typical Russian motorized rifle division.[28] Shoigu did not state that Russian VDV divisions would receive tank regiments, which are common in Russian motorized rifle divisions.[29] These additional units will likely allow the Russian military to use Russian VDV divisions almost interchangeably with motorized rifle divisions in the future, and VDV elements in Ukraine have been increasingly operating as combat infantry similar to motorized rifle divisions.[30] The Russian MoD’s provision of additional elements to Russian VDV units and formations serving in Ukraine is a recognition of the role Russian VDV forces are currently playing in Ukraine and highlights the non-standard way in which the Russian military is using these forces. These Russian formations have become “airborne” in name only, and it is not clear when the Russian MoD intends for them to take to the skies again.

Russian forces conducted a series of Shahed-131/136 drone strikes on port and military targets in Ukraine on the night of September 25-26. Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces launched 38 drones from Krasnodar Krai and Cape Chauda, Crimea, targeting Ukrainian port and border infrastructure and that Ukrainian air defenses shot down 26 drones.[31] Russian forces hit the Orlivka-Isaccea ferry crossing that connects Odesa Oblast and Romania, and Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk denied speculations that the Russian drones crossed into Romanian territory.[32] Geolocated footage shows that Russian forces destroyed a Ukrainian MiG-29 fighter aircraft at the Kulbakino airfield in Mykolaiv Oblast.

Russian and Western sources largely claimed that Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) Commander Admiral Viktor Sokolov is alive after the Russian MoD posted footage of Sokolov allegedly attending a meeting on September 26, although the situation remains unclear at this time. Russian and Western sources largely speculated that footage posted by the Russian MoD on September 26 of Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu’s remarks at the Russian MoD Board meeting purportedly shows Sokolov attending via teleconference.[34] The Ukrainian Special Operations Forces previously reported on September 25 that the Ukrainian strike on the BSF headquarters in Sevastopol on September 22 killed Sokolov, and Russian officials have not yet issued a response confirming or denying reports of Sokolov’s death.[35] The Ukrainian Special Operations Forces stated on September 26 that it was clarifying information about Sokolov’s possible death but that available sources indicate that he is dead.[36] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on September 26 that he had not received any information from the Russian MoD about the matter and that the Kremlin had nothing to say as this is “solely [the Russian MoD’s] prerogative.”[37] ISW is unprepared at this time to make an assessment about the authenticity of the Russian MoD’s footage of Sokolov or about Sokolov’s status on Earth.

The Russian MoD has reportedly recruited some former Wagner Group personnel for MoD-affiliated private military companies (PMCs) fighting in Ukraine, while negotiations between the reported Wagner leadership and the Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) have allegedly stalled over disagreements concerning Wagner’s independence and cohesion. A reported Wagner-affiliated source claimed on September 26 that the Wagner Group is still operating in Africa and Belarus and that there are no plans to close the organization.[38] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that former Wagner personnel that left the organization with Andrey Troshev (known under the callsign “Sedoy”) after Prigozhin’s rebellion have joined the MoD-affiliated “Redut” and “Volunteer Corps” PMCs and have begun to redeploy to the Bakhmut area in Ukraine.[39] The milblogger claimed that Troshev is trying to recruit Wagner personnel who are currently operating in Belarus, Africa, and the Middle East for Russian MoD-affiliated PMCs. The milblogger also claimed that Anton Yelizarov (known as “Lotos”) is now the head of Wagner and is negotiating with Rosgvardia about the inclusion of Wagner units within Rosgvardia. Yelizarov is reportedly resisting Rosgvardia’s condition that Wagner personnel sign individual contracts, which the milblogger complained would allow Rosgvardia to divide the Wagner units and send them to various areas. ISW previously reported that Russian State Duma deputies will reportedly propose a bill allowing Rosgvardia to include volunteer formations, and Yelizarov is likely pushing for Wagner personnel to be considered a distinct Rosgvardia volunteer formation.


Key Takeaways:

The tactical situation in Verbove remains unclear as Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 26.
Likely degraded elements of the Russian 58th Combined Arms Army’s 42nd Motorized Rifle Division are increasingly counterattacking in the Novoprokopivka area, suggesting that Ukrainian counteroffensive operations may have degraded relatively more elite Russian Airborne (VDV) elements that were responsible for counterattacking in the area.
Elements of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division are reportedly deployed as far back as Tokmak, continuing to suggest that the Russian command has not manned the multi-echeloned defense in southern Ukraine in depth.
Interethnic tensions appear to be sowing division between elements of the Russian 42nd Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment defending against the Ukrainian counteroffensive in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Interethnic tensions may also threaten Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov’s broader standing within the Russian political sphere amid an ongoing controversy surrounding Kadyrov’s son.
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu discussed ongoing Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) efforts to increase Russian Airborne (VDV) Forces’ combat capabilities and add elements similar to those normally found in motorized rifle units to the VDV, likely to better align VDV elements with their current combat roles in Ukraine.
Russian forces conducted a series of Shahed-131/136 drone strikes on port and military targets in Ukraine on the night of September 25-26.
Russian and Western sources largely claimed that Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) Commander Admiral Viktor Sokolov is alive after the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) posted footage of Sokolov allegedly attending a meeting on September 26, although the situation remains unclear at this time.
The Russian MoD has reportedly recruited some former Wagner Group personnel for MoD-affiliated private military companies (PMCs) fighting in Ukraine, while negotiations between the reported Wagner leadership and the Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) have allegedly stalled over disagreements concerning Wagner’s independence and cohesion.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly advanced in some areas on September 26.
https://www.understandingwar.org/ba...ve-campaign-assessment-september-26-2023

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, SEPTEMBER 28, 2023
Sep 28, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 28, 2023

Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, and Frederick W. Kagan

September 28, 2023, 7:20pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2:00pm ET on September 28. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 29 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 28. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction and in the Bakhmut direction.[1] The “Storm Ossetia” and “Alania” volunteer battalions claimed that unspecified sources continue to spread false information about a Ukrainian breakthrough in the Robotyne-Verbove area, possibly referring to a fringe Russian milblogger’s claims on September 22 and 23 that Ukrainian forces advanced into Verbove (18km southeast of Orikhiv).[2] ISW has been unable to confirm this report and will not continue to record it in the absence of visual confirmation or similar claims from other Russian sources.

Russian forces have reduced the tempo of their localized offensive operations on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line in recent days. Russian and Ukrainian officials are increasingly reporting fewer Russian ground attacks in the Kupyansk and Lyman directions, indicating that Ukrainian offensive operations have drawn Russian forces away from the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line and significantly degraded the Russian offensive effort on this line.[3] ISW has previously assessed that Russian offensive operations on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line aimed to pin Ukrainian forces on this line and away from more critical areas of the front.[4] Ukrainian Deputy Director of the Department of Application Planning of the Main Directorate of the Ukrainian National Guard Colonel Mykola Urshalovych stated on September 28 that Russian forces conducted defensive operations and reinforced units in the past week while Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations and pushed Russian forces from unspecified positions.[5] The Ukrainian General Staff’s September 28 morning situation report (SITREP) reported no Russian ground attacks in the Kupyansk and Lyman directions while the September 28 evening SITREP only reported one Russian attack south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka.[6] Russian aviation has become increasingly active on this line as ground attacks have apparently diminished, and Russian sources consistently claim that Russian air strikes hit Ukrainian-controlled bridges across the Oskil River — presumably to stymie the threat of any Ukrainian offensive operations east of the river.

Russian aviation is increasingly active in the Kharkiv, Luhansk, and Kherson oblasts and apparently less active in areas of western Zaporizhia Oblast where Ukrainian forces are conducting counteroffensive operations. Russian forces have been increasingly conducting airstrikes against targets in the west (right) bank of Kherson Oblast and against rear Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the Kupyansk direction in the past week.[8] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Ilya Yevlash stated on September 28 that Russian Su-35 attack aircraft and Ka-52 helicopters are increasingly active in the Kupyansk and Lyman directions and that Russian forces conducted 21 airstrikes in these directions, primarily near the Siversk (19km south of Kreminna) and the Serebryanske forest area (11km south of Kreminna).[9] Kherson Oblast Military Administration Spokesperson Oleksandr Tolokonnikov stated on September 28 that Russian forces have increased the number of airstrikes on Kherson City and right bank Kherson Oblast by a factor of three or four in the past three days and that Russian forces dropped more than 50 aerial glide bombs against targets in these areas.

Russian aviation continues to conduct strikes against rear Ukrainian areas in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast, although mentions of Russian aviation repelling Ukrainian assaults in frontline areas have become less routine in Russian reporting than earlier in the counteroffensive. Russian sources noted that Russian aviation, particularly Ka-52 helicopters, played a significant role in disrupting Ukrainian assaults at the start of the counteroffensive.[11] Ukrainian forces appear to have increased their ability to down Russian Ka-52 helicopters in mid-August 2023, and the Russian command may have decreased aviation use in western Zaporizhia Oblast out of fears of aviation and pilot losses.[12] The decreased Russian aviation use in western Zaporizhia Oblast has not seriously undermined the Russian defense, however, as Russian forces appear to have increased their use of strike drones against advancing Ukrainian forces, and Russian artillery units continue to play a significant role in repelling Ukrainian assaults.It remains unclear what Russian forces intend to achieve with increased aviation activity in Kherson Oblast and whether more airstrikes against Ukrainian targets in the Kupyansk and Lyman directions will be able to offset degraded Russian combat power in the area.

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of September 27 to 28.The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 28 that Ukrainian air defenses downed 31 of 39 Russian-launched Shahed drones over Ukraine on the night of September 27 to 28 and three out of five Shahed drones on September 27.[13] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched the drones from Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai, and occupied Crimea.[14] Ukrainian Center for the Research of Trophy and Prospective Weapons and Military Equipment of the Ukrainian General Staff Spokesperson Captain Andriy Rudyk stated that Russian companies have modified the Russian-produced Shahed-136 drones to contain more domestically produced parts but have not improved the drone’s tactical or technical characteristics.[15] Rudyk stated that the modifications indicate that Russia continues to pursue the domestic mass production of Shahed drones.[16]

Several Russian milbloggers claimed that they self-censor the majority of their reporting amidst an apparent wider self-censorship in Russian reporting about the tactical realities on certain sectors of the front. Some notably critical Russian milbloggers claimed that they only publish five to 15 percent of the amount of information they receive.[17] One milblogger claimed that problems with communications, drones, tires, electronic warfare (EW), personnel payments, and various other issues persist among Russian forces on the frontline but that Russian personnel attempt to mitigate these problems through connections and personal initiatives, likely, according to the milblogger, because Russian commanders routinely silence complaints and ignore efforts to fix problems.[18] The milblogger amplified a statement from a claimed Russian platoon commander who complained about the inefficient flow of information from the Russian frontline to decision makers and who stated that he has had to take unusual measures to mitigate negative battlefield consequences from this poor information flow.[19] Another milblogger noted that certain information should not be shared and that the ability to remain silent at the right moment is an important quality.[20] A Russian milblogger deleted a part of a post on September 25 claiming that Ukrainian forces advanced near Novoprokopivka (13km south of Orikhiv) and controlled the northeastern part of the settlement.[21] The milblogger edited the post and instead claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked near Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv), just north of Novoprokopivka.[22] Geolocated footage published later in the day showed that Ukrainian forces advanced 1.5km northeast of Novoprokopivka.[23] The milblogger’s deletion suggests that Russian sources are intentionally limiting their reporting on tactical actions, especially those with outcomes unfavorable to Russia. Censorship or self-censorship among Russian milbloggers will affect ISW’s and the wider Western coverage ability of Russian operations, and ISW will continue to track changes in the Russian information space that could affect open-source reporting on the war in Ukraine.

The Russian State Duma adopted a bill in its first reading that criminalizes promoting and justifying extremism, likely to encourage self-censorship in the Russian information space. The bill amends a current Russian law that punishes inciting extremism with a fine of up to 300,000 rubles (about $3,100) and up to four years in prison.[25] The amendment would also increase the imprisonment term to five years for calling for, promoting, or justifying extremism online.[26] Russian authorities arrested former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin on July 21 on extremism charges and likely intends to use the proposed expansion of the law on extremism to encourage self-censorship among more figures disseminating criticisms of the Kremlin in the Russian information space.[27]

Russian President Vladimir Putin signaled his support for Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov during a meeting on September 28 amid continued speculations about Kadyrov’s health and public backlash against the recent behavior of Kadyrov’s son. Putin praised the claimed successes of Chechen forces in Ukraine and Kadyrov’s leadership of Chechnya during the meeting.[28] Putin and Kadyrov appeared comfortable during the meeting in stark contrast with the pair’s last meeting on March 23 where Kadyrov appeared visibly nervous.[29] Kadyrov’s and Putin’s September 28 meeting comes amid continued speculations about Kadyrov’s health and recent public backlash over footage of Kadyrov’s son beating a detainee.[30] Putin’s meeting with Kadyrov is likely a reciprocation of Kadyrov’s expressions of loyalty to Putin following Wagner’s armed rebellion on June 24 and signals Putin’s willingness to continue supporting Kadyrov despite recent events.

The Russian information space continued to criticize the Armenian leadership and lament Russia’s perceived decreased influence in Armenia. Imprisoned ardent nationalist and former Russian officer Igor Girkin called the Russian peacekeeping contingent in Nagorno-Karabakh “pathetic” on September 27 for attempting to undertake “imperial functions” without the “ability and willingness” to support peacekeeping operations.[32] Girkin also claimed that Russian peacekeeping forces would have suffered defeat if they had intervened in the recent fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh.[33] A Russian milblogger criticized the Armenian government for not intervening in Nagorno-Karabakh.[34] Another Russian source claimed that Russia has lost a “frozen conflict” that it can leverage and that the disappearance of a breakaway republic in Russia’s supposed sphere of influence is directly connected to decreasing Russian international influence.[35]

Senior NATO and Western defense officials met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Kyiv on September 28 to discuss Ukraine’s military needs.[36] NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg, UK Defense Secretary Grant Shapps, and French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu discussed defensive cooperation and strengthening Ukrainian air defenses with Zelensky.


Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 28.
Russian forces have reduced the tempo of their localized offensive operations on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line in recent days.
Russian aviation is increasingly active in Kharkiv, Luhansk, and Kherson oblasts and apparently less active in areas of western Zaporizhia Oblast where Ukrainian forces are conducting counteroffensive operations.
Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of September 27 to 28.
Several Russian milbloggers claimed that they self-censor the majority of their reporting amidst an apparent wider self-censorship in Russian reporting about the tactical realities on certain sectors of the front.
The Russian State Duma adopted a bill in its first reading that criminalizes promoting and justifying extremism, likely to encourage self-censorship in the Russian information space.
Russian President Vladimir Putin signaled his support for Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov during a meeting on September 28 amid continued speculations about Kadyrov’s health and public backlash against the recent behavior of Kadyrov’s son.
The Russian information space continued to criticize Armenian leadership and lament Russia’s perceived decreased influence in Armenia.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and did not make confirmed gains.
Russian sources stated that the Russian Aerospace (VKS) Forces received a new batch of fifth-generation Su-57 stealth fighter and fourth-generation Su-35S air defense fighter aircraft on September 28.
Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko stated on September 28 that Ukrainian partisans set fire to a Russian military facility in occupied Yalta, Donetsk Oblast (21km southwest of Mariupol).
https://www.understandingwar.org/ba...ve-campaign-assessment-september-28-2023

CEPA
Center for European Policy Analysis

To the Last Ukrainian — What We’ve Learned from Kyiv’s Counter-Offensive

By Oleksandr Moskalenko

September 28, 2023

The counter-offensive has not swept the Russian occupiers from Ukrainian territory, but it has made some things clear.
First: There is a growing dissonance between the broad, international acceptance of Ukraine’s terms for a “just peace” and the understanding of how they can be delivered.

The counter-offensive has emphasized the limited resources Ukraine has to achieve its declared objectives militarily, so what happens on the battlefield should not be regarded as the predominant factor in attaining a just peace. On the contrary, international diplomatic and sanctions pressure should be seen as key to ending the war.

Putin’s Russia has evolved into an existential threat to the international community and it would be unfair to load Ukraine with the burden of bringing it down, even if Kyiv did have all the resources to do so.

Second: The counter-offensive was not adequately prepared nor equipped. Much has been written about the absence of F-16 combat aircraft as a factor impeding success, yet a lot of other equipment was needed, including mine-clearing machines, heavy tanks, long-distance missile systems, and artillery shells.

The relative success of the counter-offensive has demonstrated the motivation and commitment of the Ukrainians who have managed — and continue — to break through Russian lines. But mathematics and military science show an obvious need to supply Ukraine with the equipment necessary to achieve military success. Without it, the campaign will waste the lives of still more Ukrainian soldiers, and 200,000 are already either dead or seriously wounded.

Third: The Russians did not run away from Ukrainian territory, and there was no collapse of the frontline. In this connection, there are already voices discussing the next Ukrainian counter-offensive in the winter and spring. A high-ranking Western official was recently quoted saying there could be seven more years of war. If it does continue for so long, as a war of attrition on Ukrainian territory, the country will be completely destroyed.

What is clear is that Ukrainians have no choice but to fight, as it is a war of genocide. Russia’s stated policy is to destroy Ukraine as a nation, either by smashing its identity or killing everybody who remains loyal to that identity.

The only choice is whether my nation should die on its feet or on its knees. It is cynical to suggest Ukraine should stop military action and start negotiations. As has been emphasized many times, the surrender of Ukrainian territory will not stop Russian aggression but will raise Russia’s appetite for a pause followed by further military action.

Fourth: There are two options that may positively transform the counter-offensive: a qualitative leap in NATO’s involvement, through more and better weapons in war-winning numbers, and intensified pressure on Russia through diplomacy and sanctions (the so-called oil price cap on Russian crude is now openly failing, for example, and yet the G7 is refusing to take any corrective action.)

Should these steps be taken simultaneously, there is some chance that Russia will either step back and withdraw from Ukraine or be defeated. In this case, NATO’s follow-up in the peace negotiations is vital, to restore peace in Europe and re-establish the European security system, reasserting the old yet still relevant slogan “Never again!”
Oleksandr Moskalenko is an academic?researcher ?focusing on European politics. He is? an In-resident Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA, Washington, DC). He has a?Ph.D. in European Law? and previously lived in the Ukrainian city of Kharkiv.
https://cepa.org/article/to-the-last-ukrainian-what-weve-learned-from-kyivs-counter-offensive/

Slovakia elects pro-Russian politician who wants to cut military support for Ukraine
A pro-Russian politician has won Slovakia's parliamentary elections, throwing NATO's unity amid the Russia-Ukraine war into question.

Ukraine will divide Europe in the long term, that is Putin's strategy.

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 2, 2023
Oct 2, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 2, 2023

Grace Mappes, Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Frederick W. Kagan

October 2, 2023, 7:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on October 2. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 3 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

A prominent Russian milblogger and front-line unit commander claimed that Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky “saved” the Russian 31st Guards VDV Brigade, which was fighting south of Bakhmut, mirroring claims made by a much smaller milblogger about VDV units in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Vostok Battalion commander Alexander Khodakovsky recalled a conversation with then-Commander of the 31st VDV Airborne Brigade Colonel Andrei Kondrashkin prior to Kondrashkin’s death around Bakhmut in mid-September, in which Kondrashkin revealed that his forces suffered personnel losses and that their motivation to fight dropped to a critical level.[1] Kondrashkin reportedly stated that the Russian military command demanded that his forces undertake “decisive actions,” while he knew that his personnel were suffering a critical lack of motivation. Khodakovsky noted that Kondrashkin refrained from raising his concerns to the military command and proceeded to blame his military failures on the lack of cohesion among Russian forces. Khodakovsky, in turn, noted that cohesion was not the problem, but rather that Kondrashkin needed to make a choice to either “waste” his troops in combat or protest the Russian military command’s order at the expense of his career. Khodakovsky observed that Kondrashkin never had a chance to make this choice because he sustained an injury in combat immediately after the conversation, and that Teplinsky “saved” the 31st VDV Brigade by taking the “remnants [of the brigade] under his wing” and giving them the opportunity to take a break from combat.

A Telegram channel that advocates for Teplinsky also amplified Khodakovsky’s account, claiming that Russian VDV forces – namely elements of the Russian 7th and 76th VDV divisions – are facing similar issues in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[2] The milblogger claimed that Teplinsky is no longer able to rescue these divisions, however, as he was quietly stripped of his responsibilities. ISW cannot confirm either Khodakovsky‘s or the pro-Teplinsky milblogger’s claims, but both narratives attempt to portray Teplinsky as a commander who values the wellbeing of his forces over his career – likely to advance political goals that could support changes in the Russian military command. Khodakovsky’s account of Kondrashkin’s dilemma prior to his death also supports ISW’s prior assessment that Ukrainian counteroffensive operations south of Bakhmut may be degrading Russian units defending and counterattacking the area.

A Russian “Storm Z” assault unit instructor speculated that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) removed Lieutenant General Andrey Sychevoy from commanding in the Bakhmut direction due to his poor performance. The instructor claimed on October 1 that the Russian military command removed Sychevoy from his position for conducting unprepared and unsupported counterattacks south of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka and Andriivka.[4] Sychevoy’s current formal position within the Russian military is unknown. Sychevoy previously commanded the Russian Western Group of Forces in Kharkiv Oblast until his dismissal in early September 2022, and this claim is the first observed speculation that Sychevoy has had a role in military operations in Ukraine since September 2022.[5] Prominent Russian ultranationalist media outlet Tsargrad claimed in August 2023 that Sychevoy refuses all journalistic requests for comment, indicating that Sychevoy retained an official position and may have intended to keep this position concealed.

Ukrainian forces marginally advanced in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area amid continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and near Bakhmut on October 2. Geolocated footage published on October 2 indicates that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced northwest of Novomayorske (18km southeast of Veylka Novosilka).[7] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) and Bakhmut directions.[8] ISW is updating its October 1 assessment that Ukrainian forces lost positions in a trench system southwest of Robotyne (13km south of Orikhiv) to Russian counterattacks between September 13 and 30.[9] Geolocated footage published on October 2 and satellite imagery indicate that Ukrainian forces likely retook these positions sometime between September 12 and 17 and currently hold them.

Prominent actors in the Russian information space continue to speculate about the possible future of the Wagner Group under Rosgvardia. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed on October 2 that the Wagner Council of Commanders and Wagner Commander Anton Yelizarov (call sign “Lotos”) reached an agreement with Rosgvardia in which Wagner personnel must sign individual and group agreements to join Rosgvardia before January 1, 2024.[11] The milblogger claimed that the group agreements “serve as a guarantee that [Wagner] will not be ‘torn apart’” and that Wagner personnel will be able to keep their symbols and callsigns while serving under Rosgvardia. The milblogger claimed that although it is unclear where Rosgvardia will deploy its Wagner personnel in Ukraine, it will likely not be to the Bakhmut area where former Wagner personnel who signed contracts with the Russian MoD under former Wagner representative and current MoD employee Andrey Troshev are reportedly operating. The milblogger stated that the future of Wagner’s operations in Africa and the Middle East is also not clear as Rosgvardia has reportedly only approved Wagner’s use of aircraft for operations in the war in Ukraine and the new Wagner leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin’s son Pavel, is focusing only on Wagner’s business in Russia.[12] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin’s ideas about the relationship(s) between Wagner elements and the Russian government are unclear at this time as Russian President Vladimir Putin publicly embraced Troshev and subordinated some Wagner elements to the Russian MoD on the one hand, while the Russian MoD will need to supply Rosgvardia with the equipment it lacks on the other.[13] Russian milbloggers’ continued discussion of the matter recently indicates that the relationship is likely still not fully defined or made public.

Interethnic tensions and claims about the superiority of Chechen “Akhmat” forces over regular Russian forces continue to generate controversy in the Russian information space. Chairman of the “Patriots of Russia” political party and the State Duma Committee on Nationalities Gennady Semigin reportedly published a since-deleted statement on the “Patriots of Russia” website in support of Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov’s son on September 29 after Kadyrov’s son was filmed beating a detainee accused of burning a Quran.[14] The post stated that “if the Russian soldier defended his ideals as uncompromisingly, then the [Chechen] Akhmat battalion would not have to kick the soldiers of the Russian Armed Forces onto the battlefield.”[15] Semigin’s post generated widespread criticism within the Russian information space on October 2, with one Russian official going so far as to call for Russian authorities to ban Duma members from speaking publicly about the war in Ukraine.[16] One Russian milblogger accused Semigin of attempting to incite ethnic hatred by comparing ”brave Chechens with cowardly Russians.”[17] Semigin later issued a statement on Telegram claiming that unspecified actors hacked the ”Patriots of Russia” website to publish the statement in protest of a bill on interethnic relations that his team was developing.[18] A milblogger also criticized Semigin‘s claim of a hacker posting the message, asking why Semigin did not take down the statement sooner or how Semigin was able to access the “Patriots of Russia“ website if it had been hacked.[19] ISW has long observed tensions between Chechen and non-Chechen officials and military units, and the continued emotional reaction within the Russian information suggests that these tensions are still present.

Russian forces conducted a small-scale Shahed-131/136 drone strike on Ukraine on the night of October 1-2 after Russian forces conducted a record number of drone strikes targeting Ukrainian grain and port infrastructure in September 2023. Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces launched seven drones from the Krasnodar Krai direction and that Ukrainian air defenses shot down four drones.[21] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated that even though Russian forces have launched fewer drones in the past days, the Russian strikes still target Ukrainian military and infrastructure areas and are reconnoitering Ukrainian air defenses.[22] Ukrainian military expert Aleksandr Kovalenko stated on October 1 that Russian forces launched a record number of 521 drones that mostly targeted Ukrainian port and grain infrastructure in September 2023.[23] Kovalenko stated that Russia is still dependent on Iran for drone production due to issues with domestic production and that this September increase was due to Iran’s possible increased production from 100 Shahed-136 drones per month at the end of 2022 to 150-200 per month by May 2023.


Key Takeaways:

A prominent Russian milblogger and front-line unit commander claimed that Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky “saved” the Russian 31st Guards VDV Brigade, which was fighting south of Bakhmut, mirroring claims made by a much smaller milblogger about VDV units in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
A Russian “Storm Z” assault unit instructor speculated that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) removed Lieutenant General Andrey Sychevoy from commanding the Bakhmut direction due to his poor performance.
Ukrainian forces marginally advanced in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area amid continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and near Bakhmut on October 2.
Prominent actors in the Russian information space continue to speculate about the possible future of the Wagner Group under Rosgvardia.
Interethnic tensions and claims about the superiority of Chechen “Akhmat” forces over regular Russian forces continue to generate controversy in the Russian information space.
Russian forces conducted a small-scale Shahed-131/136 drone strike on Ukraine on the night of October 1-2 after Russian forces conducted a record number of drone strikes targeting Ukrainian grain and port infrastructure in September 2023.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Kreminna, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly advanced in some areas on October 2.
The Russian “Vostok” Battalion continued to complain on October 1 that the Russian military command is not fulfilling its promises of having the unit fight as a second-echelon force and is not providing state awards.
Russian occupation officials continued to transport Ukrainian children to Russia under the guise of educational trips.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-2-2023

Day 588 of the invasion !

‘Absolutely possible’ EU membership talks could begin this year, says Zelenskiy. The EU wants it but there are elections next year.
\

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 4, 2023
Oct 4, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 4, 2023

Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, and Frederick W. Kagan

October 4, 2023, 5:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on October 4. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 5 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Russian military recently transferred several Black Sea Fleet (BSF) vessels from the port in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea to the port in Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai, likely in an effort to protect them from continued Ukrainian strikes on Russian assets in occupied Crimea. Satellite imagery published on October 1 and 3 shows that Russian forces transferred at least 10 vessels from Sevastopol to Novorossiysk.[1] The satellite imagery reportedly shows that Russian forces recently moved the Admiral Makarov and Admiral Essen frigates, three diesel submarines, five landing ships, and several small missile ships.[2] Satellite imagery taken on October 2 shows four Russian landing ships and one Kilo-class submarine remaining in Sevastopol.[3] Satellite imagery from October 2 shows a Project 22160 patrol ship reportedly for the first time in the port of Feodosia in eastern Crimea, suggesting that Russian forces may be moving BSF elements away from Sevastopol to bases further in the Russian rear.[4] A Russian think tank, the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, claimed on October 3 that the BSF vessels’ movements from occupied Sevastopol to Novorossiysk were routine, however.[5] Russian forces may be temporarily moving some vessels to Novorossiysk following multiple strikes on BSF assets in and near Sevastopol but will likely continue to use Sevastopol’s port, which remains the BSF’s base. Former Norwegian Navy officer and independent OSINT analyst Thord Are Iversen observed on October 4 that Russian vessel deployments have usually intensified following Ukrainian strikes but ultimately returned to normal pattern.] ISW will explore the implications of Ukrainian strikes on the BSF in a forthcoming special edition.

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and marginally advanced on October 4. Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks towards the rail line between Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) and Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut), and the Ukrainian General Staff stated that Ukrainian forces achieved partial success near these settlements.[7] Geolocated footage published on October 4 indicates that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced east of Novoprokopivka (5km southeast of Robotyne) in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and the Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces achieved partial success west of Robotyne.[8] Some Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced up to a Russian trench line on the Robotyne-Kopani line (5km northwest of Robotyne).

Autumn and winter weather conditions will slow but not stop Ukrainian counteroffensive operations. US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby stated on October 3 that good weather will last for another six to eight weeks before weather will impact both Ukrainian and Russian operations.[10] ISW has previously observed that seasonal heavy rain and resulting mud in the autumn will slow ground movements on both sides, and that the autumn rain and mud are usually less intense than spring conditions.[11] Hardening ground during the winter freeze will likely enable the tempo of combat operations to increase, however, and Ukrainian officials have expressed their intent to continue counteroffensive operations into late 2023 and exploit cold weather conditions.[12] ISW has frequently assessed that offensive operations will continue through the winter season and has observed the continuation of combat activities throughout the fall mud season of 2022, winter season of 2022–2023, and spring mud season of 2023.

The Kremlin is likely intensifying its use of tools of digital authoritarianism to increase domestic repression and tighten control of the information space. Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii reported on October 4 that the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office requested that Russian social media platform VKontakte (VK) begin blocking posts from relatives of mobilized servicemen calling for their loved ones to return home.[14] Vazhnye Istorii noted that VK is hiding posts with several hashtags pertaining to the treatment or return of mobilized servicemen and that several posts in group chats have reportedly disappeared.[15] The Prosecutor General is likely able to impose this form of censorship under the existing law that concerns “unreliable” information about Russian operations in Ukraine.[16] The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) additionally proposed a draft resolution on October 3 that would expand the list of personal and geolocation data that “organizers of information dissemination” (ORIs) are required to store and provide to law enforcement bodies upon request.[17] The FSB’s October 3 proposal notably follows its recent backing of amendments that would allow it unrestricted access to user data of Russian internet, banking, and telecom companies.[18] Some Russian opposition outlets notably suggested that this apparent expansion of digital authoritarianism may be increasingly based on the restrictive Chinese model. One Russian opposition source, later amplified by an insider source, claimed that the Russian State Social University is developing and testing a social rating system for Russians based on the Chinese model and that the intended generated social scores will link to personal data that government entities and banks will have access to.[19] ISW has recently reported on previous instances of the Kremlin’s efforts to expand digital authoritarianism to surveil the Russian information space, likely to consolidate power and increase information space oversight prior to the 2024 presidential elections.

CNN reported on October 4 that the US will transfer seized Iranian weapons and ammunition rounds to Ukraine.[21] CNN cited US officials saying that the US intends to transfer “thousands” of such weapons to alleviate some equipment shortages that Ukraine is facing. US Central Command (CENTCOM) noted that the US obtained the weapons through a Department of Justice civil forfeiture claim against the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) on July 20, 2023, and that the US has already transferred one million rounds of small-arms ammunition to Ukraine as of Monday, October 2.

Russian sources continue to speculate about the current role of former Aerospace Forces (VKS) Commander and Wagner Group–affiliate Army General Sergei Surovikin after the Wagner rebellion, further highlighting his continued relevance in the Russian information space. Some Russian sources amplified footage on October 3 and 4 allegedly of Surovikin and his family outside a church near Moscow on October 3.[22] This speculation comes after prior speculation of Surovikin allegedly appearing in various African countries on behalf of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).[23] Russian news outlet Novye Izvestia claimed that Surovikin denied to comment to journalists who approached him near the church.

The European Union (EU) is reportedly preparing for negotiations on Ukraine’s EU accession that will take place in December. Politico reported on October 4, citing three unnamed diplomats, that EU leaders are preparing to begin formal talks with Kyiv on Ukraine’s accession to the EU as early as December of this year.[25] Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba reported on October 4 that he and Swedish Foreign Minister Tobias Billstrom spoke about Ukraine’s EU integration and are working bilaterally to opening talks about Ukraine’s accession by the end of the year.


Key Takeaways:

The Russian military recently transferred several Black Sea Fleet (BSF) vessels from the port in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea to the port in Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai, likely in an effort to protect them from continued Ukrainian strikes on Russian assets in occupied Crimea.
Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and marginally advanced on October 4.
Autumn and winter weather conditions will slow but not stop Ukrainian counteroffensive operations.
The Kremlin is likely intensifying its use of tools of digital authoritarianism to increase domestic repression and tighten control of the information space.
CNN reported on October 4 that the US will transfer seized Iranian weapons and ammunition rounds to Ukraine.
Russian sources continue to speculate about the current role of former Aerospace Forces (VKS) Commander and Wagner Group-affiliate Army General Sergei Surovikin after the Wagner rebellion, further highlighting his continued relevance in the Russian information space.
The European Union (EU) is reportedly preparing for negotiations on Ukraine’s EU accession that will take place in December.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and made limited gains near Kreminna.
Russian authorities continue efforts to collect information about Russian citizens for future conscription and enlistment cycles.
Russian Deputy Prime Minister for Construction and Regional Development Marat Khusnullin is reportedly heavily involved in Russian infrastructure projects in occupied Ukraine.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-4-2023

UKRAINE AID: CONGRESS’ FAILURE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY LEADERSHIP
Oct 4, 2023 - ISW Press








Ukraine Aid: Congress’ Failure of U.S. Foreign Policy Leadership

By Lt. Gen. (Ret.) James M. Dubik

October 4, 2023 8:00 AM ET

That there has been no major war in Europe since 1945 isn’t an accident. It is because that generation of American leaders — political, diplomatic, economic and military — came together to defeat Adolf Hitler’s expansionist, war-crime-filled aggression. This same set of leaders then designed a set of structures that (a) provided near-term stability in a very turbulent and quite violent post-fighting Europe that (b) laid a foundation for a long-term peace — NATO and the European Union — from which almost four generations have benefitted. That is, until Russia invaded Ukraine.

American and European leaders worked together to fashion post-war European security, economic, and political institutions that were mutually beneficial to all — including America. Many of these leaders had very visceral reasons to succeed at this monumentally difficult task: They had lived through or fought in two world wars. America falsely believed that “what happened in Europe doesn’t affect us,” only to be drawn into World War I and suffer almost 260,000 U.S. killed and wounded. And again, when an aggressive dictator went unanswered for too long: World War II, in which millions of civilians and hundreds of thousands of those fighting were killed or wounded in Europe alone — including approximately 552,000 Americans.

The scale of death, destruction, famine and the massive displacements of European civilians, many parentless children, all led senior leaders of the period to the same conclusion — never again. “The enormity of the task before all of them,” said Dean Acheson in the opening of his memoir Present at the Creation, “began to appear as just a bit less formidable than that described in the first chapter of Genesis.”

The men and women who fought, and then built the Europe most of us inherited, would be appalled by the growing attitude today among too many American leaders and citizens of not supporting Ukraine.

The full text of this piece is available at https://themessenger.com/opinion/uk...policy-leadership-putin-war-nato-funding

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-aid-congress%E2%80%99-failure-us-foreign-policy-leadership

Oct. 5, 2023 — A village cafe and store in eastern Ukraine was hit by a Russian rocket, killing at least 51 civilians in one of the deadliest attacks of the year. Zelenskyy denounced the strike in the village of Hroza as a "demonstrably brutal Russian crime" and "a completely deliberate act of terrorism." The cafe was hosting a wake following a funeral.

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 6, 2023
Oct 6, 2023 - ISW Press











Karolina Hird, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, and Mason Clark

October 6, 2023, 6:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2pm ET on October 6. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 7 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 6. Ukrainian military sources noted that Ukrainian forces continued successful offensive actions south of Bakhmut near Andriivka (8km southeast of Bakhmut).[1] Geolocated footage posted on October 5 shows that Ukrainian forces have advanced towards a tree line between Robotyne and Verbove, about 6km southeast of Robotyne.[2] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Ilya Yevlash noted that Ukrainian forces are preparing for offensive operations throughout the autumn-winter period. Yevlash emphasized that while supply requirements will increase and rainy and foggy conditions may complicate the use of drones and tactical and army aviation, Ukrainian forces will continue to fight through the winter.[3] Yevlash’s statement supports ISW’s longstanding assessment that weather will not prevent either side from conducting offensive operations throughout the winter of 2023-2024 if they are well-supplied and choose to do so, as they did in the winter of 2022, and that the pace of Ukrainian offensives will largely be metered by Western provision of appropriate small-arms and ammunition and non-lethal supplies to Ukraine - not simply winter weather conditions or any specific weapons system.

Russian forces appear to have recently conducted a regimental rotation in the Orikhiv area, demonstrating an ability to sustain their defenses in this critical sector of the frontline. A Ukrainian military observer reported on October 6 that elements of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District), which were recently “partially restored,” withdrew to positions east of Nesteryanka (about 10km northwest of Robotyne) after the Russian command previously committed them to the area.[5] The Ukrainian observer also suggested that elements of the 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment (also of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division) are ”persistently” counterattacking on the northern outskirts of Novoprokopivka (2km south of Robotyne).[6] ISW observed in mid-September that critical elements of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, particularly its 291st and 71st Motorized Rifle Regiments, withdrew behind the Russian defensive line between Verbove and Solodka Balka (about 5km south of Robotyne) due to casualties that may have rendered them combat ineffective.[7] Following the withdrawal of elements of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division to rear areas in western Zaporizhia Oblast, elements of the 7th and 76th Airborne (VDV) divisions laterally redeployed to the area from Kherson and Luhansk oblasts to fill in the gaps left by 42nd Motorized Rifle Division elements.[8] By late September, ISW observed elements of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division apparently recommitting to the front near Novoprokopivka, suggesting that they rotated back to the front after resting and reconstituting for a short time.[9] The Ukrainian military source’s observations about the 291st and 71st Motorized Rifle Regiments, as well as increased recent Russian reporting of these regiments defending against Ukrainian attacks in the areas south and west of Robotyne, suggest that Russian forces have conducted regiment-level rotations in this sector of the front over the past month.[10] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces were likely struggling to conduct tactical to operational level rotations along the entire frontline, but is revising this assessment considering the apparent rotation of substantial elements of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division and two VDV divisions to and from the frontline south of Orikhiv.

Russian forces reportedly resumed an offensive effort near Kupyansk on October 6, but the majority of the Russian forces reportedly deployed to this sector of the front likely remain combat ineffective.Ukrainian military officials reported a decrease in Russian activity near Kupyansk in recent weeks, but Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Ilya Yevlash stated on October 6 that Russian forces resumed combat operations in the Kupyansk-Lyman direction.[11] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces launched an offensive push near Synkivka (8km northeast of Kupyansk) and that Russian forces are heavily shelling the N26 (Shevchenkove-Kupyansk) highway.[12] One milblogger characterized the renewed Russian offensive push towards Kupyansk as “large-scale” in a now-deleted post.[13] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov previously reported that the Russian military deployed elements of the newly formed 25th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (reportedly formed under the Eastern Military District) to the Kupyansk direction to replace elements of the 41st CAA (Central Military District).[14] The resumption of Russian offensive operations near Kupyansk, possibly including elements of the 25th CAA, is likely intended to draw Ukrainian attention away from other sectors of the front in southern Ukraine. ISW previously assessed, however, that the 25th CAA was hurriedly deployed ahead of an intended deployment date of December 2023 and is likely severely understaffed, poorly trained, or both.[15] ISW has also previously observed the presence of heavily degraded Western Military District (WMD) elements, particularly of the 1st Guards Tank Army and 6th Combined Arms Army, in the Kupyansk area, and ISW does not assess at this time that a grouping comprised of the newly formed 25th Combined Arms Army with degraded WMD elements will be able to sustain meaningful offensives in this area.

Russian forces may be expanding military training infrastructure in occupied eastern Ukraine as part of ongoing efforts to increase the training and mobilization capacity of the Russian military. A Ukrainian reserve officer published satellite imagery on October 5 showing that Russian forces are expanding multiple training facilities in rear areas in occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, including near Novopavlivka in occupied Luhansk Oblast.[17] The Ukrainian reserve officer stated that Russian forces are likely attempting to alleviate logistical bottlenecks and improve infrastructure to support continued mobilization and training.[18] Russian forces may be expanding training infrastructure in rear areas of occupied eastern Ukraine as part of the effort to establish nine reserve regiments, as well as ”self-sufficient” force groupings, in occupied areas of Ukraine as part of ongoing large-scale military reforms.[19] ISW assessed with low confidence that the nine reserve regiments undergoing training may be training regiments through which Russian volunteers could flow on their way to the front.[20] The Russian military may also be expanding bases in occupied Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts as part of ongoing efforts to integrate and formalize Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republic forces within the Russian military and to increase the self-sufficiency of Russian groupings in occupied Ukraine by establishing forward training and C2 infrastructure in occupied Ukraine, rather than running operations in Donetsk and Luhansk from the Southern Military District itself.

The Kremlin’s continued attempts to deflect blame for the crash of Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s plane crash and disgrace Prigozhin are generating continued praise for Prigozhin and efforts to defend his legacy among select information space communities. Pro-Wagner and Wagner-affiliated channels largely lampooned Putin’s suggestion on October 5 Prigozhin’s plane crashed due to grenades detonating onboard, possibly due to the passengers using alcohol or drugs onboard.[22] Some channels called Putin’s claims “laughable,” “a farce,” and disrespectful to “heroes” of Russia.[23] A Russian insider source claimed that members of the Russian Presidential Administration ”provoked” Putin to deliver these statements in order to “de-heroize” Prigozhin, since Prigozhin’s previous statements questioning the reasons for the start of the war in Ukraine are apparently gaining popularity throughout Russia.[24] Putin’s comments do not appear to have had the intended effect and have instead pushed some elements of the Russian information space to attempt to preserve Prigozhin’s reputation and disprove Putin‘s implication that Prigozhin was to blame for the plane crash by continuing to discuss Prigozhin and criticize the Kremlin’s official line on his death. However, the Kremlin’s apparent perceived need to continue to discuss Prigozhin’s death and denigrate him further is noteworthy regardless of any information space responses, indicating the Kremlin likely perceives some continuing threat from Prigozhin’s statements and stance on the war.

Former Russian military commanders who participated in the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 reportedly remain in peripheral positions of some influence within the Russian military or defense-industrial base. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger amplified a claim by a Russian insider source on October 6 that listed the current positions of Russian military commanders whom the Russian military leadership replaced after the initial invasion of Ukraine in 2022 failed to achieve its intended goals.[25] The source claimed that former Western Military District (WMD) Commander Colonel General Alexander Zhuravlev and former Southern Military District (SMD) Commander Army General Alexander Dvornikov are currently advisors to High Precision Complexes (a subsidiary of Rostec, Russia’s primary state-owned defense conglomerate) and the Almaz-Antey Aerospace Defense Concern (another state-owned defense enterprise), respectively. The source claimed that Dvornikov is still in “army circles” and hopes to return to the military. The source claimed that former Central Military District Commander Colonel General Alexander Lapin is currently the Chief of Staff of the Russian Ground Forces. The source claimed that former Eastern Military District (EMD) Commander Colonel General Alexander Chaiko served in Syria and the Russian General Staff after his dismissal as EMD commander but that his current position is unknown. Former United Kingdom Secretary of State for Defense Ben Wallace stated on October 1 that the Russian military leadership had removed all commanders who led major Russian units into Ukraine in February 2022.[26] These insider source claims are largely consistent with ISW’s previous observations of a pattern of Russian military leadership shifting disgraced and ineffective commanders to peripheral positions far removed from Ukraine without entirely discharging them from military or security sector government positions, leaving open the option of returning to a command position.

Russian forces conducted a Shahed-131/136 drone strike targeting port, grain, and border infrastructure in southern Ukraine on the night of October 5-6. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched 33 Shahed drones from Cape Chauda, Crimea and that Ukrainian air defenses shot down 25 of the drones.[28] The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported that the Russian strike damaged port infrastructure and a granary along the Danube River in Odesa Oblast, and geolocated footage published on October 6 indicates that the strike hit the Orlivka-Isaccea ferry crossing that connects Odesa Oblast and Romania.


Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 6.
Russian forces appear to have recently conducted a regimental rotation in the Orikhiv area, demonstrating an ability to sustain their defenses in this critical sector of the frontline.
Russian forces reportedly resumed an offensive effort near Kupyansk on October 6, but the majority of the Russian forces reportedly deployed to this sector of the front likely remain combat ineffective.
Russian forces may be expanding military training infrastructure in occupied eastern Ukraine as part of ongoing efforts to increase the training and mobilization capacity of the Russian military.
The Kremlin’s continued attempts to deflect blame for the crash of Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s plane crash and disgrace Prigozhin are generating continued praise for Prigozhin and efforts to defend his legacy among select information space communities.
Former Russian military commanders who participated in the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 reportedly remain in peripheral positions of some influence within the Russian military or defense-industrial base.
Russian forces conducted a Shahed-131/136 drone strike targeting port, grain, and border infrastructure in southern Ukraine on the night of October 5-6.
Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Lyman line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas.
Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations near Bakhmut and advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Russia has reportedly recruited up to several hundred Serbian nationals to fight in Ukraine.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-6-2023

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 8, 2023
Oct 8, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 8, 2023

Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Kateryna Stepanenko, Angelica Evans, and Mason Clark

October 8, 2023, 5pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on October 8. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 9 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

NOTE: ISW has added a new section on Russian information operations and narratives to the daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, found at the end of the update.

Russia advanced legal mechanisms to reform the Leningrad Military District as part of ongoing large-scale military reforms. The Russian federal portal of draft regulatory legal acts published a presidential decree on October 8, prepared by the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), which proposes stripping the Northern Fleet (NF) of its status as an “interspecific strategic territorial association.”[1] Russian state media noted that the proposal indicates that the NF will no longer be a separate military-administrative unit equal to a military district, suggesting that the NF and its four constituent regions (The Komi Republic, Arkhangelsk, and Murmansk oblasts, and the Nenets Autonomous Okrug) will be transferred to the reformed Leningrad Military District.[2] Russian military analyst Yuri Fedorov noted that the recreation of the Leningrad Military District suggests that Russia is preparing for possible conflicts with Baltic states and NATO.[3] The Russian military merged the Moscow and Leningrad Military Districts into the Western Military District in 2010.[4] The MoD created the Northern Fleet in 2014 out of territory covered by the Western Military District, and Russian President Vladimir Putin made the NF a military-administrative unit equal to a military district starting January 1, 2021.[5] Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu proposed the recreation of the Moscow and Leningrad Military Districts on the basis of the Western Military District (reversing the 2010 and 2014 changes) in December of 2022, and confirmed that these military districts were under active formation as of August 2023.[6] The MoD’s decision to re-divide the WMD indicates Russia sees the need to restructure its forces facing NATO and likely posture on the Finnish border, although it remains unclear how Russia will be able to mobilize, train, and organize these forces into new military district-level formations.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and marginally advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 8. Geolocated footage published on October 8 shows that Ukrainian forces made limited gains north of Novoprokopivka (14km south of Orikhiv), and a Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces also advanced near Kopani (10km southwest of Orikhiv).[7] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces achieved partial success northeast of Andriivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut), and Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued attacks near Andriivka, and Kurdyumivka (11km southwest of Bakhmut).[8] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that deteriorating weather conditions are impacting both Russian and Ukrainian operations across the theater. Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Shtupun stated that Russian drone and aviation activity has decreased in the past few days due to poor weather.[9] Russian milbloggers claimed that deteriorating weather conditions in the Bakhmut and Zaporizhia directions are impacting Ukrainian offensive operations as well as Russian aerial reconnaissance operations.[10] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Ilya Yevlash reiterated that poor weather may impact drone and aviation operations but that the weather will not halt Ukraine’s counteroffensive.

Russian forces are intensifying mining efforts in the Robotyne-Verbove area and seek to fix Ukrainian forces on areas of the front away from western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have begun remining previously cleared areas on the Robotyne-Verbove line (10km south to 18km southeast of Orikhiv) to achieve tactical surprise.[12] The milbloggers claimed that heavy Russian mining and remining efforts have disrupted the movement of heavy Ukrainian cargo and equipment in these areas in recent days. A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces intensified tactical offensive operations in several areas of the front beyond Zaporizhia Oblast in order to stretch Ukrainian defenses and divide Ukrainian attention.[13] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Shtupun stated that Russian forces are trying to fix Ukrainian forces in the Avdiivka and Marinka directions and prevent them from deploying reserves to the Zaporizhia direction.

Russian sources are highlighting apparent fault lines between regular Russian forces and irregular formations of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR). A Russian milblogger claiming to be a Buryat soldier fighting in the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade [MRB] (36th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) responded on October 7 to a post published by another milblogger on August 13 that accused the 37th MRB of abandoning their positions around Novodonetske (in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia border area) during Ukrainian attacks that ultimately liberated the village, leaving only elements of the DNR “Kaskad” operational tactical combat formation to defend the area.[15] The Buryat milblogger refuted this story and claimed that “Kaskad” conducts a small part of combat activities on the front while regular Russian troops shoulder more of the offensive burden, and derided other DNR units for having positions far behind frontline areas held by regular units.[16] The milblogger also claimed that DNR units have low skill levels and that regular Russian troops distrust them.[17] The allegations made by this milblogger against DNR formations suggest that there is continued friction between DNR forces and regular Russian forces, which is likely to further complicate efforts to integrate DNR forces into the regular Russian military as part of ongoing military reforms.

Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat expressed concern over an anticipated Russian Shahed 131/136 drone strike campaign against Ukraine this winter. Ihnat stated on October 8 that Russian forces have increased the intensity of Shahed strikes recently, as Ukrainian officials previously warned.[19] Ihnat stated that Russian forces used 1,000 Shahed drones during the 2023-23 heating season but used a record 500 drones during September 2023 alone, indicating that Ukraine needs to prepare seriously for Russia’s 2023-24 winter drone strike campaign. Ihnat noted that Ukraine is gradually replacing Soviet air defense systems with Western-provided systems and intends to use these systems to protect Ukrainian energy facilities, port infrastructure, grain silos, and other critical infrastructure against Russian drone strikes this winter. Ihnat added that Russian authorities want to increase the production of Shahed drones domestically but cannot overcome their reliance on Iran for certain technologies and spare parts required for production.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) observed satellite imagery showing that rail traffic between North Korea and Russia “dramatically” increased since Russian President Vladimir Putin met with North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un on September 12-17.[21] CSIS’ Beyond Parallel project found that satellite imagery captured on October 5 showed an “unprecedented” 73 freight railcars at the North Korea’s Tumangang Rail Facility. Beyond Parallel noted that previous satellite images showed a maximum of approximately 20 railcars at the Tumangang facility at once over the past five years. Beyond Parallel also observed shipping crates/containers and equipment laid out in the open at the main warehouse area at the Tumangang facility, although the contents of the transported goods remain unclear. Beyond Parallel remarked that the external characteristics of the containers and equipment are different from those observed during the past five years at the facility and assessed that it is “probable that these shipments are, or include, munitions and artillery.” Russian milbloggers and sources amplified Beyond Parallel findings in the Russian information space without confirming or denying the possibility of North Korean arms supplies to Russia.[22] ISW previously assessed that Putin may be open to some forms of technological and defensive cooperation with North Korea in return for North Korean artillery ammunition as long as such cooperation does not trigger secondary sanctions against Russia.

The Russian federal government continues to disenfranchise certain ethnic minority federal subjects (regions) while selectively empowering others. Radio Liberty’s Tatar-Bashkir service Idel Realii amplified an opinion piece written by Tatar activist Ruslan Aisin on October 8 which criticizes the implementation of a new Tatarstan state national policy as federally enforced “feudalism.”[24] Aisin noted that the new policy dropped a provision on “strengthening Tatarstan identity,” which Aisin emphasized is aimed at Russifying ethnically diverse populations living in the Russian Federation, and claimed that the Russian federal government likely prompted the provision’s removal.[25] Aisin remarked that the removal of this provision is meant to deprive ethnic minority regions of their ability to empower their own cultures, languages, and traditions but questioned why Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov is allowed to publicly promote Chechen traditions and identity.[26] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Kremlin have recently signaled explicit support for Kadyrov and his style of rule in Chechnya despite increased interethnic tensions within Russian society and the military.[27] The suggestion that Russian federal policy is purposefully trying to disenfranchise Tatar identity while simultaneously empowering Kadyrov indicates that the Kremlin is interested in rewarding the ethnic minority regions that are the most overtly loyal to the Kremlin and provide the Kremlin with substantial military manpower for the war in Ukraine.


Key Takeaways:

Russia advanced legal mechanisms to form the Leningrad Military District as part of ongoing large-scale military reforms.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and marginally advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 8.
Russian forces are intensifying mining efforts in the Robotyne-Verbove area and seek to fix Ukrainian forces on areas of the front away from western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Russian sources are highlighting apparent fault lines between regular Russian forces and irregular formations of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR).
Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat expressed concern over an anticipated Russian Shahed 131/136 drone strike campaign against Ukraine this winter.
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) observed satellite imagery showing that rail traffic between North Korea and Russia “dramatically” increased since Russian President Vladimir Putin met with North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un on September 12-17
The Russian federal government continues to disenfranchise certain ethnic minority federal subjects (regions) while selectively empowering others.
Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, western Donetsk Oblast, and on the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast administrative border on October 8 and reportedly advanced in some areas.
Prague-based Russian-language outlet Current Time reported on October 8 that the number of desertion cases within the Russian military has increased.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-8-2023

Special Edition Campaign Assessment


SPECIAL EDITION CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT: UKRAINE’S STRIKE CAMPAIGN AGAINST CRIMEA
Oct 8, 2023 - ISW Press

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, Special Edition: Ukraine’s Strike Campaign Against Crimea

Ukraine’s Strike Campaign Against Crimea Seeks to Degrade Russian Defenses in Southern Ukraine and Supports Ongoing Ukrainian Counteroffensive Operations

Nicole Wolkov and Mason Clark

Note: ISW is publishing this special edition update on Ukraine’s strike campaign against Crimea in addition to its regular daily update for October 8.

Key Takeaway: Ukrainian forces have conducted a campaign of strikes against Russian military infrastructure, headquarters, and logistics routes in Crimea since June 2023 in order to degrade the Russian military’s ability to use Crimea as a staging and rear area for Russian defensive operations in southern Ukraine. Ukrainian strikes on logistics routes are disrupting Russian supplies to Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblast. Strikes on Black Sea Fleet assets are degrading its role as a combined arms headquarters but have not defeated it as a naval force. Ukrainian strikes generate outsized morale shocks among Russian commanders and in the Russian information space. Western provision of long-range missiles to Ukraine would amplify this ongoing, essential, and timely campaign to weaken Russia’s ability to defend southern Ukraine.

Ukrainian forces began a successful and ongoing campaign of strikes on Russian military infrastructure in Crimea in summer 2023, intended to degrade Russia’s ability to use Crimea as a key staging and rear area for Russian operations in southern Ukraine. Ukrainian forces conducted a series of strikes on Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in Crimea – including the Chonhar and Henichesk Bridges, and likely the Kerch Strait Bridge – during the first phases of Ukraine’s counteroffensive in June 2023 to disrupt Russia’s ability to provide personnel and material to defensive operations in southern Ukraine.[1] Ukrainian forces have since then consistently targeted Russian airfields, air defense systems, command posts, and supply depots in Crimea and along the Crimea-Melitopol-Rostov-on-Don route.[2] Ukrainian military officials including Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi have stated that Ukraine’s interdiction campaign has successfully degraded Russian logistics and defensive systems, and Ukraine has increasingly expanded its strike campaign to target Russian naval assets.

The Russian military used Crimea as a springboard for its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and continues to use it as a key staging area. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) likely considers Crimea a “platsdarm” – ? Russian military term roughly translated as “bridgehead,” but defined more broadly as an area that a military can use to concentrate forces and use as a starting point for military operations.[4] Russian forces, primarily from the Black Sea Fleet (BSF) and other Southern Military District (SMD) formations, began concentrating personnel and equipment in Crimea and conducting exercises in 2021 in the buildup to the February 2022 invasion.[5] The Russian axis of advance north from Crimea achieved greater successes than Russia’s multiple other axes during the first weeks of the full-scale invasion, and ISW previously assessed that Russian forces advancing out of Crimea (including elements of the SMD, 7th Airborne (VDV) Division, and Black Sea Fleet) had higher readiness and performed more effectively than Russian forces in northern and eastern Ukraine.

The Russian military continues to use Crimea as the primary rear area for Russian forces defending against Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in southern Ukraine and would use Crimea to support any future offensive operations in this region. The Russian military continues to use rail lines and roads in Crimea to transit military personnel, equipment, fuel, and lubricants intended for Russian frontline operations in southern Ukraine, supporting the longer supply route from Rostov Oblast, Russia, across occupied southern Ukraine.[7] Russian forces have also consistently used major Crimean cities including Sevastopol, Armyansk, and Dzhankoi as military logistics hubs.[8] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Radio Svoboda reported in April 2023 that the Russian military operated multiple military hospitals in Sevastopol, Simferopol, and Fedosia with a total of 1,250 beds and that Russian officials closed these hospitals to civilian patients about three months prior to the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and Russia has leveraged these hospitals to treat wounded Russian personnel throughout the war.

Ukrainian forces are conducting precision strikes on Black Sea Fleet (BSF) elements in addition to strikes on Russian logistics routes and hubs, likely disrupting its role as a combined arms – not strictly naval – headquarters coordinating Russian ground operations in southern Ukraine. Despite its name, the BSF is a major combined arms formation, roughly equivalent in stature to Russia’s land Combined Arms Armies. In addition to naval surface and submarine warfare elements, the BSF formally controls several surface-to-surface missile batteries and air defense batteries which have been deployed to occupied southern Ukraine; the 22nd Army Corps; and Naval Infantry elements.[10] Russian fleet and army headquarters are additionally designed to flexibly take control of attached units, and the BSF is likely responsible for commanding some portion of Russian volunteer formations and other irregular units in southern Ukraine. The BSF is also likely responsible for maintaining Russian logistics between Krasnodar Krai and Crimea to the Russian southern grouping of forces, as the BSF is the only formal Russian military structure with a long-term presence in occupied Ukraine.[11] Satellite imagery published on September 22 indicates that Ukrainian forces conducted a precise strike on the BSF headquarters despite Russian air defenses and electronic warfare capabilities.[12] Ukrainian military officials reported that the September 22 Ukrainian strike on the BSF Command headquarters occurred during a meeting of senior BSF officials and reportedly wounded 105 Russian personnel including the commander of the Russian grouping of forces in the Zaporizhia direction, Colonel General Alexander Romanchuk, and killed 34 BSF officers.[13] Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk stated that the loss of unspecified BSF leadership will likely cause significant challenges to command and control because junior commanders lack the initiative to make individual decisions.[14] Pletenchuk also reported that some unspecified mechanisms of the BSF have become inoperable due to the BSF’s centralization of command.

Ukrainian strikes against BSF naval assets and repair facilities in Crimea may be preventing BSF naval elements from fully conducting their desired missions, though BSF elements remain capable of conducting most wartime operations, and assertions Ukraine has driven away or defeated the BSF are premature. A Ukrainian missile strike on Sevastopol damaged a Russian landing ship, Kilo-class submarine, and the state-owned ship repair facility Sevmorzavod on September 13.[16] Satellite imagery published on October 1 and 3 shows that Russian forces transferred at least 10 vessels from Sevastopol to Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai, likely to protect them from continued Ukrainian strikes.[17] Further satellite imagery taken on October 6 confirms that at least thirteen vessels, including at least one Kalibr missile-equipped warship, remain in Sevastopol, and it is premature to state Ukraine has defeated or driven away the BSF.[18] The threat of Ukrainian strikes on BSF vessels may be prompting Russian command to withdraw some vessels away from the shore of occupied southern Ukraine. Russian withdrawals from the coast may partially impede Russia’s ability to conduct regular patrols and close support of defensive operations in southern Ukraine but do not remove Russia’s seaborne strike capabilities entirely. Russian vessels could continue to strike Ukraine with Kalibr cruise missiles and other systems even if the Russian military chooses to move vessels from Sevastopol to Novorossiysk, and Russian forces have conducted multiple sea-based Kalibr cruise missile strikes since Ukrainian military officials officially acknowledged the interdiction campaign.

However, Ukrainian strikes on Russian vessels and Russia’s decision to withdraw vessels from the western Black Sea likely have limited the ability of BSF vessels to threaten Ukraine’s “grain corridor” in the Black Sea. Russia likely intended to impose a blockade following Russia’s departure from the Black Sea grain deal without having to formally commit warships and legally declare a blockade, but at least six commercial vessels have successfully traveled to Ukraine through the unofficial corridor since July 2023.[20] The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on September 26 that Ukrainian strikes have diminished the BSF’s ability to conduct wide security patrols, conduct routine maintenance, and enforce blockades of Ukrainian ports despite continuing to execute its core capabilities.

Ukrainian strikes are successfully degrading Russian air defenses, possibly enabling future strikes on key Russian assets. Suspilne Crimea reported on September 21 that Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) sources stated that the SBU and the Ukrainian Navy enabled a successful Neptune missile strike on a Russian airfield near Saky, Crimea by first launching drones to overwhelm Russian air defense systems.[22] The SBU sources reportedly stated that the missile strike inflicted unspecified serious damage to the airfield.[23] Ukrainian forces struck a Russian air defense system (likely a S-400 system near Yevpatoria, Crimea) in September and likely struck another S-400 system near Olenivka, Crimea in August.[24] Russian sources expressed concerns over Ukraine’s ability to operate drones over Crimea during these strikes.[25] Successive Ukrainian strikes on Russian air defense infrastructure may be indicative of wider systemic issues with Russian air defenses in Crimea.

Ukrainian strikes on Russian military assets in Crimea often generate Russian panic disproportionate to their kinetic effect and negatively impact Russian morale. Ukrainian strikes on Russian rear areas consistently cause panic in the Russian information space and generate frustration and criticism about the Russian military command.[26] Ukrainian strikes on Crimea have also caused some Russian milbloggers to panic and erroneously perceive any Ukrainian actions targeting Crimea as conditions setting for imminent Ukrainian operations to liberate the peninsula.[27] Russian milbloggers notably expressed concern that Ukrainian forces were able to operate a drone and record footage of a strike on a Russian S-400 air defense system in Crimea about 120km behind the current frontline.[28] The Russian withdrawal of aviation elements and other military equipment from the Chornobaivka base from May to September 2022 following the Western provision of HIMARS to Ukraine and the more recent withdrawal of some BSF surface elements from Crimea suggest that preemptive fears of Ukrainian strikes can compel Russian forces to withdraw military assets further into the rear.[29] Several Russian milbloggers accused other milbloggers of spreading panic by publishing images purportedly showing the aftermath of Ukrainian strikes in Crimea in late July 2023.[30] Crimean occupation head Sergey Aksyonov announced on August 14 that Crimean occupation officials will propose amendments at a federal level to increase the liability for the spread of photos and videos showing the location and operation of Russian air defense systems, other systems, and military and strategic assets, indicating increased concern over Ukrainian strike capabilities.

A sustained and expanded Ukrainian strike campaign against Russian military targets in Crimea would likely degrade Russian efforts to defend against Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in southern Ukraine. Ukrainian strikes against Russian military infrastructure in occupied southern Ukraine often cause Russian occupation officials to temporarily suspend transit, disrupting key Russian ground lines of communications (GLOCs) connecting Crimea to occupied Kherson Oblast for periods from a few hours to a few months.[32] Disruptions to Russia’s southern GLOCs have created severe logistics delays and bottlenecks, as the only routes to or from Crimea to occupied Kherson Oblast or Russia are a limited set of bridges. Suppressing or destroying Russian air defense capabilities in southern Ukraine would increase the vulnerability of these GLOCs to Russian ground operations in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts. Sustained missile strikes on Russian offensive air capabilities would likely strain Russian aviation attempting to conduct strikes on Ukraine by increasing their flight time, thereby decreasing the loitering time for Russian aviation to conduct strikes on Ukraine.

Sustained long-range strikes against Russian military targets in Crimea could additionally force the Russian military to move military assets and command centers farther away from the frontline, disrupting command and control. Russian milbloggers acknowledged that Western-provided HIMARS forced the Russian military to establish and execute a withdrawal plan from the Russian military base at the Kherson International Airport Chornobaivka (1km northwest of Kherson City) that concluded in September 2022.[33] ISW has also observed reports that Russian forces have moved command headquarters out of range of some Ukrainian platforms in an attempt to protect command centers from HIMARS and other long-range missile strikes after summer 2022.[34] A sustained and successful Ukrainian strike campaign against Crimea could likely achieve similar effects.

Western provision of long-range missiles to Ukraine would amplify this ongoing, essential, and timely campaign to weaken Russia’s ability to defend southern Ukraine. No single Western-provided system will provide Ukraine with a decisive advantage or directly enable Ukrainian victory, and this report does not assert that ATACMS or other systems would provide Ukraine with a silver bullet.[35] However, Ukraine is demonstrably degrading Russian forces and logistics in Crimea, and the Western provision of long-range missiles would enable further strikes on the Russian rear. Four unnamed US government officials told NBC News in an article published on September 22 that US President Joe Biden told Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky that the US would provide Ukraine with “a small number of long-range missiles.”[36] Several unnamed people familiar with ongoing deliberations on ATACMS told the Washington Post that the Biden administration plans to provide Ukraine with a version of ATACMS armed with cluster munitions rather than a single (unitary) warhead.[37] Ukraine’s use of precision fires enables ongoing counteroffensive operations against occupied Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts and is not focused solely on a hypothetical future ground attack into Crimea itself - and Ukraine’s need for ATACMS and similar systems is therefore a timely requirement to support ongoing Ukrainian operations.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/special-edition-campaign-assessment-ukraine%E2%80%99s-strike-campaign-against-crimea

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 10, 2023
Oct 10, 2023 - ISW Press

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 10, 2023

Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Karolina Hird, Nicole Wolkov, and Mason Clark

October 10, 2023, 5:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on October 10. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 11 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

NOTE: ISW has added a new section on Russian information operations and narratives to the daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, found at the end of the update.

Russian forces launched localized offensive operations in the Avdiivka area of Donetsk Oblast and southwest of Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 9, which are likely intended to fix Ukrainian forces away from the Robotyne area. Russian forces intensified offensive operations northwest of Avdiivka near Ocheretyne, Tonenke, and Berdychi and southwest of Avdiivka on the Vodyane-Opytne line.[1] Russian forces also attacked southwest of Orikhiv on the Pyatykhatky-Zherebyanky line, and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced up two kilometers in the area.[2] The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed up to three Russian battalions conducted an attack in the Avdiivka direction, and ISW has observed footage of fighting in the area, but ISW has not observed any confirmation of these claimed Russian advances as of this writing.[3] Russian milbloggers are largely portraying the Avdiivka-area operations as a significant offensive effort aimed at encircling the Ukrainian force grouping in Avdiivka and capturing the city.[4] A successful encirclement of Avdiivka, one of the most heavily fortified areas of the Donetsk Oblast front line, would very likely require more forces than Russia has currently dedicated to the Avdiivka-Donetsk City effort. Russian forces have largely deployed irregular forces along this frontline, primarily elements of the 1st Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Army Corps and additional volunteer formations that have largely suffered from poor and abusive command culture and tensions with regular Russian units.[5] ISW has observed no recent Russian deployments to this line. Russian forces have also conducted grinding offensive operations for relatively minimal territorial gains near Avdiivka for the past year and a half of the war, and the Russian military command is likely aware that an effort to capture Avdiivka would require more and higher-quality units than those currently deployed in the area.

The increased Russian offensive operations in the Avdiivka and Zherebyanky areas coincide with other localized offensive efforts in Luhansk Oblast and eastern Zaporizhia Oblast, all likely aimed at fixing Ukrainian forces and preventing Ukrainian command from transferring reserves to critical areas of the front in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[7] Ukrainian officials have made a number of statements within the past few weeks to this effect, particularly noting that Russian attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line are meant to prevent Ukrainians from transferring forces to Zaporizhia Oblast.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and made confirmed advances in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area. Geolocated footage published on October 9 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced northeast of Mykilske (3km southeast of Vuhledar and about 30km southeast of Velyka Novosilka).[9] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces achieved partial success near Andriivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).[10] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced west of Novofedorivka (15km northeast of Robotyne and 6km northeast of Verbove).

Russian military leadership may have once again replaced the commander of the 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA), suggesting ongoing pervasive Russian command and control issues in western Zaporizhia Oblast. A Russian insider source claimed on October 9 that the Russian command removed Lieutenant General Denis Lyamin from command of the 58th CAA, after Lyamin replaced former commander Major General Ivan Popov on July 13.[12] The insider source claimed that during Lyamin’s three-month tenure, the Russian General Staff went to great lengths to conceal the true nature of the situation within units of the 58th CAA, which are currently defending against Ukrainian counteroffensives in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and claimed that this is in large part because Lyamin is a close associate of Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov. The insider source suggested that Gerasimov removed Lyamin from command of the 58th CAA and re-assigned him the position of Chief of Staff of the Central Military District to shield him from criticism over Russian operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast. While ISW cannot independently confirm Lyamin’s alleged re-appointment, the suggestion that the 58th CAA has undergone two major command changes in a short period possibly indicates command-and-control challenges, and at minimum concern among Russian command over the conduct of operations in this key sector of the front.

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes targeting southern Ukraine on the night of October 9 to 10. The Ukrainian General Staff and Air Force reported that Ukrainian air defenses downed 27 of the 36 Shahed-131/-136 launched from occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea towards Odesa, Mykolaiv, and Kherson oblasts.[13] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk reported on October 10 that Russian forces are likely conducting strikes using only Shahed drones because the Russian military is attempting to conserve missiles since Russian missile production has slowed due to sanctions.[14] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated that Ukrainian air defense systems will continue to operate as usual during the winter and that Ukrainian forces will strengthen their defense of energy and fuel facilities.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced plans to open a new corridor through Moldova and Romania for the export of Ukrainian grain. Zelensky announced that the overland grain corridor will open soon during a press conference with Romanian President Klaus Iohannis in Bucharest on October 10.

NATO adopted several resolutions aimed at increasing aid to Ukraine on October 9. The NATO Parliamentary Assembly adopted six resolutions related to the war in Ukraine and called for NATO countries to increase and expedite political, military, intelligence, financial, training, and humanitarian support to Ukraine and to “sustain this support for as long as it takes for Ukraine to prevail.”[18] The resolutions also called for the increased and rapid delivery of military equipment to Ukraine, including air defense systems, missiles, and fighter aircraft.


Key Takeaways:

Russian forces launched localized offensive operations in the Avdiivka area of Donetsk Oblast and southwest of Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 9, which are likely intended to fix Ukrainian forces away from the Robotyne area.
The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed up to three Russian battalions conducted an attack and ISW has observed footage of fighting in the area, but ISW has not observed any confirmation of these claimed Russian advances as of this writing.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and made confirmed advances in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.
Russian military leadership may have once again replaced the commander of the 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA), suggesting ongoing pervasive Russian command and control issues in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced plans to open a new corridor through Moldova and Romania for the export of Ukrainian grain.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in western Donetsk Oblast, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas on October 10.
The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Luhansk Oblast occupation authorities are cracking down against Ukrainian underground communication networks.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-10-2023
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Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 12, 2023
Oct 12, 2023 - ISW Press

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 12, 2023

Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, and Mason Clark

October 12, 2023, 8pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2:30pm ET on October 12. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 13 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

NOTE: ISW has added a new section on Russian information operations and narratives to the daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, found at the end of the update.

Russian forces likely launched a significant and ongoing offensive effort around Avdiivka, Donetsk Oblast on October 10. ISW observed Russian forces simultaneously attacking northwest, west, and south of Avdiivka using armored assault groups, rotary wing aircraft, and concentrated artillery starting on October 10.[1] Avdiivka City Military Administration Head Vitaliy Barabash indicated that Russian forces are carrying out assaults with air support in 10 to 12 directions around the settlement.[2] Ukrainian military observers framed Russian offensive operations against Avdiivka as a “major attack” and noted that Russian forces used an unusually high number of armored vehicles in combat.[3] Russian forces’ increased use of armored vehicles and aviation – alongside persistent simultaneous ground attacks – indicates that Russian forces are conducting an offensive effort more significant in scope and intent than ISW previously assessed on October 10 and October 11.[4] ISW is revising its assessment that Russian attacks around Avdiivka are local efforts intended solely to fix Ukrainian forces but is not prepared to assess the exact objectives and likely outcome of Russian efforts in the Avdiivka direction at this time.

Russian forces have not secured any major breakthroughs near Avdiivka as of October 12 and are unlikely to immediately cut off Ukrainian forces in the city.near Avdiivka as of October 12 and are unlikely to immediately cut off Ukrainian forces in the city. ISW estimates that Russian forces have captured 4.52 square kilometers of territory from different directions around Avdiivka since October 10 and that Russian forces are 3.32km away from a Ukrainian ground line of communication (GLOC) along the O0562 highway from the south and 5.25km from the north of Avdiivka, and Russian claims of advances beyond these distances are likely overstated. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces are attempting to create a cauldron around Ukrainian forces in Avdiivka, but quickly acknowledged that current advances are slow.[5] Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin claimed that it is too early to discuss a “full-scale [Ukrainian] exodus from the city” despite some Russian advances in the area.[6] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have already advanced 12km in the Avdiivka direction despite geolocated footage indicating only that Russian forces made limited advances northwest, south, and west of Avdiivka as of October 12 and did not immediately threaten Ukrainian forces with encirclement.[7] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces gained additional ground on a waste heap on Avdiivka’s northern flank near the Avdiivka Coke Plant; seized a section of a railroad south of Avdiivka; and advanced around the city, but ISW cannot confirm these claims at the time.[8] Russian sources also claimed that Russian forces destroyed the Ocheretyne railway station (13km northwest of Avdiivka), which they claimed supports Ukrainian logistics to Avdiivka.

Geolocated footage indicates that Russian forces have likely lost at least a battalion tactical group’s (BTG’s) worth of armored vehicles in offensive operations around Avdiivka. A reliable X (Twitter) user observed on October 12 that Ukrainian forces destroyed 33 Russian armored vehicles and 15 tanks since October 10 near Avdiivka.[10] A Ukrainian reserve officer stated that conservative estimates suggest Ukrainian forces have destroyed a minimum of 36 Russian armored vehicles including tanks, armored personnel carriers, and transport vehicles.[11] A milblogger also claimed that both sides are suffering “significant losses” in operations around Avdiivka.[12] Footage published on October 11 purportedly shows a Russian armored vehicle in a column near Avdiivka falling into a body of water, and geolocated footage published on October 11 and 12 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian vehicle columns around Avdiivka.[13] This footage indicates that Russian armored forces may not be applying lessons learned from previous offensive operations near Vuhledar in February 2023 or around Kyiv in March 2022, when Ukrainian forces destroyed a disorderly advancing column of Russian armored vehicles.[14] ISW previously reported that Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces operating around Avdiivka were effectively incorporating lessons learned from Russian defensive operations in southern Ukraine.[15] While Russian implementation of lessons learned will vary and Russian forces have achieved some advances in the Avdiivka area which were likely enabled by more effective units, ISW’s October 11 assessment was likely overstated.

Defending Ukrainian forces are inflicting relatively heavy losses and suppressing Russian logistics near Avdiivka, likely slowing down the Russian pace of advance. A Russian milblogger claimed that the pace of Russian advance had slowed down and Russian forces are now focusing on “quality” attacks after Russian forces endured initial high equipment losses.[16] Geolocated footage published on October 12 shows that Ukrainian forces destroyed a bridge northeast of Avdiivka between Yasynuvata and Horlivka.[17] A Russian milblogger claimed that the bridge’s destruction will negatively impact Russian logistics in the Avdiivka area and that Russian forces will likely face difficulties attempting to repair the bridge due to its proximity to the frontline.

The Russian information space is likely exaggerating the degree of Russian successes on the Avdiivka front and will continue to do so despite military failures or a slow pace of advance. Russian sources are celebrating Russian offensive operations but are largely not reacting to the significant vehicle losses sustained in just a few days of fighting. This muted response is largely inconsistent with prior outcry when Russian forces lost a whole armored vehicle column as the Russian offensive against Vuhledar culminated in February 2023.[19] The milbloggers are likely engaging in self-censorship following the recent arrests of prominent critical information space voices. Many prominent Russian milbloggers also have strong connections to formations in the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) People’s Militia, many of which are fighting in the Avdiivka area, further providing incentive for milbloggers to censor defeats and exaggerate claimed victories.[20] One prominent milblogger praised the Russian military command for providing information about claimed successes and noted that “this is the first operation in a long time where the [Russian] command tried to create an information cap.”

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly advanced in both sectors of the front on October 12. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces achieved some unspecified successes east of Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) and east of Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut).[22] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Ilya Yevlash stated that Ukrainian forces are continuing offensives in the Bakhmut direction and have advanced several hundred meters in unspecified areas.[23] The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Shtupun reported that Ukrainian forces improved their tactical positions west of Robotyne.

Russian “Vostok” Battalion Commander Alexander Khodakovsky advocated for Russian forces to freeze the frontlines in Ukraine in order to replace exhausted mobilized personnel with fresh contract servicemen and launch a renewed offensive effort. Khodakovsky stated on October 12 that Russian forces could conduct a “deliberate final phase” to end the war after replacing tired units with contract servicemen, which aligns with ISW’s longstanding assessment that Russian forces will almost certainly take advantage of any short or long-term freeze to refresh their forces and restart fighting at a later date.[25] Khodakovsky also noted that Russian forces will likely face effective Ukrainian defenses and resistance as Russian forces attempt to advance further west into Ukraine. Imprisoned former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin has consistently claimed that a specific faction of the Russian leadership, which Khodakovsky appears to be a member of, has long advocated for freezing the current frontline in Ukraine.[26] Girkin claimed on October 9 that Russian forces will continue to conduct a strategic defense to freeze the frontlines ahead of the Russian presidential elections in March 2024.

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes across Ukraine, targeting port infrastructure in southern Ukraine and critical infrastructure in Kharkiv Oblast on the night of October 11 to 12. Ukrainian official military sources reported that Ukrainian air defenses shot down 28 of the 33 Shahed-131/136 drones.[28] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported that an unspecified number of Russian drones struck the port area in Odesa Oblast.[29] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov stated on October 12 that the Russian military is stockpiling weapons intended for strikes against Ukrainian energy facilities and the oil and gas sector.[30] Ukrainian Kharkiv Oblast Administration Head Oleh Synehubov stated that a Russian drone partially damaged a critical infrastructure facility in Kharkiv Oblast and noted that Russian forces will increasingly target the Ukrainian energy sector in the fall and winter.[31] Ukrainian Minister of Energy Herman Halushchenko reported that Ukrainian power engineers are undergoing training in case of massive power outages but noted that it is difficult to predict the scale and impact of Russian attacks on the power system.

The Russian Presidential Administration continues preparations to manage and falsify the March 2024 presidential elections. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on October 12 that the Russian Presidential Administration may install electronic voting terminals with passport scanners at polling stations in certain regions of Russia ahead of the presidential election in March 2024.[33] The electronic voting terminals will reportedly allow Russian authorities to collect data about Russian citizens in an electronic database, including data regarding mobilization eligibility and voting habits. Meduza noted that Russian authorities first used electronic voting terminals during the Moscow mayoral elections in September 2023. ISW has previously observed the Kremlin manipulate national election results using electronic voting after the September 2021 State Duma elections.[34] Ural Regional State newswire URA.ru reported that its sources close to the Russian government claimed that the Russian federal government is closely monitoring the social media accounts of almost 90 current and former Kurgan Oblast politicians who expressed support for deceased Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s armed rebellion in June 2023.[35] Russian authorities have reportedly advised politicians to consider their social media posts carefully ahead of the presidential elections, likely an attempt to encourage self-censorship among politicians.


Key Takeaways:

Russian forces likely launched a significant and ongoing offensive effort around Avdiivka, Donetsk Oblast on October 10, and ISW is revising its initial assessment these attacks are a limited effort to fix Ukrainian forces.
Russian forces have not secured any major breakthroughs near Avdiivka as of October 12 and are unlikely to immediately cut off Ukrainian forces in the city.
Geolocated footage indicates that Russian forces have likely lost at least a battalion tactical group’s (BTG’s) worth of armored vehicles in offensive operations around Avdiivka.
The Russian information space is likely exaggerating the degree of Russian successes on the Avdiivka front and will continue to do so despite military failures or a slow pace of advance.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly advanced in both sectors of the front on October 12.
Russian “Vostok” Battalion Commander Alexander Khodakovsky advocated for Russian forces to freeze the frontlines in Ukraine in order to replace exhausted mobilized personnel with fresh contract servicemen and launch a renewed offensive effort.
Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes across Ukraine, targeting port infrastructure in southern Ukraine and critical infrastructure in Kharkiv Oblast on the night of October 11 to 12.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Kupyansk, along the Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, around Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizha Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas.
Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev stated on October 12 that the Russian military has recruited more than 357,000 contract, volunteer, and conscripted military personnel since January 1, 2023.
Russian authorities continue to persecute religious communities in occupied Ukraine as part of ongoing Russian efforts to destroy the Ukrainian identity.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-12-2023

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 14, 2023
Oct 14, 2023 - ISW Press

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 14, 2023

Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, Christina Harward, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Mason Clark

October 14, 2023, 4:25pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on October 14. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 15 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

US and Ukrainian officials reported on October 12 and 13 that they anticipated the Russian offensive operations around Avdiivka and expressed confidence in Ukrainian defenses US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby reported on October 13 that the new Russian offensive operations near Lyman and Avdiivka “did not come as a surprise.”[1] Kirby stated that the US is confident that Ukrainian forces will repel these Russian attacks.[2] Kirby also reported that Russian forces appear to be using human wave tactics, wherein the Russian military uses masses of poorly trained and equipped Russian soldiers to attempt to advance - the same practice Russian forces used during their failed winter offensive in winter 2023.[3] ISW has additionally observed Russian forces using higher than usual numbers of armored vehicles in ongoing operations.[4] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Representative Andriy Yusov similarly reported on October 12 that Ukrainian forces knew about and prepared for the Russian attack near Avdiivka and that Russian forces did not form sufficient reserves to attack along the entire frontline, but only in certain sectors.[5] Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian mines are slowing Russian advances near Avdiivka, indicating Ukrainian prior preparations for the attack.

The Russian information space remains divided on the prospects of Russian successes near Avdiivka and on current Ukrainian capabilities. Geolocated footage published on October 13 indicates that Russian forces marginally advanced north of the waste heap north of Avdiivka.[7] Additional geolocated footage published on October 14 indicates that Russian forces also advanced south of Avdiivka.[8] Some Russian sources claimed on October 13 and 14 that Ukrainian defensive fortifications pose a significant challenge to Russian advances around Avdiivka.[9] Some Russian sources indicated that Russian problems with medical support are also impeding Russian advances in the Avdiivka area. One Russian source claimed on October 12 that there is a shortage of surgeons in occupied Horlivka and Donetsk City near Avdiivka and called on Russian doctors to travel to the front to help treat wounded Russian soldiers.[10] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Shtupun similarly stated on October 14 that the majority of Russian casualties in the Avdiivka direction are due to low-quality medical treatment and local hospitals reaching capacity.[11]

Other Russian milbloggers continued to praise Russian offensive efforts on October 13 and 14 and reiterated the Kremlin’s desired narrative that the Ukrainian counteroffensive is over.[12] One Russian milblogger warned that Russian officials and sources have likely dismissed the Ukrainian counteroffensive too quickly and noted that it is too early to determine if the Russian attacks near Avdiivka will develop into an organized offensive operation.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in eastern and southern Ukraine on October 14 and advanced west of Donetsk City. Geolocated footage published on October 14 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced north of Marinka (just west of Donetsk City).[14] Ukrainian and Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued to attack Russian positions on Bakhmut’s southern flank.[15] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced west of Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv) towards Rivne (24km southwest of Orikhiv) in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

The Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) will maintain some vessels at its main Sevastopol naval base amid Ukrainian strikes on Russian vessels, as the Russian Navy’s main drydock on the Black Sea is in Sevastopol. Ukrainian Naval Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk reported on October 14 that Ukrainian forces struck the Russian Professor Nikolai Muru tugboat and the Pavel Derzhavin patrol ship on October 13 and stated that the BSF has redeployed vessels from Sevastopol to Kerch, Feodosia, and Novorossiysk (in mainland Russia).[17] Pletenchuk noted that Russian forces continue to use the Sevastopol base because there are not enough piers to accommodate vessels at other ports, however.[18] The BSF‘s headquarters and main facilities including a dry dock are located in Sevastopol, and the Russian navy therefore must send some vessels for repairs within range of Ukrainian strikes.[19] The UK Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) reported on October 14 that the BSF has likely increased its defensive and reactive posture after multiple Ukrainian strikes on BSF assets in August and September 2023.

Armenia ratified the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) Rome Statute on October 14, obliging Armenia to arrest Russian President Vladimir Putin if he enters Armenia due to the ICC’s outstanding arrest warrant, directly after Putin’s efforts on October 13 to claim that the Russia-Armenia relationship is not deteriorating. Armenian President Vahagn Khachaturyan signed the corresponding degree as well as a statement recognizing the ICC’s jurisdiction on October 14 following the Armenian parliament‘s vote to ratify the statute on October 3.[22] Ratifying the Rome Statute notably legally obliges Armenia to arrest Putin on behalf of the ICC, which issued a warrant for Putin’s arrest on March 17, 2023, for illegally deporting Ukrainian children from occupied Ukraine to Russia.[23] Armenia’s ratification of the Rome Statute comes one day after Putin boasted about the strength of Russia-Armenia relations during the meeting of the Council of Heads of State of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Member States.

Ukrainian forces will reportedly begin training on F-16 fighter jets in the US next week.Politico reported on October 13 that anonymous US officials stated that a “small number” of Ukrainian pilots will begin F-16 fighter jet training next week at Morris Air National Guard Base in Arizona after having completed English language training at Lackland Air Force Base in Texas.[25] One US official reportedly stated that the training may be accelerated due to Ukrainian forces’ urgent need for F-16 fighter jets.


Key Takeaways:

US and Ukrainian officials reported on October 12 and 13 that they anticipated the Russian offensive operations around Avdiivka and expressed confidence in Ukrainian defenses.
The Russian information space remains divided on the prospects of Russian successes near Avdiivka and on current Ukrainian capabilities.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in eastern and southern Ukraine on October 14 and advanced west of Donetsk City.
The Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) will maintain some vessels at its main Sevastopol naval base amid Ukrainian strikes on Russian vessels, as the Russian Navy’s main dry dock on the Black Sea is in Sevastopol.
Armenia ratified the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) Rome Statute on October 14, obliging Armenia to arrest Russian President Vladimir Putin if he enters Armenia due to the ICC’s outstanding arrest warrant, directly after Putin’s efforts on October 13 to claim that the Russia-Armenia relationship is not deteriorating.
Ukrainian forces will reportedly begin training on F-16 fighter jets in the US next week.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas.
Relatives of Russian mobilized men and recruited prisoners continue to complain that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Russian military command are mistreating troops on the frontlines – especially on the Kupyansk-Svatove line.
Russian officials and occupation authorities continue to establish patronage programs between Russian federal subjects and occupied areas in order to integrate occupied territories into Russia.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-14-2023

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 16, 2023
Oct 16, 2023 - ISW Press

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 16, 2023

Karolina Hird, Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, Christina Harward, and Mason Clark

October 16, 2023, 6pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on October 16. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 17 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russia likely deployed elements of at least two Central Military District (CMD) brigades to reinforce offensive operations by Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) forces on the Avdiivka front. A Ukrainian military observer reported on October 16 that three Russian brigades — the DNR’s 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (MRB) and the CMD’s 15th and 21st MRBs (both of the 2nd Combined Arms Army [2nd CAA]) — have been involved in recent attacks on Avdiivka alongside various scattered DNR elements, while Russian forces are holding the CMD’s 30th MRB in tactical reserve.[1] Elements of the CMD, particularly of the 2nd CAA, have been active along the Svatove-Kreminna line until recently, and the newly formed 25th CAA likely relieved them along the Svatove-Kreminna line.[2] 2nd CAA elements have primarily conducted defensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line for the last several months and have therefore likely had more time to rest and reconstitute before deploying to a more challenging sector of the frontline, which accounts in part for recent Russian advances in the previously stagnant Avdiivka sector of the front.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Avdiivka direction on October 16 and recently made some gains, albeit at a relatively slower pace than in the initial attacks. Geolocated footage posted on October 16 shows that Russian forces have marginally advanced past the E50 road about 3km south of Avdiivka.[3] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a total of 22 Russian attacks in the Avdiivka direction in the past day, notably fewer than the 30 reported attacks on October 15.[4] Russian sources noted that Russian forces have increased the intensity of air and artillery strikes on the settlement in order to compensate for slow ground maneuvers, which are complicated by heavy Ukrainian fortifications surrounding Avdiivka.[5] During a meeting on the operational situation in Ukraine on October 16, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu claimed that Russian forces have improved their tactical positions in unspecified areas and that the Russian “active defense” along the front, including near Avdiivka, is prohibiting Ukrainian advances.

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 16. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) and Bakhmut directions.[7] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted assaults near Avdiivka and on Verbove’s western and northwestern outskirts (10km east of Robotyne or 18km southwest of Orikhiv).[8] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces are within 200 to 300 meters of Russian positions west of Verbove.

Kremlin-appointed Children’s Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova reiterated statements admitting that Russia deported millions of Ukrainians — including 700,000 children — to Russia since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, as a Qatari-mediated deal returned four children from Russia to Ukraine. Lvova-Belova claimed in a report published on October 15 that Russia has “accepted” about 4.8 million Ukrainians, including 700,000 children, since February 2022 and that Russian authorities have placed 380 Ukrainian orphans into foster care in Russia between April and October 2022.[10] Lvova-Belova also attempted to discredit information about Russia’s deportation of Ukrainian children and claimed instead that Ukrainian authorities act “against the interests of children.”[11] The Washington Post reported on October 16 that four children ranging from two to seventeen years old have returned or will return to Ukraine from Russia after Ukraine asked Qatar to mediate negotiations on the matter.[12] An official source told The Washington Post that more Ukrainian children may be returned in the future as part of the Qatari-mediated negotiations but that the process has been complicated by Russia providing a list of only hundreds of Ukrainian children currently in Russia while Ukraine has identified thousands of deported children. International humanitarian law defines the forced transfer of civilians to the territory of an occupying power as “deportation,” and ISW continues to assess that Russian authorities are conducting a large-scale campaign to deport Ukrainians to Russia.

Some Russian milbloggers continue to complain about the alleged restriction of information about Russian military failures. A Russian milblogger criticized an unspecified associate of Russian Lieutenant General Andrey Sychevoy, who was reportedly recently dismissed from a command position for military failures near Bakhmut, for causing Russian forces (presumably near Bakhmut) to suffer 1,500 casualties in September 2023.[14] The milblogger also criticized the broader Russian military command for communication failures and forcing injured personnel back into combat.[15] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces have crossed the railway line south of Bakhmut in some places and complained that only one major milblogger has discussed this issue, underlining the fact that many milbloggers restrict their presentation of negative information about Russian capabilities.[16] Another milblogger, who previously claimed to censor all but 10-20 percent of the “sad” information they receive, claimed that the first milblogger’s complaints provide a glimpse into the 80-90 percent of unreported information, yet criticized other Russian milbloggers for consistently claiming that the Ukrainian counteroffensive has failed.

Russian forces conducted a drone and missile strike against Ukrainian rear areas on the night of October 15-16. Ukrainian military sources reported that Russian forces launched five Kh-59 cruise missiles, one Iskander ballistic missile in eastern and southern Ukraine, and 12 Shahed-131/136 drones in western Ukraine.[18] Ukrainian air defense reportedly destroyed two of the Kh-59s and 11 Shahed drones.[19] Ukrainian officials reported explosions near Myrhorod, Poltava Oblast, and in Kirovohrad Oblast.[20] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that one strike destroyed a Ukrainian communication center at the Myrhorod airfield in Poltava Oblast.

A new Russian procedure restricting the border checkpoints that Ukrainians can use to enter Russia from third countries came into force on October 16, effectively only allowing Ukrainians to enter Russia from third countries through the Sheremetyevo airport in Moscow. The new procedure only allows Ukrainians aged 14 and older to enter Russia from third countries through the Ludonka automobile checkpoint from Latvia and Sheremetyevo airport in Moscow.[22] Latvia announced on October 12 that it would close its side of the Ludonka checkpoint beginning on October 16.[23] ISW previously assessed that Russia implemented this new border crossing procedure likely in response to continued concern over the security of Russian border regions.[24] The new procedure does not apply to Ukrainians entering Russia from occupied Ukrainian territories or Ukrainians under the age of 14 traveling with a legal guardian.

A group of Russian lawyers appears to be challenging the Kremlin’s precariously crafted veneer of legality surrounding the Russian judicial system, calling for a strike three days after Russian authorities arrested four lawyers on extremism charges. A group of Russian lawyers published a petition encouraging members of the Russian Federal and Regional Chambers of Lawyers and other public lawyer associations to strike from all types of legal proceedings from October 25 to 28 in response to commonplace intimidation of lawyers in the Russian judicial system.[26] The petition states that Russian authorities often ignore violations of the professional rights of lawyers and threaten violence against them on “trumped-up administrative and criminal charges.”[27] The petition also argues that Russian judges increasingly abuse their powers and accuse Russian law enforcement officers of perpetrating crimes against lawyers. The petition states that “sophisticated methods of prosecuting lawyers for their professional activities on far-fetched administrative and criminal charges” have become established practices by Russian law enforcement agencies and courts. This petition comes three days after Russian authorities arrested four lawyers, including three of imprisoned Russian opposition figure Alexei Navalny’s lawyers, on extremism charges on October 13.[28] The Russian lawyers calling for a strike appear unwilling to further tolerate the Kremlin’s weaponization of the Russian judicial system, challenging the Kremlin’s veneer of legality and legitimacy in Russian institutions that are intended to provide cover for Russian President Vladimir Putin’s authoritarian and corrupt rule.


Key Takeaways:

Russia likely deployed elements of at least two Central Military District (CMD) brigades to reinforce offensive operations by Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) forces on the Avdiivka front.
Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 16.
A new Russian procedure restricting the border checkpoints that Ukrainians can use to enter Russia from third countries came into force on October 16, effectively only allowing Ukrainians to enter Russia from third countries through the Sheremetyevo airport in Moscow.
A group of Russian lawyers appears to be challenging the Kremlin’s precariously crafted veneer of legality surrounding the Russian judicial system, calling for a strike three days after Russian authorities arrested four lawyers on extremism charges.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, in the Bakhmut direction, near Avdiivka, southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas.
The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) reported further details on ongoing North Korean weapons shipments to Russia on October 16.
Senior Russian officials reiterated boilerplate narratives about the Ukrainian counteroffensive and the Israel-Hamas war during a Russian Security Council meeting on October 16 likely to deter Western support for Ukraine.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-16-2023

US Supply Of Long-range ATACMS To Ukraine Is 'Grave Mistake': Russian Envoy To US

AFP - Agence France Presse
October 17, 2023
Washington's decision to supply Ukraine with ATACMS long-range missiles is "a grave mistake", Russian ambassador to the United States Anatoly Antonov said Wednesday.

"The White House's decision to send long-range missiles to Ukrainians is a grave mistake. The consequences of this step, which was deliberately hidden from the public, will be of the most serious nature," he said in a statement.

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 18, 2023
Oct 18, 2023 - ISW Press

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 18, 2023

Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, and Mason Clark

October 18, 2023, 5:45pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on October 18. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 19 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian sources claimed that likely company-sized elements of two Ukrainian naval infantry brigades conducted an assault across the Dnipro River onto the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast on October 17-18. Geolocated footage published on October 18 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced north of Pishchanivka (14km east of Kherson City and 3km from the Dnipro River) and into Poyma (11km east of Kherson City and 4km from the Dnipro River).[1] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that two Ukrainian “assault groups” landed on the east bank of the Dnipro River and broke through initial Russian defenses, temporarily occupying all of Poyma and positions on the northern outskirts of Pishchanivka on the afternoon of October 17.[2] The milblogger later claimed that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces back from these positions towards the Dnipro River.[3] The milblogger claimed that a Ukrainian sabotage group is still operating in Pishchanivka as of the afternoon of October 18. The milblogger, however, suggested that Russian forces only maintain positions on the southern outskirts of the settlement. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) also acknowledged the Ukrainian operations, claiming that Russian forces stopped four Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups near Pidstepne (16km east of Kherson City) and Poyma.[4] Another prominent Russian milblogger also claimed that Ukrainian forces occupied Poyma on the night of October 17 to 18.

Russian sources expressed pronounced concern about ongoing Ukrainian activity on the east bank of Kherson Oblast and framed these activities as part of a potential larger Ukrainian operation. The majority of Russian claims about developments on the east bank are largely single-sourced to one prominent Russian milblogger who has recently heavily focused his reporting on this section of the front.[6] Russian sources characterized the reported assaults as a Ukrainian effort to expand a “bridgehead” on the east bank and the initial stages of a larger offensive operation across the Dnipro River.[7] Russian President Vladimir Putin similarly described Ukrainian activity in Kherson Oblast as the “next counteroffensive” and continued his typical rhetorical line by painting all Ukrainian offensive operations as a failure.[8] The prominent Russian milblogger who is the basis for many of these claims has expressed concern about a Ukrainian offensive across the Dnipro River on and off throughout 2023 and escalated his warnings in late September 2023. The milblogger reacted to the reported assault on the night of October 17 to 18 by accusing the Russian MoD of not taking the threat of a Ukrainian crossing seriously.

across the Dnipro River may be partially connected to the condition of the Russian grouping of forces on the left bank. The Russian command has drawn relatively more elite units from the Kherson direction to support defensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast in recent months due to likely viewing Kherson as a quiet sector, and the current force composition in the area is likely relatively less combat effective.[10] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk stated on October 17 that Russian forces were still redeploying trained units from the Kherson direction to the Zaporizhia and eastern directions.[11] The Russian military may have recently redeployed elements of the 41st Combined Arms Army (Central Military District) and the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) to the Kherson direction, however, but it is unclear where in Kherson Oblast elements of the 41st Combined Arms Army are currently deployed.[12] Ukrainian counteroffensive operations reportedly previously rendered the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade combat ineffective as of September 22.

ISW will not speculate on the scope and prospects of ongoing Ukrainian activity on the east bank of Kherson Oblast but does not assess that Ukrainian forces have created a bridgehead on the east bank of Kherson Oblast suitable for the further maneuver of sizeable mechanized forces at this time. However, it is noteworthy that prominent and generally reliable Russian sources are discussing Ukrainian activities on the east bank as occurring at a larger scale than previously documented tactical cross-river raids by Ukrainian forces. ISW will continue to monitor the area closely and assess control of terrain changes and Russian responses, in line with its standing policy of not forecasting Ukrainian actions.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in eastern and southern Ukraine and reportedly advanced near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive actions south of Bakhmut and had partial success south of Robotyne.[14] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced near Klishchiivka, 5km southwest of Bakhmut.

Western media reported that the United States has thus far provided Ukraine with a limited number of ATACMS missiles. The Associated Press reported on October 17 that an unnamed US official stated that the United States provided Ukraine with “fewer than a dozen” missiles “within the last few days.”[16] The New York Times (NYT) reported on October 18 that two unspecified Western officials stated that the United States sent “about 20” ATACMS to Ukraine.[17] Russian President Vladimir Putin stated at a press conference in Beijing on October 18 that the ATACMS are “fundamentally incapable of changing the situation on the frontline.”[18] The Kremlin does not view the provision of ATACMS to Ukraine as an escalatory step, and the United States has not crossed a Russian “red line” by providing Ukraine with these missiles. Ukraine will need additional ATACMS to sustain the operational effects of their use on the arrayment of Russian aviation assets and logistics.

Satellite imagery from October 17 suggests that the Ukrainian ATACMS strike on the Berdyansk airfield likely substantially damaged Russian aircraft and airfield infrastructure, but ISW cannot yet confirm the extent of the damage. Several open-source intelligence analysts amplified satellite imagery of the Berdyansk airfield and suggested that it shows at least seven burned-out areas where satellite imagery previously showed various Russian helicopters, and additionally noted that many helicopters have since moved.[20] A Ukrainian reserve officer stated that prior to the strike, Russian forces had Mi-28, Mi-24, and Ka-52 helicopters at the airfield, and suggested that the extent of the damage is likely more widespread than depicted in preliminary satellite imagery.[21] Ukrainian military sources previously reported that the Ukrainian strike destroyed nine helicopters, one anti-aircraft missile launcher, special equipment, ammunition depots, and runway infrastructure, but ISW cannot fully confirm these Russian losses with available imagery at this time.

Russian President Vladimir Putin indicated his desire to deepen Russian-Chinese economic and political ties but did not announce any practical changes at the One Belt One Road International Forum in Beijing, China on October 18. Several open-source intelligence analysts amplified satellite imagery of the Berdyansk airfield and suggested that it shows at least seven burned-out areas where satellite imagery previously showed various Russian helicopters, and additionally noted that many helicopters have since moved.[20] A Ukrainian reserve officer stated that prior to the strike, Russian forces had Mi-28, Mi-24, and Ka-52 helicopters at the airfield, and suggested that the extent of the damage is likely more widespread than depicted in preliminary satellite imagery.[21] Ukrainian military sources previously reported that the Ukrainian strike destroyed nine helicopters, one anti-aircraft missile launcher, special equipment, ammunition depots, and runway infrastructure, but ISW cannot fully confirm these Russian losses with available imagery at this time.

Russian President Vladimir Putin indicated his desire to deepen Russian-Chinese economic and political ties but did not announce any practical changes at the One Belt One Road International Forum in Beijing, China on October 18. Putin stated that close Russian and Chinese foreign policy coordination is especially necessary in “current difficult conditions” and emphasized Russian and Chinese cooperation through multilateral formats including the One Belt One Road Initiative, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).[23] Putin claimed that economic cooperation between Russia and China is integral to strengthening Russian economic, technological, and financial sovereignty.[24] Putin notably did not emphasize Russian-Chinese security cooperation, possibly due to China’s reticence at the no-limits partnership that Russia wants to establish, as ISW has previously reported.[25] Putin also held bilateral talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping, and available Kremlin readouts of the meeting similarly stressed economic ties between Russia and China.[26] Putin’s visit to China and meeting with Xi does not appear to have resulted in any substantial change in the Chinese reticence to establish the Kremlin’s desired level of bilateral relationship or any breakthroughs in the degree of Chinese military support to Russia. Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov notably claimed on October 18 that almost all of Russia’s dual-use civilian drones come from China and stated that the Russian government aims to increase domestic civilian drone production to 41 percent by 2025.[27] ISW has previously observed reports that China often exports dual-use equipment to Russia, including civilian drones, which Russian forces can employ on the battlefield in Ukraine.


Key Takeaways:

Russian sources claimed that likely company-sized elements of two Ukrainian naval infantry brigades conducted an assault across the Dnipro River onto the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast on October 17-18.
Russian sources expressed pronounced concern about ongoing Ukrainian activity on the east bank of Kherson Oblast and framed these activities as part of a potential larger Ukrainian operation.
ISW will not speculate on the scope and prospects of ongoing Ukrainian activity on the east bank of Kherson Oblast but does not assess that Ukrainian forces have created a bridgehead on the east bank of Kherson Oblast suitable for the further maneuver of sizeable mechanized forces at this time.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in eastern and southern Ukraine and reportedly advanced near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Western media reported that the US has thus far provided Ukraine with a limited number of ATACMS missiles, and the Kremlin issued a muted response to the provision of these systems
Satellite imagery from October 17 suggests that the Ukrainian ATACMS strike on the Berdyansk airfield likely substantially damaged Russian aircraft and airfield infrastructure, but ISW cannot yet confirm the extent of the damage.
Russian President Vladimir Putin indicated his desire to deepen Russian-Chinese economic and political ties but did not announce any practical changes at the One Belt One Road International Forum in Beijing, China on October 18.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, in the Avdiivka direction, southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced south of Avdiivka.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-18-2023

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 20, 2023
Oct 20, 2023 - ISW Press

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 20, 2023

Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Karolina Hird, and Mason Clark

October 20, 2023, 4:00 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30 pm ET on October 20. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 21 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian forces launched a renewed offensive push near Avdiivka on October 20 and marginally advanced, indicating that the Russian military command remains committed to offensive operations in the area despite heavy materiel and personnel losses. Geolocated footage published on October 20 shows that Russian forces secured minor advances west of Krasnohorivka (5km north of Avdiivka).[1] Russian milbloggers and a Ukrainian military observer claimed that Russian forces captured a Ukrainian stronghold near the waste heap just northeast of Avdiivka, advanced to a rail station north of Avdiivka, and advanced near the “Tsarska Okhota” restaurant south of Avdiivka.[2] One prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Sieverne (6km west of Avdiivka), south of Avdiivka, near Stepove (8km northwest of Avdiivka), and near Novokalynove (11km northwest of Avdiivka), however.[3] Other milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced up to one kilometer on the Stepove-Berdychi line (8-10km northwest of Avdiivka) on October 19 and that fighting is ongoing near Berdychi on October 20.[4] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near Avdiivka, Novokalynove, Stepove, Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka), and Sieverne.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 20 that Ukrainian forces damaged and destroyed almost 50 Russian tanks and over 100 armored vehicles during the past day of fighting near Avdiivka.[6] Ukrainian soldiers operating in the Avdiivka area reported on October 20 that Ukrainian forces have destroyed 200 Russian armored vehicles in the past four days.[7] Avdiivka City Military Administration Head Vitaliy Barabash stated that Russian forces are attempting to repair damaged equipment while still in the field.[8] Footage published on October 20 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian TOS-1 thermobaric artillery system near Avdiivka.[9] A Russian milblogger complained that Russian counterbattery fire near Avdiivka is decreasing in effectiveness due to poor communication and the failure to stockpile munitions ahead of the offensive effort, very likely exacerbating material losses in the area.[10] The initial Russian offensive operations in the Avdiivka area on October 10 also resulted in high verified Russian equipment losses, and the fact that Russian forces regrouped and re-launched assaults after the initial attacks suggests that either Russian forces believe they can feasibly take Avdiivka, or that the Russian military command is poorly prioritizing offensive operations regardless of cost.

Ukrainian forces continued larger-than-usual ground operations on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast on October 20 and established a confirmed presence in a settlement on the east bank. Geolocated footage published on October 19 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced into northeastern Krynky (27km east from Kherson City and 2km from the Dnipro River).[12] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are establishing a foothold near Krynky and continue to maintain their presence near the Antonivsky roadway and railway bridges.[13] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces temporarily advanced further into Krynky up to the Kozachi Laheri-Krynky-Korsunka road before Russian airstrikes pushed Ukrainian troops back to the northern outskirts of the settlement.[14] Another Russian milblogger claimed that fighting is ongoing near Pishchanivka (14km east from Kherson City and 4km from the Dnipro River) and that a Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance group is operating on the southern outskirts of the settlement.[15] The prominent Russian milblogger suggested that Russian forces only maintained positions on the southern outskirts of Pishchanivka as of the afternoon of October 18, and the Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 19 that Russian aviation struck Pishchanivka, implying that Ukrainian forces were still operating in the settlement.[16] ISW has not observed any other visual confirmation of Ukrainian forces maintaining positions in east bank settlements other than Krynky, however.

Russian and Ukrainian sources continue to indicate that the Russian units defending the east bank of Kherson Oblast are relatively less combat effective than other Russian forces elsewhere on the frontA Ukrainian military observer stated that the Russian Dnepr Grouping of Forces is primarily comprised of elements of the 49th Combined Arms Army (Southern Military District) and likely elements of the newly created 18th Combined Arms Army.[17] The majority of the 49th Combined Arms Army (CAA) has been deployed to east bank Kherson Oblast since Russian forces withdrew from the west (right) bank, and elements of the 49th CAA’s 205th Motorized Rifle Regiment have since suffered significant casualties.[18] The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) reported on August 21 that the Russian military was likely forming the new 18th CAA from other units currently operating in Kherson Oblast, and it is unlikely that the new units of the 18th CAA are entirely comprised of fresh forces or staffed to doctrinal end strength.[19] The deployment of the 18th CAA to Kherson Oblast is reminiscent of the rushed deployment of the newly created 25th CAA to the Kupyansk and Lyman directions in early September 2023, and the 18th CAA likely faces similar issues with a lack of personnel, equipment, and proper training.[20] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the 26th Motorized Rifle Regiment, reportedly of 70th Motorized Rifle Division of the 18th CAA, are defending against Ukrainian activities near Krynky.[21] Another Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the 1st Battalion of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are operating near the Antonivsky railway bridge.[22] Elements of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment have been defending in western Zaporizhia Oblast since the start of the Ukrainian counteroffensive and have likely suffered significant casualties.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces made marginal advances northwest of Verbove (10km east of Robotyne), though ISW has not observed evidence to confirm this claim.[24] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continue offensive operations in the Bakhmut and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions.[25] Russian sources reported Ukrainian attacks south of Bakhmut on the Klishchiivka-Andriivka-Kurdyumivka line and south of Orikhiv near Robotyne, Novoprokopivka, and Verbove.

Russian President Vladimir Putin visited the Southern Military District (SMD) headquarters in Rostov-on-Don, Rostov Oblast, on October 19 to discuss the battlefield situation in Ukraine. Russian media reported that Putin met with the Chief of the Russian General Staff and overall theater commander for Russian forces in Ukraine Army General Valery Gerasimov, who told Putin that Russian troops are "solving problems in accordance with the operation plan."[27] Various elements of the SMD are notably currently deployed in critical areas of the frontline — elements of the SMD's 8th Combined Arms Army are conducting offensive operations near Avdiivka in Donetsk Oblast, elements of the 58th Combined Arms Army are defending against ongoing Ukrainian offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and elements of the 49th Combined Arms Army are operating in the Kherson Oblast direction as of late August 2023.[28] Putin's publicized visit with Gerasimov indicates that Gerasimov is still the active figurehead of Russian operations in Ukraine and was likely meant to posture the effectiveness and involvement of the Russian military leadership as Russian forces pursue offensive and defensive operations along multiple sectors of the front. ISW will provide additional updates on Putin's visit to Rostov-on-Don once more readouts become available.


Key Takeaways:

Russian forces launched a renewed offensive push near Avdiivka on October 20 and marginally advanced, indicating that the Russian military command remains committed to offensive operations in the area despite heavy materiel and personnel losses.
Ukrainian forces continued larger-than-usual ground operations on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast on October 20 and established a confirmed presence in a settlement on the east bank.
Russian and Ukrainian sources continue to indicate that the Russian units defending the east bank of Kherson Oblast are relatively less combat effective than other Russian forces elsewhere on the front.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make confirmed advances.
Russian President Vladimir Putin visited the Southern Military District (SMD) headquarters in Rostov-on-Don, Rostov Oblast, on October 19 to discuss the battlefield situation in Ukraine with Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, around Avdiivka, west of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and made limited advances in some areas.
Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin argued on October 20 that Russian authorities should strip migrants of acquired Russian citizenship if they are unwilling to fight in Ukraine.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-20-2023

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 22, 2023
Oct 22, 2023 - ISW Press

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 22, 2023

Karolina Hird, Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, Riley Bailey, and Mason Clark

October 22, 2023, 4:45pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on October 22. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 23 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian forces are funneling additional forces to the Avdiivka front despite ongoing challenges with frontal mechanized assaults and the failure of a renewed push on October 19-20. Several Russian milbloggers claimed that there were no significant changes along the front in the Avdiivka direction on October 22.[1] Russian forces are likely once again pausing following a failed major push which suffered heavy losses. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces “unexpectedly” counterattacked in the direction of Pisky (8km southwest of Donetsk City) and pushed Russian forces from positions in the area. Another milblogger stated that claims of Ukrainian advances near Pisky and Opytne (4km south of Avdiivka) are false.[2] Another Russian source allegedly serving in the Avdiivka direction claimed that Ukrainian forces did not conduct counterattacks in his unspecified sector of the front.[3] Geolocated footage published on October 21 indicates that Russian forces recently made marginal advances southeast of Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka).[4] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have not completely cleared the Avdiivka waste heap area and that the area is currently a contested “gray zone.”

A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger discussed difficulties that may be contributing to a “positional deadlock” for Russian offensive operations in the Avdiivka direction as of October 22.[6] The milblogger claimed that it is difficult to conduct maneuver warfare on a static front line with a large number of personnel and fortified areas on both sides. The milblogger noted that Ukrainian drones and other precision weapons have made armored vehicles increasingly vulnerable and have made ground attacks increasingly difficult. The milblogger also noted that Russian forces are facing difficulties in overcoming Ukrainian minefields near Avdiivka and are unable to completely destroy Ukrainian logistics, allowing the Ukrainian command to quickly transfer personnel to critical areas. Russian sources have previously claimed that Ukrainian defensive fortifications pose a significant challenge to Russian advances around Avdiivka.[7] These challenges are highly similar to those faced by Ukrainian forces in southern Ukraine in the initial weeks of the ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive in June 2023. However, it remains to be seen if Russian forces have the capabilities and flexibility to adapt in some manner, as Ukrainian forces did following early setbacks in June 2023.

Ukrainian sources stated that Russian forces continue to transfer personnel to the Avdiivka direction to support offensive efforts despite heavy losses. Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Shtupun stated that the Russian military is deploying personnel from Russian territory directly to the Avdiivka direction to replace personnel losses.[8] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that the Russian military command has recently transferred several Russian regiments comprised of mobilized personnel to the Avdiivka direction, indicating that Russia likely does not plan to abandon operations in this direction.[9] Mashovets noted that the Russian military also transferred elements of the 57th Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps, Western Military District) to the Spartak-Yakolivka-Minerale-Kashtanove area (4km south to 5km southeast of Avdiivka).

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 22. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian troops continue offensive actions south of Bakhmut and in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions.[10] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Shtupun noted that Ukrainian forces maintained offensive pressure in western Zaporizhia Oblast despite active Russian hostilities in the Avdiivka direction.

The nationalist pro-war Russian information space is reckoning with the possibility of a major demographic decline by weaponizing anti-migrant rhetoric. The Russian Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) published a new demographic forecast for the Russian Federation on October 20 that predicts that Russia's population will decrease to 138.77 million people by January 1, 2046.[15] Rosstat estimated that the rate of natural population decline will exceed 600,000 people per year between 2024-2032 but will slow to 400,000 people per year from 2032-2046.[16] Several Russian commentators seized on these statistics and warned that they portend “demographic catastrophe” if restorative measures are not undertaken immediately.[17] One Russian source blamed Russia’s declining population on migrants and called for ethnic Russians to immediately increase the national birthrate, as well as to automate many production systems to replace migrant labor.[18] ISW has previously reported on instances of vocal Russian nationalist enclaves within the pro-war information space amplifying anti-migrant rhetoric to explain away and try to remedy reports of Russian demographic transitions.[19] Such rhetoric is particularly noteworthy as the Russian force generation apparatus is increasingly exploiting migrant and other ethnic minority communities as a mobilization resource, which ISW outlines in the force generation section of today’s update.

A prominent Russian milblogger and frontline commander criticized Russian top-down censorship campaigns. Russian “Vostok” Battalion Commander Alexander Khodakovsky claimed on October 22 that many Russians are dissatisfied with official reports and summaries about the war in Ukraine and urged Russian officials to report honestly about the frontline to garner wider public support.[21] Khodakovsky, who has consistently complained about problems affecting Russian combat operations, claimed that all of his statements are “inspected with increased scrutiny” given his official status.[22] Khodakovsky argued that one can “install filters on the central media” but cannot make people think a certain way.[23] Khodakovsky claimed that unspecified actors who are “embarrassed” by his statements are pushing Rosgvardia to take action against him for his criticisms.[24] Khodakovsky was appointed the deputy head of the Main Directorate of Rosgvardia in occupied Donetsk Oblast in February 2023 and commands Rosgvardia’s special rapid response and riot police (OMON and SOBR) in occupied Donetsk Oblast.[25] Khodakovsky‘s claim, if true, indicates that some actors may be trying to leverage Rosgvardia's likely concern about potential repercussions for Khodakovsky’s increasingly vocal criticisms, which have become more conspicuous as other Russian milbloggers engage in greater self-censorship over fears of running afoul of Russian authorities.

Deceased Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin's ideological and rhetorical campaign against the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has largely become decoupled from the issue of the Wagner Group and appears to have outlived Prigozhin himself. Russian lawyer Kirill Kachur, whom the Russian Investigative Committee charged in absentia for embezzlement and bribery in 2022, claimed on October 22 that Prigozhin filed applications to the Russian Investigative Committee to initiate a criminal case against Russian Defense Minister Army General Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov for the “genocide of the Russian people, the murder to tens of thousands of Russian citizens, and the transfer of Russian territories to the enemy” before Wagner’s June 24 armed rebellion.[27] Kachur appealed to Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin to publicly address what has happened to these applications since Prigozhin’s death and concluded that Russians who support Prigozhin and his message should coalesce around the ideological principles Prigozhin espoused and push for the restoration of justice in Russian society.[28] Kachur’s invocation of Prigozhin’s ideological opposition to the Russian MoD suggests that the intense dislike for and disapproval of the MoD has outlived Prigozhin, even as the Wagner Group has disbanded as a centralized entity. A select camp within the Russian information space that aligns itself with Prigozhin’s hyper-nationalist pro-war, yet anti-MoD ideology will likely continue to launch informational critiques on the MoD and the Russian military command as the war continues.


Key Takeaways:

Russian forces are funneling additional forces to the Avdiivka front despite ongoing challenges with frontal mechanized assaults and the failure of a renewed push on October 19-20.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 22.
Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on October 22.
The nationalist pro-war Russian information space is reckoning with the possibility of a major demographic decline by weaponizing anti-migrant rhetoric.
A prominent Russian milblogger and frontline commander criticized Russian top-down censorship campaigns.
Deceased Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin's ideological and rhetorical campaign against the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has largely become decoupled from the issue of the Wagner Group and appears to have outlived Prigozhin himself.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas on October 22.
Russian authorities are intensifying mobilization efforts targeting Central Asian migrant communities.
Russian occupation authorities continue to use cultural and education programs to forcibly Russify Ukrainian children.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-22-2023

Ukraine SBU killed dozens trained by CIA.

https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023...ns-of-russians-collaborators-wapo-a82857

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 24, 2023
Oct 24, 2023 - ISW Press

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 24, 2023

Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Karolina Hird, and Frederick W. Kagan

October 24, 2023, 5:00pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:00pm ET on October 24. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 25 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in eastern and southern Ukraine on October 24 and advanced south of Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Geolocated footage published on October 23 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced east of Andriivka (10 km southwest of Bakhmut), and geolocated footage published on October 24 indicates that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced west of Robotyne.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported on October 24 that Ukrainian forces continued offensive actions south of Bakhmut and achieved partial success near Robotyne.

Russia appears to be increasingly supplementing the use of Shahed-131/136 drones with cheaper and lighter domestically produced drone variants during strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure. Russian media speculated on October 23 that Russian forces used new long-range "Italmas" drones and Italmas variants for the first time in Ukraine during a drone attack on Kyiv Oblast.[3] Russian sources noted that Italmas drones are lighter than Shaheds and are harder to detect and shoot down. Russian milbloggers noted that Italmas drones are cheaper than Shaheds, which means that they can be more widely manufactured and used, but that they deliver lighter payloads, which restricts their usefulness in isolation.[4] Russian sources noted, therefore, that Russian forces will likely use the Italmas drones in tandem with Shaheds.[5] ISW previously assessed that Russia is likely trying to expand and diversify its arsenal of drones, missiles, and guided bombs for strikes against Ukrainian critical infrastructure in advance of the fall-winter season, and increased use of Italmas drones is likely part of the wider munitions diversification effort.

Russian authorities are intensifying mobilization efforts targeting Central Asian migrant communities in Russia. Russian Internal Affairs (MVD) Minister Vladimir Kolokoltsev met with the MVD board to discuss “migration problems” and “ethnic crime” and insinuated that migrants commit crimes at a higher rate than natural born Russian citizens.[7] Kolokoltsev defended recent Russian law enforcement mobilization raids on migrant communities and claimed that Russian law enforcement is enforcing standard legal norms.[8] A Russian insider source claimed that the Russian Investigative Committee is conducting investigations into naturalized migrants with Russian citizenship and is reopening previously terminated and canceled criminal cases in order to mobilize migrants to fight in Ukraine.[9] The insider source also claimed that the Russian Investigative Committee will now investigate migrants for committing any offense, even minor ones, and will expand that individual’s investigation to include their friends and family. The insider source claimed that unspecified actors, possibly the MVD or MVD Head Alexander Bastrykin, ordered Russian state media to increase reporting about ethnic crime in Russia, likely to set informational conditions for further mobilization raids on migrant communities.[10] Bastrykin has continually advocated for the targeted mobilization of migrants with Russian citizenship, in line with Russian law enforcement’s recent expansion of its efforts to detain and forcibly register migrants with Russian citizenship for military service.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky highlighted diminishing Russian control over the Black Sea and Ukraine’s temporary grain corridors during a speech at the Crimean Platform summit on October 24. Zelensky stated that Russia attempted to create the illusion that Russian dominance of the Black Sea was insurmountable but said that this illusion is fading as the Russia Black Sea Fleet (BSF) gradually "flees" Crimea and increasingly struggles to operate in the western Black Sea.[12] Zelensky stated that the Russian authorities recently announced the creation of a new naval base for BSF assets in occupied Ochamchire, Abkhazia, far from the reach of long-range Ukrainian missiles and naval drones. ISW has previously reported on the impact of Ukraine’s strike campaign against Crimea and BSF assets and the construction of a permanent Russian naval base in Abkhazia.[13] Zelensky added that Russian forces no longer have a completely reliable logistical route between Crimea and mainland Russia. Zelensky noted that Ukraine has launched new temporary export routes from the Danube port in Odesa Oblast through the Black Sea and the overland “Solidarity Lanes” through Europe.


Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in eastern and southern Ukraine on October 24 and advanced south of Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Russia appears to be increasingly supplementing the use of Shahed-131/136 drones with cheaper and lighter domestically produced drone variants during strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure.
Russian authorities are intensifying mobilization efforts targeting Central Asian migrant communities in Russia.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky highlighted diminishing Russian control over the Black Sea and Ukraine’s temporary grain corridors during a speech at the Crimean Platform summit on October 24.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Avdiivka on October 24 and made confirmed advances northeast of Avdiivka.
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain some positions in Krynky (30km east of Kherson City and 2km from the Dnipro River) and continued limited attacks on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)-affiliated "Redut" private military company (PMC) is reportedly trying to recruit women into combat roles.
Russian occupation authorities continue to establish programs to forcibly deport Ukrainian children to Russia.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2023

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 26, 2023
Oct 26, 2023 - ISW Press

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 26, 2023

Riley Bailey, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Ashka Jhaveri, Annika Ganzeveld, and Frederick W. Kagan

October 26, 2023, 7:15pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on October 26. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 27 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Heavy Russian equipment losses around Avdiivka will likely undermine Russian offensive capabilities over the long term. Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Shtupun stated on October 26 that Russian forces have suffered 5,000 personnel killed and wounded and 400 armored vehicles losses near Avdiivka and Marinka (southwest of Donetsk City) since October 10.[1] Satellite imagery has confirmed that the Russian military has lost at least 109 military vehicles, primarily armored fighting vehicles and tanks, near Avdiivika between October 10 and 20.[2] A Ukrainian reserve officer stated that Russian forces appear to be using fewer armored vehicles near Avdiivka, although Russian forces may be regrouping for renewed large mechanized assaults as they did between the initial mechanized assaults on October 10 and a second series of large mechanized assaults on October 19 and 20.[3] The Russian command has funneled additional forces to the Avdiivka front to offset heavy manpower losses and maintain the Russian military’s ability to sustain its ongoing offensive effort.[4]

The Russian command will likely struggle to offset Russian equipment losses, particularly in armored vehicles, however. Widespread Russian equipment losses and shortages in the first year of the full-scale invasion heavily restricted Russia’s ability to conduct effective mechanized maneuver warfare during the Russian military's winter-spring 2023 offensive, contributing to further losses in disorderly mechanized assaults near Vuhledar, Donetsk Oblast in January and February 2023.[5] Heavy losses around Vuhledar likely prevented the Russian command from committing to sustained mechanized assaults elsewhere in Ukraine later in the winter-spring 2023 offensive.[6] Recent Russian equipment losses around Avdiivka appear to be much larger than earlier equipment losses around Vuhledar. It remains unclear if the prospect of further heavy equipment losses will deter the Russian command from launching another series of large, mechanized assaults near Avdiivka. Russia has gradually mobilized elements of its defense industrial base (DIB) to address equipment shortages but has not done so at a scale remotely sufficient to offset the cumulative Russian equipment losses in Ukraine.[7] Recent Russian equipment losses around Avdiivka will likely lead to even more pronounced Russian equipment shortages and setbacks for any progress that the Russian military has made in addressing degraded mechanized maneuver warfare capabilities.

Ukrainian forces marginally advanced on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast and continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Geolocated footage published on October 25 shows that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced north of Pidstepne (15km east of Kherson City).[8] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions.

Ukrainian officials denied reports that Ukraine suspended a corridor for civilian vessels in the Black Sea on October 26. Reuters reported that British security firm Ambrey, Ukrainian consulting firm Barva Invest, and specialized Ukrainian news outlet Ukrainian Ports stated that Ukraine had temporarily suspended traffic through the corridor on October 26.[10] Barva Invest stated that the Ukrainian Sea Ports Administration announced the suspension on the evening of October 25 and that a de facto suspension had already been in place for two days.[11] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk stated that many factors, including threats from Russian forces and weather, affect the Ukrainian military’s decisions to allow individual civilian vessels to pass through the corridor.[12] The Ukrainian Ministry of Reconstruction and the Ukrainian Minister for Communities, Territories, and Infrastructure Development, Oleksandr Kubrakov, later clarified that reports about the suspension are false and that civilian vessels are using all available routes established by the Ukrainian Navy.[13] Russia has continually pursued efforts to disrupt Ukrainian grain exports and curtail maritime traffic to Ukrainian ports and will likely continue escalatory posturing in the Black Sea meant to undermine confidence in the Ukrainian corridor.

An amendment to the Russian citizenship law allowing for the revocation of naturalized Russian citizenship came into force on October 26, providing the Russian government with a new mechanism to coerce migrants into Russian military service. The amendment most notably allows Russian authorities to revoke Russian citizenship from naturalized citizens who are convicted of discrediting the Russian military and of committing “certain crimes encroaching on public and personal safety” regardless of when the crime was committed, the date of sentencing, or for how long the convicted has held Russian citizenship.[15] Russian authorities have recently increased raids against migrants accused of committing crimes to deliver summonses and impress migrants into signing military contracts.[16] Russian authorities will likely use this new amendment to further recruit naturalized migrants under threat of revoking their Russian citizenship or after having done so.[17] It is unclear what procedure Russian authorities will follow once they deprive someone of their citizenship, and Russian authorities may intend to use deportation procedures to increase the number of migrants in detention centers, where Russian officials regularly try to recruit.[18] Russian authorities will also likely exploit denaturalized migrants whose labor options will become limited upon conviction of a crime and loss of their Russian citizenship and therefore more vulnerable to military recruitment efforts. The new amendment to the citizenship law also streamlines the process for allocating Russian citizenship to certain individuals, including children with at least one Russian parent, migrants currently residing in Russia, and participants in the Russian state resettlement program, by removing certain entrance requirements.
The EU is reportedly behind on its artillery ammunition round provision to Ukraine. Unspecified sources told Bloomberg in an article published on October 25 that the EU has currently delivered only 30 percent of the promised one million shells that are expected by March 2024.[20] Bloomberg also reported that some unspecified counties have asked to extend the provision deadline.

The US Department of Defense (DoD) and the UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) recently announced new military aid packages to Ukraine. The UK MoD announced on October 11 a new package of military material support for Ukraine valued at over 100 million pounds (about $121 million).[21] The US DoD announced on October 26 a new security assistance package valued at up to $150 million in materiel.

Armenia continues to distance itself from Russia amid deteriorating Armenian-Russian relations. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan stated in an interview with the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) published on October 25 that there are no “advantages” to the continued presence of Russian military bases in Armenia.[23] Pashinyan also stated that Armenia is in the process of diversifying its security partnerships.[24] Pashinyan previously stated on October 11 that Russian peacekeepers should return to Russia instead of the Russian bases in Armenia if they leave Nagorno-Karabakh.

A senior Hamas delegation traveled to Moscow and met with Russian and Iranian officials on October 26.[26] (NOTE: This text also appeared in the Critical Threats Project (CTP)’s October 26 Iran Update) Hamas’ International Relation Office head and political bureau member Musa Abu Marzouk led a delegation, which also included the Health Minister of the Gaza Strip, Basem Naim.[27] The delegation held a joint meeting with Russian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister and Special Representative for the Middle East Mikhail Bogdanov and Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Ali Bagheri Kani. Hamas leaders issued statements around the visit praising Russia’s stance toward the Israel-Hamas war. Russia has framed itself as a possible mediator between Israel and Hamas and submitted a UN resolution calling for a humanitarian ceasefire on October 16. The UN resolution failed to mention Hamas by name.[28] The Israeli Foreign Affairs Ministry condemned Russia’s invitation to Hamas on October 26.[29]CTP-ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin is already exploiting and will likely continue to exploit the Israel-Hamas war to advance several information operations intended to reduce US and Western support for and attention to Ukraine.[30] A senior Hamas delegation most recently visited Moscow in March 2023 amid strained tensions between Russia and Israel over the Russian invasion of Ukraine.


Key Takeaways:

Heavy Russian equipment losses around Avdiivka will likely undermine Russian offensive capabilities over the long term.
Ukrainian forces marginally advanced on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast and continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Ukrainian officials denied reports that Ukraine suspended a corridor for civilian vessels in the Black Sea on October 26.
An amendment to the Russian citizenship law allowing for the revocation of naturalized Russian citizenship came into force on October 26, providing the Russian government with a new mechanism to coerce migrants into Russian military service.
A senior Hamas delegation traveled to Moscow and met with Russian and Iranian officials on October 26.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas.
Several Russian opposition outlets reported that Russian defense industrial base (DIB) companies continue to use Western components supplied through intermediaries to manufacture missiles to use against Ukraine.
Russian occupation authorities continue efforts to forcibly indoctrinate Ukrainian youth into Russian culture and identity through the expansion of military-patriotic educational programs.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-26-2023