RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 2, 2024 Jan 2, 2024 - ISW Press
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 2, 2024
Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Angelica Evans, and Frederick W. Kagan
January 2, 2024, 8:20pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2:30 pm ET on January 2. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 3 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Russian President Vladimir Putin identified the West as Russia’s “enemy” and implied that Russia is fighting in Ukraine in order to defeat the West. Putin responded to a Russian serviceman’s question about Western aid to Ukraine during a meeting at a military hospital in Moscow Oblast on January 1, stating that Russia’s issue is not necessarily that the West is aiding Ukraine, but rather that the West is Russia's "enemy."[1] Putin added that “Ukraine by itself is not an enemy for [Russia],” but that Western-based actors “who want to destroy Russian statehood” and achieve the “strategic defeat of Russia on the battlefield” are Russia’s enemies. Putin claimed that Western elites are trying to break Russia into five parts and are trying to do so using Ukraine, but that the situation on the frontlines is changing and that Russia will “deal with the [West] faster” than the West can deal with Russia on the battlefields in Ukraine. Putin added that the problem is not in Western aid deliveries to Ukraine and noted that Ukraine has already been “completely destroyed,” that there is “nothing left” of the country, and that it “exists only on handouts.”
Putin implied that Russia is fighting an existential war against the West in Ukraine and noted that Western rhetoric has recently refocused on how to “quickly end the conflict.” This phrasing implies that Putin sees a conflict and potential negotiations between Russia and the West – not a conflict and potential negotiations between Russia and Ukraine. Putin added that Russia also wants to end the Russia-West conflict but only on the Kremlin’s terms and emphasized that Russia will not give up its positions. Putin does not view Ukraine as an independent actor and is thus portraying his full-scale invasion of Ukraine as a confrontation between Russian and West – deliberately misrepresenting the reality that Russia invaded Ukraine to destroy Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Putin’s emphasis on changing narratives in the West may indicate that he will perceive and/or frame any wavering in Western support for Ukraine and any Ukrainian defeats on the battlefield as a Russian victory in this supposed Russian-Western confrontation.
Putin’s framing of his war in Ukraine as a Russian struggle against the West – and not Ukraine – indicates that he does not intend to negotiate in good faith with Ukraine and is setting information conditions aimed at convincing the West to betray Ukraine through negotiations. Putin is likely deliberately and falsely framing Ukraine as pawn without agency in the Russia-West conflict to mask his expansionist and maximalist goals of establishing full effective Russian control of Ukraine. Putin’s January 1 discussion of negotiations refers to his intent to negotiate solely with the West about Ukraine’s future within the Russian sphere of influence and only about Western abandonment of Ukraine. It does not signal that Putin is interested in negotiating with Ukraine as an autonomous actor. Putin previously adopted a similar line when issuing two ultimatums to the United States and NATO in December 2021, which were intended to force the West to recognize Russia’s sphere of influence in Eastern Europe by surrendering essential elements of Ukraine’s sovereignty in the name of de-escalating the conflict between the West and Russia that Putin was inflaming.[2] Any Western commitment to negotiations about Ukraine's future that bypass Ukraine will signal to Russia that it can impose its will upon countries that it deems to be in its sphere of influence – even countries beyond Ukraine, and potentially including Finland and Moldova, about which various Russian actors have begun setting informational conditions for future campaigns.
Putin may be expanding his war aims in Ukraine to include confrontation with the West in an effort to set conditions for permanent Russian military buildup and to justify high battlefield sacrifices. Russia gained almost no meaningful ground in 2023 at a high manpower cost, despite Putin’s January 1 absurd claims that he only orders Russian servicemen to launch offensives that will not generate significant casualties.[4] The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD), however, stated on December 30 that “the average daily number of Russian casualties in Ukraine has risen by almost 300 during the course of 2023” and that Russian casualties could rise to over half a million by the end of 2024.[5] A declassified US intelligence assessment shared with Congress on December 12 stated that Russian forces have lost 315,000 personnel since the beginning of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[6] Such high casualties for small territorial gains are likely prompting Putin to present a strong and ideological justification to continue the prolonged war of choice on which he has launched Russia. Ukraine needs no such contorted justifications for the high losses and suffering that Putin’s invasion is inflicting on its people, even when Ukraine’s military operations do not produce the desired results. The war really is existential for Ukraine as it is not for Russia.
Putin notably concluded his observations about the Russian-West conflict by telling one wounded serviceman in the hospital that the serviceman did not get wounded for Russia to give up everything and surrender. Putin also addressed several domestic concerns about the lack of housing and compensations to servicemen who have received injuries on the battlefield, thereby attempting to posture himself as an empathetic and involved wartime leader even while seemingly raising the stakes to support his demands for increasing sacrifices by his people. Putin’s statements likely suggest that he is preparing a long-term justification to keep forces mobilized and engaged in combat for the perpetual defense of Russia’s sovereignty against the West.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stressed Ukraine’s need for urgent Western support to protect both Ukraine and the rest of Europe in an interview with the Economist published on January 1.[7] Zelensky warned that the West has lost its sense of urgency and that some Ukrainians have lost a sense of the existential threat that Russia poses to Ukraine. Zelensky emphasized that Europe needs to support Ukraine not solely to protect Ukraine but also to protect Europe, as Russian President Vladimir Putin will continue fighting further west if Ukraine loses. Zelensky added that the speed of Ukrainian military success depends on Western military assistance. Zelensky noted that the idea that Putin is "winning" the war is false and that there are no indications that Russia is willing to engage in meaningful peace negotiations, citing recent massive Russian drone and missile strikes against Ukrainian civilian infrastructure as evidence of Putin's continued pursuit of his maximalist objectives. Zelensky assessed that Crimea and the Black Sea will be the center of gravity for military operations in 2024 and noted that a successful Ukrainian operation in Crimea, particularly an operation that would isolate Crimea and degrade Russian military operations there, would have a significant effect on Russia.
Russian forces conducted another massive series of drone and missile strikes against deep rear areas in Ukraine between December 31 and January 2, one of which used a strike package similar to that used on December 29, and to which Ukrainian forces appear to be adapting. Ukrainian military officials stated that overnight on December 31 to January 1 Russian forces launched 90 Shahed-136/131 drones from Cape Chauda and Balaklava (occupied Crimea); Kursk Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai and that Ukrainian forces shot down 87 of the drones.[8] Ukrainian officials stated that Russian forces also launched four S-300 missiles, three Kh-31P missiles, and one Kh-59 missile from occupied Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts on January 1. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that later in the afternoon on January 1, Russian forces later launched an additional 10 Shahed drones and one Kh-59 missile, and that Ukrainian forces shot down nine of the drones and the missile.[9] Ukrainian officials stated that the Russian strikes damaged a museum and part of the Lviv National Agrarian University in Lviv City and residential buildings in Odesa City and Esma, Sumy Oblast.[10] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that the Russian strikes on December 31 targeted unspecified Ukrainian airfields, although ISW has not yet been able to confirm strikes against Ukrainian airfield infrastructure.[11] Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed on January 1 that Russian strikes on January 2 would target military infrastructure in Ukraine like the strikes on January 1.[12]
Russian forces then conducted another massive series of missile and drone strikes overnight on January 1-2 and during the day on January 2. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 35 Shahed drones; 10 Kh-47 Kinzhal hypersonic missiles; 70 Kh-101/555/55 missiles; 12 Iskander-M, S-300, and S-400 ballistic missiles; four Kh-31P anti-radar missiles; and three Kalibr missiles at Ukraine on the night of January 1-2 and the morning of January 2 and that Ukrainian forces shot down 59 of the Kh-101/555/55 missiles and all of the drones, Kinzhal missiles, and Kalibr missiles.[13] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi stated on January 2 that Ukrainian forces shot down a record number of 10 Kinzhal hypersonic missiles with Western-provided Patriot systems.[14] Ukrainian officials stated that the Russian strikes caused damage in Kyiv and Kharkiv cities.[15] The Russian MoD claimed that the Russian strikes targeted Ukrainian weapons storage sites and defense industrial base (DIB) enterprises, including those that produce missiles and drones and repair military equipment in Kyiv City and its suburbs, and Zaluzhnyi confirmed that there were hits to civilian, critical, and military infrastructure.
Western provision of air defense systems and missiles to Ukraine remains crucial for Ukraine as Russian forces will likely attempt to adapt to Ukrainian air defense capabilities. Ukrainian military officials largely characterized the weapons composition of munitions used and the number of Russian strikes on January 1-2 as comparable to those on December 29, 2023.[17] Ukrainian forces notably shot down more Shahed drones and Kinzhal missiles on January 1-2 than on December 29, suggesting that Ukrainian forces may have adapted to the type of strike package Russian forces employed on December 29, likely after months of experimentation and testing Ukrainian air defenses using various weapons systems, strike routes, and air defense mitigation tactics.[18] Russian strikes on Ukraine are part of an ongoing tactical and technological offense-defense race wherein both sides are constantly experimenting and adapting to the other, particularly in the realm of long-range strikes and air defense. Western aid to Ukraine remains crucial as Russian forces will likely continue to experiment and innovate new ways to penetrate Ukrainian air defenses. ISW continues to assess that the end of Western aid to Ukraine would likely set conditions for an expanded Russian air campaign in Ukraine and eventually result in significant Russian advances further west, likely all the way to the western Ukrainian border with NATO member states.[19] UK outlet the Telegraph cited analysts on January 1 who stated that Ukraine may have to ration its air defense missiles in the face of decreasing Western aid in order to protect targets it deems to be the most important, which would likely expose critical frontline areas if Ukraine is forced to withdraw air defense systems to cover critical population centers.[20] Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba called on Western countries to expedite deliveries of air defense systems and ammunition to Ukraine and provide Ukraine with combat drones and long-range missiles.[21] Several Western officials condemned the Russian strikes on January 2 and noted Ukraine’s need for air defenses.
Russian officials publicly defined the goals for Russia’s 2024 chairmanship of both BRICS and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), articulating how the Kremlin may intend to use these organizations to fulfill its foreign policy objectives this year. Russian President Vladimir Putin stated during a speech on January 1 that Russia will promote political, economic, and cultural cooperation during its BRICS chairmanship and prioritize “strengthening multilateralism for equitable global development and security."[23] Putin stated that the accession of Egypt, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Ethiopia to BRICS demonstrates the organization’s “growing authority” in the world and that BRICS is attracting ”like-minded” countries that respect sovereign equality and desire a multipolar world order.[24]
The Russian government also published a list of priorities for its CIS chairmanship on January 1, which includes increased military cooperation, sanctions evasion, and joint “military-patriotic education and the popularization of common spiritual and moral values.”[25] The CIS’ rotating chairmanship is something of a formality due to Russia's outsized influence on the CIS generally.[26] Russia’s emphasis on unspecified “common spiritual and moral values” in the CIS follows Putin’s emphasis in his annual New Year’s address on December 31, 2023, on ideological concepts such as Russian “multinationalism” and family values that fit into his wider ideology of the Russian World (Russkiy Mir).[27] ISW previously assessed that Putin is trying to re-establish the conception of the Russian World as the backbone of Russian domestic and foreign policy and is working to create an international order, through organizations such as BRICS and CIS, that will readily accept Russian principles, including the Kremlin’s claimed right to own Ukraine.
The Norwegian government announced on January 1 that it is permitting Norwegian defense companies to sell weapons and defense-related products directly to the Ukrainian government. The new policy, which went into effect on January 1, allows Norwegian defense industrial base (DIB) companies to apply to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) for export licenses to sell these products to Ukraine, and the Norwegian MFA will consider each application on a case-by-case basis.[29] Norwegian Foreign Minister Espen Barth Eide reiterated the need for ongoing support to Ukraine to defend against Russia’s war of aggression.
The Turkish government announced on January 2 that it will not allow the United Kingdom (UK) to transport two mine hunting ships to Ukraine via the Turkish Straits “as long as the war continues.”[31] Turkey cited Article 19 of the Montreux Convention Regulating the Regime of the Turkish Straits, which stipulates that “vessels of war belonging to belligerent Powers shall not...pass through the Straits.”[32] Turkey has used the Montreux Convention to deny access to Russian warships wishing to pass through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits since February 28, 2022.[33] UK Defense Minister Grant Shapps announced on December 11 that the UK transferred two Sandown-class minehunter vessels to Ukraine as part of a plan that predated Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
Russian society continues to reckon with the impacts of increasing anti-migrant sentiment amid Russian authorities’ ongoing efforts to systematically disenfranchise migrant communities within Russia. Several Russian milbloggers and sources amplified footage posted on January 1 that shows a small group of apparently intoxicated adolescents, reportedly the children of Central Asian migrants, cursing at and later fighting with demobilized Russian veterans of the "special military operation" in Chelyabinsk.[35] The Russian Investigative Committee later detained three suspects—two 18-year-olds and a 17-year-old—and referred to them as "foreign citizens."[36] Russian milbloggers seized on the incident and called for harsh and dehumanizing punishment for the adolescents while fixating on their Central Asian ethnicities and whether they and their parents are Russian citizens.[37] Russian outlet Fontanka additionally reported on January 1 that law enforcement in central St. Petersburg detained nearly 3,000 migrants during document checks on New Year's Eve, 600 of whom were reportedly residing in Russia in some violation of migration law and 100 of whom now face deportation.[38] Russian opposition outlet Novaya Gazeta claimed that up to 1,500 of the detainees have already been coerced to sign contracts with the Russian MoD, which is consistent with a general increase in mobilization raids against migrant communities in Russia, as ISW has previously reported.[39] Russian information space actors, particularly the ultranationalist milblogger community, tend to fixate on singular incidents that implicate migrant communities in acts of violence or resistance in order to weaponize xenophobic and anti-migrant rhetoric, often to suggest that migrant communities should face wider rates of mobilization and fight in Ukraine.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian President Vladimir Putin identified the West as Russia’s “enemy” and implied that Russia is fighting in Ukraine in order to defeat the West. • Putin’s framing of his war in Ukraine as a Russian struggle against the West – and not Ukraine – indicates that he does not intend to negotiate in good faith with Ukraine and is setting information conditions aimed at convincing the West to betray Ukraine through negotiations. • Putin may be expanding his war aims in Ukraine to include confrontation with the West in an effort to set conditions for permanent Russian military buildup and to justify high battlefield sacrifices. • Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stressed Ukraine’s need for urgent Western support to protect both Ukraine and the rest of Europe in an interview with the Economist published on January 1. • Russian forces conducted another massive series of drone and missile strikes against deep rear areas in Ukraine between December 31 and January 2, one of which used a strike package similar to that used on December 29, and to which Ukrainian forces appear to be adapting. • Western provision of air defense systems and missiles to Ukraine remains crucial for Ukraine as Russian forces will likely attempt to adapt to Ukrainian air defense capabilities. • Russian officials publicly defined the goals for Russia’s 2024 chairmanship of both BRICS and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), articulating how the Kremlin may intend to use these organizations to fulfill its foreign policy objectives this year. • The Norwegian government announced on January 1 that it is permitting Norwegian defense companies to sell weapons and defense-related products directly to the Ukrainian government. • The Turkish government announced on January 2 that it will not allow the United Kingdom (UK) to transport two mine hunting ships to Ukraine via the Turkish Straits “as long as the war continues.” • Russian society continues to reckon with the impacts of increasing anti-migrant sentiment amid Russian authorities’ ongoing efforts to systematically disenfranchise migrant communities within Russia. • Russian forces made marginal confirmed advances along the Svatove-Kreminna line, northwest and southwest of Bakhmut, northwest of Avdiivka, and southwest of Donetsk City. • The Russian military command may be seeking avenues to re-pardon recidivists who previously fought in the war in Ukraine in an apparent effort to maintain Russia's ability to leverage convict recruits as a manpower resource. • Russian occupation authorities are restricting and likely monitoring internet communications ahead of the March 2024 presidential elections. https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-2-2024
