IRAN UPDATE, DECEMBER 18, 2023
Dec 18, 2023 - ISW Press

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Iran Update, December 18, 2023

Ashka Jhaveri, Amin Soltani, Andie Parry, Alexandra Braverman, Annika Ganzeveld, Kathryn Tyson, and Peter Mills

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm EST

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Key Takeaways:

1. Israel appears to be nearing the final stages of its clearing operation in the northern Gaza Strip.
2. The IDF reported on December 18 that Israeli forces destroyed Hamas’ Beit Hanoun Battalion.
3. The al Qassem Brigades still has two units that are not committed to combat in the Rafah and the Central governorates that it could draw on to defend Khan Younis.
4. Palestinian militias conducted three indirect fire attacks into Israel from the Gaza Strip.
5. Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters nine times across the West Bank.
6. Iranian-backed fighters, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted nine attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
7. The Houthis claimed to have conducted two drone attacks targeting the Norwegian-owned, Cayman Islands-flagged Swan Atlantic tanker and Swiss-owned, Panama-flagged MSC Clara container ship in the Red Sea.
8. Israel conducted airstrikes targeting the IRGC headquarters at Sayyida Zainab, Damascus.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
• Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Israel appears to be nearing the final stages of its clearing operation in the northern Gaza Strip. Israeli ground forces advanced into the northern Gaza Strip on October 27.[1] Israeli clearing operations have relied on ground, air, and naval forces to destroy Hamas’ military infrastructure, namely its tunnel system and command structure.[2] Palestinian militia fighters have clashed with Israeli forces in virtually all neighborhoods of the northern Gaza Strip since October 27.[3] The Israeli Army Radio reported that the IDF has killed between 6,000 and 7,000 Palestinian militia fighters since the war began. Operations in the northern Gaza Strip likely resulted in most of the deaths.[4] CTP-ISW defines “degrade” as a temporary effect whereby a unit’s losses seriously impede its ability to continue executing assigned missions while the unit remains able to operate.[5]

Israeli forces are engaged in intense fighting against Hamas’ Shujaiya Battalion the Shujaiya neighborhood of Gaza city.[6] A commander in the IDF noted that Shujaiya “was and still is an established stronghold” of Hamas. Palestinian militia fighters have attacked Israeli forces throughout clearing operations in Shujaiya using a variety of munitions, such as explosively formed penetrators and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) to resist Israeli advances.[7] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reported on December 18 that its forces had captured and destroyed a central square in Shujaiya.[8] CTP-ISW has reported that the Shujaiya Battalion is also facing active and intense IDF pressure as Israel takes out its infrastructure and command structure.[9]

Commercially available satellite imagery captured on December 18 shows flattened terrain throughout Shujaiya neighborhood and Jabalia city, which indicates that Israeli tanks or bulldozers have been actively operating there since early December. Israel identified Jabalia and Shujaiya as targets for Israeli clearing operations.[10] Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said on December 11 that Hamas’ Jabalia and Shujaiya Battalions are “on the verge of being dismantled.”

The IDF reported on December 18 that Israeli forces destroyed Hamas’ Beit Hanoun Battalion. Israeli forces took control of the battalions’ command and control centers including its underground headquarters and other militant infrastructure.[13] The IDF 252nd Reserve Division completed its operations in the area and handed over responsibility to the Gaza Division.[14] An Israeli war correspondent noted that the announcement indicates the military has firm control over the sector.[15] Israeli ground forces began operating in Beit Hanoun on October 27 and have faced almost daily Palestinian militia attacks on and behind the forward line of advance, with various munitions, including explosively formed penetrators (EFPs) and rocket-propelled grenades (RPG).[16] The IDF Chief of Staff told forces in the Gaza Strip on November 21 that it had caused very serious damage to the Beit Hanoun Battalion.

Palestinian militias in the northern Gaza Strip will likely continue to target Israeli forces on and behind the Israeli forward line of advance. The al Qassem Brigades—the militant wing of Hamas—claimed two complex attacks on Israeli forces in Beit Lahiya.[18] Militia fighters detonated IEDs and fired a thermobaric rocket at Israeli forces in one of the attacks.[19] The militia posted a video of an attack and claimed to fire a Kornet anti-tank guided missile at an Israeli jeep operating behind the Israeli line of advance.[20] The al Quds Brigades—the militant wing of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)—claimed sniper attacks against Israeli forces in Shujaiya and mortar Israeli forces in Juhor ad Dik on December 18.[21] Fighting behind the Israeli forward line of advance is consistent with the doctrinal definition of "clear,” which is a tactical task that "requires the commander to remove all enemy forces and eliminate organized resistance within an assigned area.”

Israeli forces detained Hamas and PIJ fighters in Rimal neighborhood of Gaza City last week. The IDF reported on December 18 that its forces detained several fighters belonging to Hamas and PIJ after intense clashes in Rimal last Friday.[22] Israel said it detained a member of the al Qassem Brigades’ naval commandos, the Nukhba forces, as well as a fighter who participated in the October 7 attacks.

Palestinian fighters continued their attempts to resist Israeli forces as the IDF continued its advance in Khan Younis on December 18. The al Quds Brigades mortared Israeli soldiers in central and eastern Khan Younis and took control of an IDF quadcopter surveillance drone in eastern Khan Younis.[24] The al Qassem Brigades fired mortars, RPGs, and anti-personnel shells at Israeli forces and tanks in eastern and northern Khan Younis.[25] The IDF said its Special Forces Unit 217 has been fighting in the heart of Khan Younis for two weeks, raided a tactical tunnel system, and destroyed a drone manufacturing site.[26] Israeli aircraft struck Hamas fighters and infrastructure with direction from ground forces in Khan Younis on December 17 and 18.[27] These Israeli operations degrade Hamas’ ability to resist IDF advances in the southern Gaza Strip.

The al Qassem Brigades still has two units that are not committed to combat in the Rafah and the Central governorates that it could draw on to defend Khan Younis. The al Qassem Brigades maintain five geographic brigades in the Gaza Strip.[28] Israeli forces have not yet expanded clearing operations to the areas of responsibility of the Central Brigade in the Central governorate or the Rafah Brigade in Rafah governorate. An Israeli defense correspondent reported on December 18 that Hamas is transferring forces from the rest of the Gaza Strip to support its Khan Younis Brigade.[29] The same correspondent noted that the IDF assesses that it will take several months to defeat the Khan Younis Brigade.

The Israeli defense minister expressed a vision for the next stage of operations in the Gaza Strip during a press conference with US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin on December 18 Israeli Minister of Defense Yoav Gallant said that some regions of the Gaza Strip are close to being able to transition to a “day after” the war and Israel can start working on bringing back the local population.[31] Gallant stated that this transition will be possible even while other parts of the Gaza Strip remain in active conflict.[32] Gallant also noted that Israel will not control Gaza in any civilian way.[33] Austin said that he spoke with Gallant about the military campaign's objectives, phasing, and protecting civilians.

Hamas has continued to issue hostage propaganda since Israeli forces mistakenly killed three Israeli hostages in Shujaiya on December 15 and as hostage exchange negotiations resume. The al Qassem Brigades posted a video of three elderly male hostages calling on Israel to agree to a hostage/prisoner swap with no conditions and to not let them “grow old” in the Gaza Strip.[35] Hamas translated a hostage's statement as “we do not want to be casualties as a direct result of IDF airstrikes,” echoing a repeated and false information operation that Israeli airstrikes are killing the hostages.[36] PIJ claimed an Israeli airstrike killed an elderly Israeli hostage a day before the group released her through the temporary pause deal in late November.[37] Hamas Gaza leadership member Ghazi Hamad claimed that Israel is purposely killing the Hamas-held hostages in airstrikes and in the December 15 incident so that it doesn’t have to complete a hostage/prisoner swap.[38] Hamas has continued to message in recent days that it will not enter hostage negotiations until Israel stops its ground operation in the Gaza Strip.[39] CIA Director Bill Burns, Israeli Mossad head David Barnea, and the Qatari prime minister met to restart hostage negotiations on December 18, however.

Palestinian militias conducted three indirect fire attacks into Israel from the Gaza Strip on December 18. The al Quds Brigades fired rockets and mortars at Nahal Oz in southern Israel.[41] The militia separately claimed to fire rockets east of Rafah along the border with Israel.[42] The al Qassem Brigades fired rockets at Kissufim, where Israeli forces used a border crossing to enter the southern Gaza Strip.[43]

Israeli forces operating in Khan Younis reported on December 18 that they destroyed rocket launchers aimed at Israeli territory.[44] IDF Home Front Command lifted workplace and educational restrictions in Ashkelon in southern Israel after a situational assessment regarding the threat of rocket fire from the Gaza Strip.[45] The IDF evacuated and designated the periphery of the Gaza Strip as a military zone on October 11.[46] Israeli clearing operations and lifted restrictions in southern Israel are consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that Israeli forces are likely degrading Hamas’ capacity to conduct indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters nine times across the West Bank on December 18.[48] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades engaged Israeli forces in small arms clashes and detonated IEDs targeting these forces in Azzun, west of Nablus.[49] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades separately fired on an Israeli civilian vehicle near Ramallah.[50] Palestinian fighters clashed with Israeli forces and detonated IEDs targeting these forces in the al Fara refugee camp near Tubas.[51] Hamas’ West Bank branch said that Israeli forces killed four fighters during the clashes.[52]

The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades said that Israeli forces killed five fighters during clashes in the Noor Shams refugee camp in Tulkarm on December 17.[53] The Noor Shams Camp branch of the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades said that Israeli ”crimes will not go unnoticed” and called on fighters across the West Bank to unite against Israeli forces.[54] The Qalqilya branch of the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades called for further attacks on Israeli forces in revenge for the killing of Palestinian fighters in Tulkarm and Jenin.[55] A Palestinian journalist said that members of the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, Hamas, and the al Quds Brigades participated in a memorial service for fighters killed in Tulkarm.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
• Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed fighters, including Lebanese Hezbollah (LH), conducted nine attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on December 18. LH claimed an attack on an IDF Iron Dome air defense system for the first time since the Hamas-Israel war began on October 7.[57] The IDF has not acknowledged the attack on the Iron Dome system. LH attacked Israeli forces near Hanita and fired rockets targeting Kiryat Shmona in retaliation for an IDF airstrike in Lebanon near the funeral of an LH fighter.[58] Unspecified fighters carried out four rocket attacks, one anti-tank guided missile attack, and launched one drone into northern Israel on December 18.[59] The IDF reported that it responded to LH attacks with artillery fire and airstrikes targeting LH rocket launchers and other unspecified military infrastructure in Lebanon on December 18.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
• Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

Iraq held provincial council elections on December 18 for the first time since 2013.[61] Iraqi provincial councils are authorized to appoint and remove governors, approve provincial director-general positions, and approve provincial security plans.[62] The Iraqi Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) announced midday on December 18 that only 17 percent of registered voters had cast votes.[63] Iraqi media claimed after the closing of the polls that voter participation had reached 38 percent and that voter participation was highest in the northern province of Kirkuk.[64] IHEC announced that it will release the results of the election on December 19.[65]

Iraqi media reported several instances of voter intimidation and violence at voting centers on December 18. Unidentified individuals threw IEDs at two voting stations in Kufah, Najaf Province.[66] Iraqi Joint Operations Deputy Commander Lieutenant General Qais al Muhammadawi separately announced that unspecified individuals hurled a stun grenade toward a voting center in Najaf.[67] Supporters of an unspecified political alliance stormed a voting center in Baghdad and demanded that voters vote for a member of their alliance.[68] Iraqi officials emphasized that the elections passed smoothly and without any major security incidents.

The Houthis claimed to have conducted two drone attacks targeting the Norwegian-owned, Cayman Islands-flagged Swan Atlantic tanker and Swiss-owned, Panama-flagged MSC Clara container ship in the Red Sea on December 18. The Houthi Navy initially deployed unspecified “craft” with armed personnel to direct the ships to alter course before attacking them.[70] The Houthi military spokesperson claimed that the group conducted drone attacks on the two ships.[71] US officials stated, on the other hand, that multiple unspecified “projectiles” had been launched from Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen.[72] It is unclear what munitions the Houthis used to conduct the attacks at the time of writing. The USS Carney responded to the Atlantic’s distress call.[73] Western media reported that the Atlantic was damaged in the attack.[74] The UK Maritime Trade Operations reported an explosion in the water near a vessel south of the port of Mokha in Yemen.[75] The Houthis have expanded their attacks on maritime traffic around the Red Sea to include all vessels traveling to Israel after having threatened to do so on December 9 and 12.

The Houthi anti-shipping attack campaign continues to achieve one of its desired effects of disrupting Red Sea maritime traffic headed to Israel. The British petroleum company BP, Taiwanese shipping company Evergreen Line, and Belgian oil tanker company Euronav announced on December 18 that they will suspend shipping operations in the Red Sea.[77] Norwegian energy group Equinor similarly stated that it had rerouted an unspecified number of ships away from the Red Sea.[78] The above companies cited the “deteriorating security situation” in the area and concern for the “safety of ships and crew.” The Hong Kong-based shipping company Orient Overseas Container Line (OOCL) similarly announced on December 17 that it would immediately stop shipping goods to and from Israel.[79] Global shipping giants, such as Mediterranean Shipping Company, CMA CGM, Maersk, and Hapag-Lloyd, previously announced that they would pause operations around the Red Sea but did not specify how it would affect their services to Israel.

Israel conducted airstrikes targeting the IRGC headquarters at Sayyida Zainab, Damascus on December 17. The Syrian Defense Ministry stated that Israel conducted airstrikes near Damascus which injured two Syrian Arab Army soldiers.[82] Iranian-backed militia groups and the IRGC maintain their main headquarters in Sayyida Zainab and use it to facilitate Iranian lines of effort elsewhere in Syria.[83] Syrian opposition news outlet Eye of Euphrates reported on October 30 that the senior-most IRGC commander in Syria has coordinated all attacks on US forces in Syria through a joint operations room based in Sayyida Zainab.[84] Israel has regularly conducted airstrikes on the headquarters and recently killed general officers in IRGC Quds Force Unit 340, which is responsible for providing technical military support and training to members of the Axis of Resistance.[85] There is no reason to believe that Israel has targeted the same unit or capabilities as it is not clear what area of the Sayyida Zainab headquarters was targeted and the headquarters is a sprawling facility.

The Jordanian armed forces clashed with Iran-backed militias attempting to smuggle weapons and drugs through the Jordan-Syria border on December 18.[86] Jordanian state media stated that this was the largest armed cross-border weapons and drug smuggling operation in recent years.[87] Several Jordanian army personnel and smugglers were injured or killed during the clash. The Jordanian army similarly announced that it had neutralized an unspecified number of drug smugglers attempting to smuggle Captagon into the country on December 12.[88] The Syrian regime and Iran-backed militias mass produce the drug in Syria and smuggle it through Jordan to the Gulf Arab states, generating billions of dollars of revenue for the malign actors.[89] Jordanian and Western officials have stated that Iran and LH have been behind the surge in drug and weapons smuggling from southern Syria into Jordan.[90] The Jordanian armed forces conducted air strikes on Iran-linked drug factories in southern Syria in May 2023.[91]

Jordanian officials have been concerned about Iranian threats to their security beyond drug and weapons smuggling.[92] The Jordanian Armed Forces shot down three drones that traveled into their airspace from Syria in August 2023, which Jordanian officials linked to Iran-backed militias in Syria.[93] Jordan also borders Iraq and the West Bank whose local governments and security institutions are infiltrated by Iran-backed militias that can then infiltrate Jordan from all directions. Some Western analysts have noted that Jordan is home to millions of displaced refugees from Iraq, Syria, and the West Bank which Iran can recruit for its militant groups.[94] Many of the Palestinian civil society organizations in Jordan are reportedly linked to Iran-sponsored groups.

An Israel-affiliated hacktivist group “Predatory Sparrow” conducted a large-scale cyberattack against gas pumps throughout Iran on December 18.[96] The cyberattack disabled between 60-70% of the gas stations around the country.[97] President Ebrahim Raisi confirmed the fuel stations were experiencing a disruption and ordered the Ministry of Oil to investigate this.[98] Iranian media outlets and Oil Minister Javad Owji stated that the oil disruption was a result of a cyberattack by Israel and the United States.[99] Iran also recently blamed Israel for the December 15 Jaish al Adl attack in Sistan and Baluchistan province.[100]

The "Predatory Sparrow” group claimed responsibility on X for the attack and warned this was only a small part of their capabilities.[101] They further stated that they were acting in response to Iranian provocations in the region and warned Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei directly that ”playing with fire has a price.” According to Israel Army Radio correspondent Doron Kadosh, Israel claimed responsibility for the attack.[102] Israel warned Iranian emergency services before the attack in a form of cyber “roof-knocking”.[103] The “Predatory Sparrow“ group has targeted IRGC-affiliated industries in the past and attributed responsibility to Israel.

Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian discussed the recent attack on an LEC Headquarters in Rask, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, during a phone call with his Pakistani counterpart Jalil Abbas Jilani on December 18.[105] The two foreign ministers discussed the Israel-Hamas war. Jilani emphasized Pakistan’s commitment to cooperating with Iran to counter terrorism.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-18-2023

IRAN UPDATE, DECEMBER 20, 2023
Dec 20, 2023 - ISW Press

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Iran Update, December 20, 2023

Brian Carter, Annika Ganzeveld, Johanna Moore, Amin Soltani, Kathryn Tyson, Andie Parry, and Alexandra Braverman

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm EST

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Key Takeaways:

1. Israeli forces are transitioning from clearing operations to holding operations in some areas of the northern Gaza Strip.
2. Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi threatened to target US warships in the Red Sea.
3. Israel and Hamas continued negotiations for a new humanitarian pause in fighting in exchange for Israeli hostages being held in the Gaza Strip.
4. PIJ Secretary General Ziad al Nakhalah and a PIJ delegation will travel to Cairo in the coming days to discuss ceasefire negotiations with Egyptian officials.
5. Iranian military leaders view current Hamas operations in the Gaza Strip as the prelude to a long-term war to destroy Israel.
6. Iraqi political parties and coalitions aligned with the Shia Coordination Framework—a loosely aligned coalition of pro-Iranian political parties—have won the most seats in the provincial council elections.
7. Iraqi media claimed on December 20 that unspecified militants attacked US forces at Ain al Asad Airbase in Anbar Province, Iraq.

Israeli forces are transitioning from clearing operations to holding operations in some areas of the northern Gaza Strip. Israeli forces in some areas of the northern Gaza Strip, such as Beit Hanoun and the al Shati camp, are beginning to execute tasks analogous to the US military definition of a holding operation. A holding operation “involves disrupting [enemy] activities in an area and providing a good security environment for the population” and “focuses on securing the population.”[1] The Israeli Defense Minister said on December 18 that the IDF is preparing to transition to a “day after” the war and that Israel will begin bringing back the local population in some areas of the strip.[2] The IDF redeployed some of the units responsible for clearing Beit Hanoun and al Shati camp and backfilled them with new units to hold the areas.[3] The backfilling units are continuing lower intensity operations, such as raids against infrastructure and clashing with small cells of Palestinian fighters.[4] The hold phase is defined by a decreased level of violence, but it still requires holding forces to engage and eliminate enemy forces and infrastructure to provide security.

Doctrinally sound holding operations would enable the Israel Defense Forces to protect local Palestinian civilians in the Gaza Strip and Israeli citizens in southern Israel. Holding operations consist of both offensive and defensive tasks that secure the population and prevent enemy forces from securing terrain.[6] US military doctrine defines the tactical task ”secure“ as efforts to prevent a unit, facility, geographic location, or population from being destroyed or damaged.[7] Holding forces execute defensive tasks, such as capturing enemy weapons caches and securing terrain.[8] They also conduct offensive operations, including raids against enemy leaders and disruption operations targeting enemy support structures among the population.[9] Holding operations allow the IDF to protect local populations by securing areas in the Gaza Strip against Hamas re-infiltration while protecting Israeli citizens in southern Israel by continuing to dismantle Hamas military infrastructure.

The holding phase is a lengthy transitional period that seeks to create a minimally acceptable security environment to provide space for the creation of a new political order. This phase can take many months. In US doctrine and practice, the holding force will increasingly execute stability tasks and operations—such as restoring essential services and supporting dislocated civilians—as the hold phase continues.[10] Stability tasks and operations during the holding phase help set conditions for the new political order and prevent a collapse of social order.

Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi threatened to target US warships in the Red Sea in a speech on December 20.[11] The United States announced on December 18 that it established a 10-nation combined maritime operation to counter Houthi attacks in the Red Sea.[12] Abdulmalik said that the Houthis would attack “US battleships, interests, and navigation” if the United States “escalates further” and targets Yemen or the Houthis.[13] The US Navy no longer operates battleships. Abdulmalik also accused the United States of “militarizing the Red Sea and asked that Arab countries leave the Houthis to respond to a “direct war” with the United States and Israel.[14] Abdulmalik claimed falsely that the Houthis would not target European vessels in the Red Sea as long as the vessels do not go to Israel.[15] The Houthis have repeatedly targeted European vessels that were en route to destinations other than Israel, such as Italy.[16]

The Houthi Supreme Political Council similarly criticized the US-led coalition as a “hostile step aimed at protecting Israel.”[17] The council said that it will hold the United States responsible for anything that comes from the “militarization” of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.

The Houthi movement is conducting an information operation that aims to frame any US response to Houthi acts of piracy and terrorism targeting international shipping as an escalation. The Houthi movement is claiming to support the Palestinian cause while criticizing the US-led coalition. The Houthis and Iran are attempting to demonstrate the threat that the Axis of Resistance poses to global shipping and major maritime routes in the Middle East, as CTP-ISW previously assessed.[18] This effort is not specific to the Israel-Hamas war. Tehran has had a long-standing goal to develop the military capabilities and proxies that it requires to disrupt traffic around both the Bab al Mandeb and the Strait of Hormuz.[19] In this context, the United States is responding to multiple Houthi acts of piracy and terrorism which aim to disrupt all international trade in the Red Sea, not just to Israel. Several of the vessels that the Houthis have attacked were bound for destinations other than Israel.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
• Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Palestinian fighters fired at Israeli forces in Beit Hanoun with small arms on December 20. The IDF reported that one Palestinian fighter attempted to conduct a drive-by shooting targeting Israeli reservists in Beit Hanoun on December 20.[20] Palestinian media also reported armed clashes between Palestinian fighters and the IDF in Beit Hanoun.[21] These attacks are consistent with the doctrinal definition of a holding operation. Enemy fighters frequently attack holding forces during holding operations as the holding force conducts defensive and offensive operations to degrade and destroy the enemy force’s military infrastructure.

The IDF continued clearing operations in Jabalia on December 20. The IDF’s 551st Brigade Combat Team and Nahal Brigade captured Hamas rockets and conducted airstrikes to eliminate Palestinian militia anti-tank team positions.[23] Palestinian fighters also clashed with advancing Israeli forces near al Sikka Road and the Civil Administration Site in Jabalia on December 20, according to Palestinian media.[24]

Palestinian militia fighters continued their efforts to defend against Israeli advances in Jabalia and Shujaiya. The al Quds Brigades—the militant wing of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)--claimed that its fighters detonated an explosively formed penetrator (EFP) targeting an IDF bulldozer and Israeli infantry east of Shujaiya.[25] The Martyr Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades—the militant wing of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)—attacked IDF units in Tal al Zaatar, near Jabalia refugee camp, on December 20.[26] The group fired rocket-propelled grenades targeting Israeli forces in Shujaiya.[27] The al Qassem Brigades—the militant wing of Hamas—used rocket-propelled grenades to attack Israeli armor in eastern Jabalia on December 20.[28]

Palestinian militia fighters conducted attacks behind the forward line of Israeli advance, which is consistent with the nature of clearing operations. The al Qassem Brigades attacked an eight-vehicle Israeli convoy in Sabra and Tal al Hawa on December 20.[29] CTP-ISW assesses that the al Qassem Brigades’ Sabra-Tal al Islam (Tal al Hawa) Battalion is degraded, but not combat ineffective.[30] Al Qassem Brigades fighters also detonated anti-personnel improvised explosive devices (IED) targeting Israeli forces in Zaytoun neighborhood, southern Gaza City.

Palestinian fighters continued using sophisticated tactics to defend against Israeli clearing operations in Khan Younis. The al Qassem Brigades detonated IEDs targeting Israeli troops in two separate booby-trapped tunnels northeast and east of Khan Younis on December 20.[32] The group also attacked Israeli armor north and east of Khan Younis using rocket-propelled grenades.[33]

Israeli forces in Khan Younis raided Palestinian militia infrastructure on December 20. The 7th Brigade Combat Team discovered “underground infrastructure” including unspecified “water and electrical systems” in the homes of senior Hamas leaders in central Khan Younis.[34] The IDF’s 55th Brigade Combat Team also captured a militia weapons cache in Khan Younis.

Israel and Hamas continued negotiations for a new humanitarian pause in fighting in exchange for Israeli hostages being held in the Gaza Strip. Egyptian officials claimed that Israeli negotiators proposed a one-week pause in fighting to allow humanitarian aid to enter the Gaza Strip in exchange for 40 women, children, and elderly men held hostage.[36] Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) have rejected any hostage release until a ceasefire is implemented and Israel withdraws from the Gaza Strip.[37] PIJ is expected to participate in hostage negotiations with Hamas for the first time since the Israel-Hamas began.[38] PIJ observed the previous humanitarian pause in fighting but was not a party to negotiations.[39] An unidentified Israeli official stated that negotiations are still in the early stages.[40] Mossad Director David Barnea traveled to Doha, Qatar on December 18 to begin negotiations.

PIJ Secretary General Ziad al Nakhalah and a PIJ delegation will travel to Cairo in the coming days to discuss ceasefire negotiations with Egyptian officials.[42] Nakhalah claimed that his delegation’s primary goal is to establish a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, remove Israeli forces from the territory, and begin reconstruction in the strip.[43] PIJ Deputy Secretary General Muhammad al Hindi said that PIJ will not negotiate any hostage release until these demands have been met.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Palestinian fighters clashed with Israeli forces in nine locations in the West Bank on December 20. Palestinian fighters detonated IEDs targeting Israeli forces in four towns in the northern and central West Bank.[45] Palestinian fighters also fired small arms at Israeli forces in seven towns.[46] The Jenin Battalion of the al Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade claimed that its fighters fired small arms and detonated IEDs targeting Israeli forces in Yamoun.[47] The Qalqilya Battalion of the al Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade fired small arms targeting an Israeli checkpoint near Qalqilya on December 19.[48] Israeli forces arrested 17 Palestinians, 11 of whom were affiliated with Hamas, during overnight raids in the West Bank on December 20.[49] The IDF confiscated small arms, ammunition, military equipment, and vehicles during the operations.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
• Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed fighters, including Lebanese Hezbollah (LH), conducted eight attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on December 20.[51] LH claimed that its fighters fired surface-to-air missiles targeting IDF helicopters operating over Shomira, Even Menachem, and Shtula.[52] LH also claimed two rocket strikes on IDF positions near Khirbet Maar and Shtula.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
• Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian met with Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh in Doha on December 19. Haniyeh praised Iran and other regional actors for their support of the Palestinian people.[55] Haniyeh also denied the IDF’s claim that it controls part of the North Gaza Governorate.[56] Abdollahian said in a press conference after the meeting that Haniyeh claimed that Hamas has only used 14 percent of its defense capabilities and manpower.[57] This is Abdollahian’s fourth trip to Doha since the start of the Israel-Hamas war.[58]

Abdollahian also met with Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammad bin Abdulrahman al Thani in Doha.[59] The two discussed the Israel-Hamas war and the likelihood of an imminent permanent ceasefire. Abdollahian questioned an unconfirmed US claim that an agreement on the Israel-Hamas war could be reached before the end of the year.[60] Abdollahian also said that indirect and direct diplomatic negotiations show that the region is gradually moving towards a ceasefire within an unspecified time frame.

Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi urged the Pakistani government to improve border security during a phone call with Pakistani President Arif Rahman Alavi. Raisi’s statement comes after Balochi Salafi-jihadi fighters attacked a police station on December 15 in the Sistan and Baluchistan province, Iran.[62] Raisi also called for increased bilateral cooperation between Iran and Pakistan particularly in the energy sector. Raisi reiterated the importance of coordinated action by Islamic countries to end the Israel-Hamas war.

Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian discussed the Israel-Hamas war during a phone call with his Syrian counterpart Faisal Mekdad on December 19. The two spoke about the need for an immediate ceasefire and the provision of aid for the Palestinian people.

Iranian military leaders view current Hamas operations in the Gaza Strip as the prelude to a long-term war to destroy Israel. IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami stated the Palestinian resistance is practicing and gaining the necessary experience in “the formula for destroying Israel” during a meeting of provincial IRGC commanders in Khuzestan Province.[64] Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Gharaei Ashtiani said on November 18 that Israel’s military and intelligence failures since October 7 provide lessons for future action against it.[65] IRGC commanders previously framed Hamas’ al Aqsa Flood operation as a prelude to future attacks on Israel. Former IRGC Commander Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari framed the attack as a “warmup” to prepare and train for future operations against Israel in an interview on October 15.[66] Salami described Hamas’ operation as the “first stage” of Israel’s “hasty collapse” on the same day.[67] Salami previously outlined what he considered to be the formula for destroying Israel during an interview with the Supreme Leader’s website in August 2022. Salami argued that Lebanese Hezbollah and Palestinian militias needed to conduct more ground operations and urban combat inside Israel that would destabilize and generate internal displacement leading to Israel’s collapse.

US Deputy Secretary of State Victoria Nuland met with senior Iraqi federal government and Kurdistan Regional Government officials in Baghdad and Erbil, Iraq, on December 19 and 20.[69] Nuland congratulated Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani on the “successful” provincial council elections.[70] Sudani emphasized his government’s commitment to protecting diplomatic missions, embassies, and international coalition advisors in Iraq. Nuland separately discussed the provincial council elections with National Wisdom Movement head Ammar al Hakim.[71] The National Wisdom Movement won the third most seats in the elections.[72]

Nuland discussed protecting diplomatic missions and US and coalition forces in Iraq during a meeting with Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) President Nechirvan Barzani.[73] Nuland and Barzani also discussed the “political and security” situation in Iraq as well as relations between Erbil and Baghdad. Nuland also met with KRG Prime Minister Masoud Barzani. Nuland and Barzani discussed the risk of the reemergence of ISIS and emphasized the need for the KRG, Iraqi central government, and US-led international coalition to cooperate to combat terrorism.

Iraqi media claimed on December 20 that unspecified militants attacked US forces at Ain al Asad Airbase in Anbar Province, Iraq.[75] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—has not claimed responsibility for the attack at the time of writing.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-20-2023

With war raging in Gaza, Christmas is effectively canceled in Bethlehem

https://www.google.com/amp/s/amp.cn...lehem-christmas-gaza-war-intl/index.html

IRAN UPDATE, DECEMBER 26, 2023
Dec 26, 2023 - ISW Press










Iran Update, December 26, 2023

Brian Carter, Andie Parry, Amin Soltani, Annika Ganzeveld, Alexandra Braverman, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm EST

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Key Takeaways:

1. Hamas and other Palestinian militias are exploiting the Israeli hostages they are holding to ensure that Hamas and its partners are involved in any negotiations about the future of the Gaza Strip. Hamas having a role in the future of the strip is incompatible with Israel’s stated war objectives of destroying Hamas, demilitarizing Gaza, and deradicalizing “Palestinian society.”
2. Hamas fighters attacked Israeli forces conducting holding operations in Beit Hanoun. CTP-ISW assessed on December 20 that the IDF transitioned to a hold phase in Beit Hanoun.
3. Hamas and its militia allies continued to defend against Israeli clearing operations in Jabalia. The IDF reported that one of Hamas’ battalions used Indonesian Hospital in Jabalia as a headquarters.
4. The IDF continued clearing operations in Daraj wal Tuffah, Gaza City. Palestinian militias continued to defend against Israeli clearing operations in Daraj wal Tuffah.
5. Palestinian militias continued to try to defend against Israeli clearing operations in Khan Younis. Palestinian militias used mortars, small arms fire, and anti-tank rockets to defend against the Israeli advances.
6. A Hamas security official shot and killed a fifteen-year-old Palestinian boy at an aid distribution site in Rafah, demonstrating the continued breakdown of governance and social order across the Gaza Strip.
7. Palestinian militias conducted at least two mortar attacks from the Gaza Strip targeting southern Israel on December 25 and five rocket attacks on December 26.
8. Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters across the West Bank in nine locations on December 25 and in four locations on December 26.
9. Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted from southern Lebanon into northern Israel 10 attacks on December 25 and nine attacks on December 26.
10. Israeli media reported that LH began withdrawing many of its forces, including Radwan special operations forces, from the Israel-Lebanon border.
11. The United States conducted airstrikes targeting three Kataib Hezbollah drone facilities in Hillah, Babil Province, Iraq, in response to a KH drone attack that wounded three US military personnel at Erbil International Airport earlier that day.
12. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed responsibility for three attacks targeting US positions in Iraq and Syria.
13. Iranian Supreme National Defense University President IRGC Brigadier General Esmail Ahmadi Moghaddam discussed security and counterterrorism cooperation with Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh in Baghdad.
14. Israel was likely responsible for an airstrike on the IRGC military headquarters near Sayyidah Zainab, Syria, killing senior IRGC officer Brigadier General Razi Mousavi. The IRGC and senior Iranian officials vowed that Iran would retaliate against Israel for Mousavi’s death.
15. The Houthis attacked two vessels in the Red Sea as part of the ongoing anti-shipping attack campaign that they and Iran have conducted around the Bab al Mandeb in recent weeks. The IDF intercepted at least one Houthi drone targeting southern Israel.

Hamas and other Palestinian militias are exploiting the Israeli hostages they are holding to ensure that Hamas and its partners are involved in any negotiations about the future of the Gaza Strip. Beginning international negotiations on what the Gaza Strip will look like after the war with discussions on hostage releases has created the opportunity for Hamas and its allies to insert themselves into the discussion on the future of the strip. Hamas and its allies seek to use the hostages as leverage to get Israel to leave the Gaza Strip and end the war on terms favorable to Hamas. Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad rejected an Egyptian three-phase peace proposal on December 25 that sought to create a long-term ceasefire likely because it did not guarantee an immediate Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.[1] The first phase of the agreement would have Hamas release 40 Israeli hostages in exchange for Israeli releasing 140 Palestinian prisoners.[2] This phase also included the withdrawal of the IDF only from residential areas in the Gaza Strip.[3] Releasing hostages prior to a complete Israeli withdrawal deprives Hamas and its allies of some of their negotiating leverage. The second and third phases of the agreement would have Hamas release female and then male soldiers held hostage in return for Israel releasing additional Palestinian prisoners.[4] The third phase would include the formation of a transitional government in the Gaza Strip that would include “various Palestinian factions, including Hamas.”[5] Hamas officials have said repeatedly in recent days that they would refuse to release any hostages prior to a complete ceasefire that forces Israel to withdraw from the Gaza Strip, leaving Hamas in power.[6] Hamas and its allies are thus exploiting the hostages to ensure it will remain in power after the end of Israeli military operations in the Gaza Strip.

Hamas' effort to secure its role in the future of the Gaza Strip is incompatible with Israel’s stated war objectives of destroying Hamas, demilitarizing Gaza, and deradicalizing “Palestinian society.”[7] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reiterated these aims in an op-ed on December 26.[8] Any agreement that maintains Hamas’ military and political role in the Gaza Strip would be tantamount to Israel’s defeat in this war because it would preserve Hamas as a governing body and military force and provide Hamas safe haven to reconstitute itself and threaten Israel again in the future. Hamas remains resilient and able to reconstitute its military capabilities, despite its military losses in the war thus far.[9] Israel’s stated war goals are meant to prevent Hamas’ reconstitution by destroying Hamas as a governing body and military force. Israeli officials, including Netanyahu, have highlighted that Israel will need to fight a "prolonged” war to achieve these objectives.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
• Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Hamas fighters attacked Israeli forces conducting holding operations in Beit Hanoun on December 26. Hamas fighters detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) targeting Israeli forces west of Beit Hanoun on December 26.[11] The IDF said on December 18 that it destroyed Hamas’ Beit Hanoun Battalion.[12] CTP-ISW assessed on December 20 that the IDF transitioned to a hold phase in Beit Hanoun.[13] Violence decreases during a hold phase but is not absent, as the holding force seeks the complete destruction of the enemy force.

Hamas and its militia allies continued to defend against Israeli clearing operations in Jabalia on December 25 and 26. Palestinian militias ambushed Israeli forces using IEDs, rocket-propelled grenades, and small arms.[15] Hamas said that it targeted two separate Israeli combat outposts with thermobaric rockets on December 25.[16] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) reported that that it used tandem charge rockets to attack advancing Israeli armor in Jabalia on December 26.[17] Hamas and PIJ also conducted a combined complex ambush using standard and thermobaric rockets against Israeli forces sheltering in a home in Jabalia city.[18] The IDF 261st Brigade engaged a Hamas cell that attempted to detonate an IED targeting an IDF tank in Jabalia on December 26.[19] Israeli air and artillery support targeted and killed the enemy Hamas cell.

The IDF reported on December 26 that one of Hamas’ battalions used Indonesian Hospital in Jabalia as a headquarters. The IDF said that its 551st Brigade searched the grounds of the Indonesian Hospital and discovered a Toyota Corolla belonging to the family of one of the Israeli hostages.[21] The IDF reported that it found “bloodstains” and “RPG remains” in the vehicle, adding that the presence of the vehicle at the hospital connects the hospital to Hamas’ October 7 attack.[22] The IDF said that the hospital was a “strategic center of the underground infrastructure” for one of the Hamas battalions operating in Jabalia.[23] The IDF was likely referring to the Khalifa (Jabalia Camp) Battalion, given that the Indonesian hospital is in the Jabalia refugee camp where this battalion operates.

The IDF continued clearing operations in Daraj wal Tuffah, Gaza City, on December 26. The IDF said that all four battalions in Hamas’ Central Brigade, of which the Bureij Battalion is apart, have sustained “some damage” but are “largely functioning.”[28] The IDF killed the Central Brigade commander in mid-October, but his deputy likely commands the brigade now given that Hamas has a conventional military structure.[29] Hamas and its militia allies attempted to defend against the IDF’s advance. The al Qassem Brigades detonated a booby-trapped tunnel targeting Israeli soldiers east of Bureij, and the National Resistance Brigades mortared Israeli forces near Abu Mutaybaq crossing.[30] The al Qassem Brigades also fired anti-tank rockets targeting advancing Israeli armor.[31]

PIJ mortared advancing Israeli units near Juhor ad Dik, northeast of Bureij, on December 26.

Palestinian militias continued to try to defend against Israeli clearing operations in Khan Younis on December 25 and 26. Palestinian militias used mortars, small arms fire, and anti-tank rockets to defend against the Israeli advances. The al Qassem Brigades claimed seven attacks using mortars and anti-tank rockets on December 25 and 26, targeting Israeli forces north and east of Khan Younis city.[33] The al Quds Brigades said that its forces engaged in "heavy fighting” against IDF forces north and east of the city.[34] The Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades, the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, and the National Resistance Brigades similarly attempted to defend against Israeli advances north of Khan Younis on December 25 and 26.[35]

The IDF 4th Brigade Combat Team (BCT) destroyed “dozens of tunnel shafts” and discovered and destroyed a weapons factory in Khan Younis on December 25.[36] The IDF also said the 4th BCT destroyed a “concrete factory” that Hamas used to manufacture concrete for building tunnels.[37] The IDF 7th Brigade called in airstrikes targeting a group of Hamas fighters in Khan Younis on December 26, killing 10.[38]

Hamas’ political leader in the Gaza Strip, Yahya Sinwar, said that Hamas is inflicting “heavy [Israeli] losses” and that the al Qassem Brigades “destroyed” the IDF and will “crush it.” Sinwar claimed that Hamas forces killed at least 1,650 Israeli soldiers and permanently disabled 1,650 more.[39] He added that Hamas has destroyed 750 IDF vehicles “completely or partially.” Sinwar provided no evidence to support his assertions and was likely exaggerating dramatically to frame Hamas as performing better militarily than it actually is. The IDF reported that 161 soldiers have been killed in action as of December 26.

A Hamas security official shot and killed a fifteen-year-old Palestinian boy at an aid distribution site in Rafah on December 24, demonstrating the continued breakdown of governance and social order across the Gaza Strip. The killing sparked clashes between Hamas security officers and the boy’s family in Tal al Sultan. A crowd formed after the killing, burning a Hamas police station and demanding revenge for the boy’s death.[42] A separate video showed plainclothes Hamas officers beating an individual with a stick in Khan Younis.[43] These reports are consistent with the Associated Press’s November 10 reporting, which noted that the strip’s society was “fraying” and that the population was beginning to push back against Hamas’ rule in the southern Gaza Strip.

Palestinian militias conducted at least two mortar attacks from the Gaza Strip targeting southern Israel on December 25 and five rocket attacks on December 26. The al Quds Brigades and the National Resistance Brigades—the militant wing of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)—claimed one mortar attack each targeting southern Israel on December 25.[45] The al Quds Brigades claimed five more rocket attacks targeting southern Israel on December 26.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in nine locations across the West Bank on December 25. Palestinian fighters used a combination of IEDs and small arms in three of the nine clashes.[48] Palestinian militias also detonated two separate IEDs targeting Israeli forces in near Ramallah and Bethlehem.[49] Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fighters fired small arms targeting Israeli forces in Tulkarm, Jenin, and Nablus on December 25.[50] Israeli forces arrested 11 people and confiscated weapons and cars in overnight raids throughout the West Bank on December 25.

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in four locations across the West Bank on December 26. Palestinian fighters used a combination of IEDs and small arms in three of the nine clashes.[48] Palestinian militias also detonated two separate IEDs targeting Israeli forces in near Ramallah and Bethlehem.[49] Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fighters fired small arms targeting Israeli forces in Tulkarm, Jenin, and Nablus on December 25.[50] Israeli forces arrested 11 people and confiscated weapons and cars in overnight raids throughout the West Bank on December 25.

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in four locations across the West Bank on December 26. Palestinian fighters used a combination of IEDs and small arms in three of the four clashes.[53] Palestinian media said that Israeli forces blew up three houses in Nour Shams refugee camp.[54] The IDF said its forces uncovered IEDs, an IED manufacturing site, makeshift rockets, and small arms in the camp.[55]

Israeli forces arrested several senior Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) militia in overnight raids in Ramallah on December 26.[56] The PFLP’s Office of Martyrs, Prisoners, and Wounded said that the arrests were an Israeli attempt to empty the West Bank of any national or political mobilization and that the arrests would only lead to “adverse results.”[57] Palestinians demonstrated in support of the Gaza Strip and Palestinian prisoners in Bethlehem and Nablus on December 26.[58] Several civil society and political groups, including Hamas’ political wing, called for mass demonstrations in the West Bank on December 26.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
• Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah (LH), conducted 10 attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on December 25.[60] LH claimed responsibility for eight of these attacks, targeting civilian and military sites. LH used an anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) in at least one of the attacks.[61] The al Qassem Brigades separately conducted an indirect fire attack targeting Israeli forces in northern Israel.

Iranian-backed militias, including LH, conducted another nine attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on December 26.[63] LH claimed responsibility for eight of these attacks, targeting military sites. LH used an ATGM in at least one of the attacks and a Burkan short-range rocket in at least one of the attacks.[64] LH also conducted a drone attack on an Israeli military site.[65]

Unspecified militants separately fired a surface-to-air missile targeting an IDF aircraft around the Israel-Lebanon border.

Israeli media reported on December 24 that LH began withdrawing many of its forces, including Radwan special operations forces, from the Israel-Lebanon border.[67] Israeli officials told Israeli media that it is not clear for how long these LH forces will remain deployed away from the border, however. Israeli media attributed the withdrawal to the high rate of casualties that LH forces have incurred.

CTP-ISW is considering the hypothesis that LH Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah ordered the withdrawals to alleviate Israeli concerns about the threat that LH poses. Israeli officials have expressed concerns in recent weeks about the potential for LH to conduct an attack into Israel similar to what Hamas did on October 7.[68] Israeli officials have accordingly discussed called for international diplomatic engagement to get LH to move its forces away from the border in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which prohibits LH forces from operating south of the Litani river.[69] Nasrallah withdrawing forces now without further international negotiations would allow him to redeploy forces to the border at a later date of his choosing.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
• Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The United States conducted airstrikes targeting three Kataib Hezbollah (KH) drone facilities in Hillah, Babil Province, Iraq, on December 25 in response to a KH drone attack that wounded three US military personnel at Erbil International Airport earlier that day.[70] The US airstrikes killed at least one KH member and wounded at least 16 others.[71] Western observers noted that the earlier KH drone attack was one of the "most serious” attacks conducted by Iranian-backed Iraqi militias since the Israel-Hamas war began.[72] The KH attack put one US servicemember in critical condition.[73] KH has not claimed responsibility for the attack at the time of writing. The Iraqi federal government condemned the US airstrike but also said that the militia attacks against military bases hosting international coalition advisers “violate Iraqi sovereignty.”

The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF)—an Iraqi security service containing several Iranian-backed Shia militias—held a funeral for the KH member who was killed in the US airstrikes.[75] Many individuals at the funeral carried PMF flags, while a small number carried Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba (HHN) flags.[76] HHN is one of the Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that has led the attacks on US forces in Iraq and Syria since the Israel-Hamas war began. The PMF and KH-affiliated media honored the killed KH member in social media posts.[77] Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Ashab al Kahf published a statement claiming that the US killing of Iraqi militants increases their determination and resolve to expel US forces.[78] Ashab al Kahf added that the United States “will not enjoy security and safety throughout our country and the region as long as there is a pulsing vein in us.”

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed responsibility for three attacks targeting US positions in Iraq and Syria on December 25 and 26.

• The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed a drone attack targeting US forces at al Harir Airbase in Erbil Province, Iraq, on December 25.[79] Al Harir Airbase is located approximately 30 miles northeast of Erbil International Airport.
• The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed a drone attack targeting US forces at al Omar oilfield in Deir ez Zor Province, Syria, on December 25.[80] The group also claimed a rocket attack targeting US forces at al Shaddadi in Hasakah Province, Syria, on December 26.

Iranian Supreme National Defense University (SNDU) President IRGC Brigadier General Esmail Ahmadi Moghaddam discussed security and counterterrorism cooperation with Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh in Baghdad on December 26 Moghaddam and Fayyadh discussed “exchanging experiences and information” between the SNDU and PMF. The meeting between Moghaddam and Fayyadh may have been part of ongoing Iranian efforts to professionalize and institutionalize the PMF. Doing so would consolidate Iranian influence in the Iraqi security sector since the IRGC strongly influences various militias under the PMF. Moghaddam previously served as Iran’s police chief between 2005 and 2015.[83] He was instrumental in the Iranian regime’s crackdown on the 2009 Green Movement and was sanctioned by the United States in 2011 for committing human rights abuses.[84] Moghaddam also met with Iraqi National Defense University President Lieutenant General Aqeel Mustafa Mahdi, Iraqi Federal Police head Major General Saleh Naser al Ameri, Iraqi National Security Advisor Qasem al Araji, and Iraqi Interior Minister Abdul al Shammari during his visit to Baghdad between December 24 and 26.[85] Moghaddam may have discussed internal security and his experience suppressing civil unrest during his conversations with Iraqi officials.

Israel was likely responsible for an airstrike on the IRGC military headquarters near Sayyidah Zainab, Syria, on December 25, killing senior IRGC officer Brigadier General Razi Mousavi. Mousavi is the most senior IRGC official killed since Israel assassinated Brigadier General Mohsen Fakhri Zadeh near Tehran in November 2020 and the most senior IRGC commander killed in Syria since 2015.[87] Iranian officials and state media emphasized Mousavi’s close relationship with former IRGC Quds Force Commander Major General Qassem Soleimani and former IRGC Quds Force Deputy Commander Brigadier General Mohammad Hejazi. They also described him as one of the most important and experienced IRGC commanders in Syria overseeing Iranian support to the Axis of Resistance.[88] Western and anti-regime media reported that Mousavi headed Quds Force Unit 2250, which manages Iranian weapons shipments to LH and to Iranian-backed groups in Syria.[89] Israeli officials told an Israeli journalist that Israel will not accept responsibility for Mousavi’s death.[90] Israel previously conducted an airstrike on Sayyidah Zainab on December 2, killing two IRGC general officers.[91] Israel also conducted airstrikes on Sayyidah Zainab on December 10.[92]

The IRGC and senior Iranian officials vowed that Iran would retaliate against Israel for Mousavi’s death.[93] Western media reported that the IDF was on high-alert and expected large-scale rocket and drone attacks launched from Lebanon and Syria.[94] Iran may be responsible for an explosion that occurred near the Israeli Embassy in New Delhi on December 26, which could be part of the Iranian retaliation for Israel killing Mousavi.[95] Iran is likely responsible for previous attacks near the Israeli Embassy in New Delhi, which makes this hypothesis plausible. An explosion occurred at the embassy in January 2021. Local authorities discovered a note at the scene that stated that the explosion was in response to Israel killing Fakhri Zadeh in November 2020.[96]

The likely Israeli airstrike that killed Mousavi follows other alleged Israeli action against Iranian interests in recent weeks. An Israel-affiliated hacktivist group “Predatory Sparrow” conducted a large-scale cyberattack against gas pumps throughout Iran on December 18.[97] Iran also blamed Israel for a Balochi Salafi-jihadi insurgent attack on a police station in Sistan and Baluchistan Province on December 16.

The Houthis attacked two vessels in the Red Sea on December 26 as part of the ongoing anti-shipping attack campaign that they and Iran have conducted around the Bab al Mandeb in recent weeks. Houthi military spokesperson Brigadier General Yahya Sarea claimed that the group fired anti-ship missiles at the Liberia-flagged, Swiss-owned cargo ship MSC United after the crew refused orders from Houthi naval forces.[99] The missiles did not strike the MSC United, which was traveling from Saudi Arabia to Pakistan.[100] The Houthis falsely claim that they only target ships headed to Israeli ports or owned by Israelis.[101] The UK Maritime Trade Operations organization announced that two one-way drones exploded near a vessel 50 nautical miles west of Yemen in a separate incident on December 26.[102] Sarea did not claim responsibility for the second attack, and the attack did not cause damage.

The IDF intercepted at least one Houthi drone targeting southern Israel on December 26. The Houthi military spokesperson said that the group launched attack drones at military targets in Eilat and other unspecified locations in Israel.[104] The IDF stated its fighter jets intercepted a hostile aerial target headed to Israel over the Red Sea.[105] Egyptian security sources speaking to Reuters stated that an unspecified actor intercepted a drone over the Egyptian Red Sea town of Dahab.

International shipping giant Maersk announced on December 24 it is preparing to resume shipping in the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea since the US established Operation Prosperity Guardian to protect commercial traffic there. Maersk halted traffic through the Red Sea on December 15, a day after the Houthis conducted a missile attack targeting one of its container ships near the Bab al Mandeb.[108] The United States announced Operation Prosperity Guardian on December 18 to address Houthi attacks on international shipping around the Bab al Mandeb.[109] The Iranian regime claimed that the US-led coalition was ”collapsing” on December 23.[110] Maersk’s decision to resume shipping as a result of the coalition refutes the Iranian information operation.

Western media reported on December 26 that a confidential International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report confirmed that Iran has increased its production rate of highly enriched uranium (HEU).[111] The report was sent to IAEA member states. CTP-ISW is treating this information with some skepticism, as Western media has previously published inaccurate interpretations of unpublished agency reports.[112] The most recent public IAEA reports in November 2023 said that Iran had slowed its enrichment rate of 60 percent HEU.[113] Iran and the United States concluded an informal agreement in August 2023 under which Iran would partially slow down and reverse its nuclear advances in return for the United States unfreezing Iranian financial assets in Qatari banks.[114] The United States reportedly refroze Iranian assets in October 2023 that it had released as part of the agreement.

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian discussed the Israel-Hamas war and Egyptian-Iranian relations during a phone call with Egyptian Foreign Affairs Minister Sameh Shoukry on December 25.[116] The ministers discussed the need for an immediate ceasefire and for the entry of humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip.

Abdollahian discussed the Israel-Hamas war and regional maritime security during a phone call with Jordanian Foreign Affairs Minister Ayman Safadi on December 25. Abdollahian said that a ceasefire would ensure the safety of the region. Abdollahian added that Iran is committed to ensuring the freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, ignoring the fact that Iran has conducted and facilitated repeated attacks against commercial vessels in these areas in recent weeks.

Abdollahian discussed the Israel-Hamas war with Syrian Foreign Affairs Minister Faisal Mekdad in Tehran on December 25.[118] The two emphasized the need for an immediate ceasefire in the Israel-Hamas war. Mekdad was in Tehran to attend the Tehran International Conference on Palestine, which the regime held on December 23.

The Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EaEU) signed a free trade agreement with Iran on December 25.[120] The agreement will eliminate customs duties on almost 90 percent of goods and establish a preferential regime for most of the trade between Russia and Iran. This agreement serves to replace a similar temporary agreement that has been in force since 2019.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-26-2023

IRAN UPDATE, DECEMBER 27, 2023
Dec 27, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF









Iran Update, December 27, 2023

Brian Carter, Annika Ganzeveld, Andie Parry, Alexandra Braverman, and Johanna Moore

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm EST

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Key Takeaways:

1. Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are driving an escalation cycle that combines military and political pressure to try to expel US forces from Iraq.
2. US, UN, Saudi, and Yemeni officials are negotiating an agreement to end the war in Yemen, which will not remove the threat the Houthis pose to freedom of navigation in the Red Sea and Bab al Mandeb.
3. The IRGC spokesperson claimed that the October 7 Hamas-led attack on Israel was retaliation for the United States’ targeted killing of Qassem Soleimani. This was a failed effort to show unity across the Axis of Resistance and portray Iran as a leader.
4. The IDF officially began operations against Palestinian militias in Khuzaa south of Khan Younis on December 27.
5. Palestinian political factions, including Hamas and PIJ, affirmed their unity against Israel on December 27. They stressed the need for a reform of Palestinian governance after the end of the war but did not specify what reform would entail.
6. An Israel Army Radio correspondent reported on December 27 that the IDF intercepted an Iranian-made drone over the Mediterranean Sea that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias launched from Iraq.
7. Iran and Russia finalized an agreement to conduct trade using their national currencies rather than the US dollar.

Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are driving an escalation cycle that combines military and political pressure to try to expel US forces from Iraq. Iranian-backed militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba said on December 11 that expelling US forces requires political efforts from the government and military efforts from the militias.[1] Iranian-backed attacks against US forces combine both military and political effects to drive US forces from Iraq, which is a long-held objective for Iran and its proxies. Iranian-backed militias—not the United States—are driving the escalation in Iraq by conducting attacks that risk killing US military personnel to trigger US self-defense airstrikes against the militias.[2] These Iranian-backed groups then frame these self-defense airstrikes as a violation of Iraqi sovereignty to argue that the Iraqi government should expel the United States from Iraq. The United States is in Iraq at the invitation of Iraq’s government to defeat ISIS, meaning that Iranian-backed attacks on an Iraqi partner are themselves a violation of Iraqi sovereignty.[3]

The Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are using legal and political pressure to drive out US forces, as CTP-ISW has previously assessed.[4] The militias’ military lines of effort create the conditions for Iranian-backed proxies to increase the legal and political pressure on Iraq’s parliament and prime minister. The Badr Organization-chaired Iraqi Parliamentary Security and Defense Committee drafted a new resolution to expel US forces from Iraq in response to a US self-defense strike targeting Kataib Hezbollah in November, and multiple Iranian-backed politicians have called for the expulsion of US forces in the wake of the December 25 US airstrikes.[5] The November strike was in response to a KH ballistic missile attack targeting US forces in Iraq.[6] Iranian-backed proxies called US forces a “threat” and demanded a timetable for a US withdrawal in separate statements after the December 25 US airstrikes.[7] The US strikes were a response to an Iranian-backed attack that wounded two US service members and severely injured a third.[8] The agreement that allows the US military presence in Iraq is an executive agreement, but a non-binding resolution will still impose political pressure on the prime minister to expel US forces.[9] The prime minister could choose to expel US forces by introducing a timetable, such as the one former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki set in the 2000s.

US, UN, Saudi, and Yemeni officials are negotiating an agreement to end the war in Yemen, which will not remove the threat the Houthis pose to freedom of navigation in the Red Sea and Bab al Mandeb. US, UN, Saudi, and Yemeni officials told the Wall Street Journal that there is now an “informal three-year roadmap” to “end” the war in Yemen.[10] The negotiations did not include key Yemeni belligerents.[11] A US official told the Journal that the United States is “separating” the Yemeni “peace” process and the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. “Sources familiar with Saudi thinking” said that Riyadh urged Washington not to retaliate against the Houthis, however.[12] Saudi Arabia seeks to prevent US strikes targeting the Houthis, believing that US strikes risk derailing the peace process.[13] Reaching an agreement would not change Riyadh’s calculus, as discouraging US efforts to deter Houthi terrorism and piracy in the Red Sea would prevent a breakdown in the agreement.

The IRGC spokesperson claimed that the October 7 Hamas-led attack on Israel was retaliation for the United States’ targeted killing of Qassem Soleimani in a failed effort to show unity across the Axis of Resistance and portray Iran as a leader.[15] IRGC Spokesperson Brigadier General Ramazan Sharif claimed that Hamas’ October 7 attack on Israel that killed 1,200 civilians was in response to the United States’ targeted killing of RGC Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani.[16] Iran funded, supported, and provided the weapons and training used in the October 7 attacks, but was reportedly surprised by the scope and timing of the attacks.[17]

Hamas denied the Iranian claim, likely to present itself domestically and internationally as only the defender of Palestine and thereby obfuscate its role as the initiator of the current war and an extension of Iran’s regional project. Iran has provided weapons, materiel, training, and guidance to Hamas, and the group is a member of Iran’s so-called Axis of Resistance.[18] The group's leaders frequently meet with Iranian officials and coordinate their actions with Iran.[19]

Hamas likely seeks to frame itself as the defender of Palestine in part to prevent blowback from its domestic audiences. Palestinians have borne the brunt of Hamas’ decision to launch its war against Israel with the October 7 terrorist attacks. Hamas’ popularity decreased in the Gaza Strip after the 2008 and 2014 Israeli ground operations.[20] Recent polls show that support for Hamas remains high in Gaza, although anecdotal evidence suggests that some Gazans increasingly blame Hamas for starting the war and/or for failing to provide for and protect civilians having begun it.[21] Hamas officials found after Israeli operations in Gaza City in 2014 that the Gazan public "did not feel they were getting the benefits [from Hamas] for tolerating the bombing of Gaza by Israel,” for example.[22] Accepting Iran’s claim that Hamas attacked Israel to avenge the death of an Iranian general could alienate Gazans. Iran’s presentation of the October 7 attacks as an offensive action in response to the Soleimani strike also undermines the current Hamas narratives that it is acting defensively against Israeli "aggression” and on behalf of the Gazan people rather than solely on behalf of Iran.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
• Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Hamas used more sophisticated weapons systems as it continued to try to defend against Israeli advances in Jabalia. The al Qassem Brigades—Hamas' military wing—said that it fired an RPO-A thermobaric rocket for the first time during this war at an Israeli special operations forces (SOF) unit in a house on Old Gaza Street in Jabalia.[23] The group also detonated at least one explosively formed penetrator targeting Israeli forces during a six-hour engagement in the al Saftawi area.[24] Al Qassem Brigades fighters also fired two Igla man-portable air defense systems targeting two Israeli helicopters over Jabalia.[25] The group did not shoot down the helicopters.

Palestinian militias other than Hamas continued to attack Israeli forces in Sheikh Radwan The National Resistance Brigades—the armed wing of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)—and the Martyr Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades—the armed wing of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)—engaged Israeli forces in two separate attacks in Sheikh Radwan.[26]

The Israel Defense Forces Navy provided fire support to Israeli forces in northern al Shati Camp on December 27, which is consistent with holding operations.[27] Violence decreases during a hold phase but is not absent as the holding force seeks the complete destruction of the enemy force.

The IDF continued clearing operations in Daraj and Tuffah neighborhoods in Gaza City. An IDF unit captured a rocket launch site and a tunnel shaft in an orchard near Darraj and Tuffah on December 27.[28] Palestinian fighters engaged the IDF with small arms and anti-tank fire as the IDF cleared the orchard.[29] A separate IDF unit called in air support during clearing operations in Darraj to eliminate a large number of Hamas fighters.

The IDF’s line of advance reached eastern Bureij on December 27, according to satellite imagery published by the New York Times.[31] The IDF announced that it began operations in Gaza’s Central Governorate on December 26.[32] Palestinian militias attempted to defend against the Israeli advance using mortars and anti-tank fire.[33] The al Quds Brigades—the Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s military wing—claimed that it destroyed an Israeli tank east of Bureij.[34] Hamas’ al Qassem Brigades and the PFLP’s Martyr Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades also engaged Israeli forces using small arms and anti-tank fire.[35] The Martyr Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades said that their “strike unit” attacked Israeli advances towards eastern Bureij.

Palestinian militias continued defensive operations against Israeli clearing efforts in Khan Younis. The al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades conducted three attacks with anti-tank rockets targeting Israeli forces and tanks in Khan Younis.[37] The al Quds Brigades ambushed an Israeli infantry unit at close range in Khan Younis.[38] The al Qassem Brigades—Hamas' military wing—attacked Israeli forces at least four times in northern and eastern Khan Younis using mortars, RPGs, and small arms.[39] National Resistance Brigades—the armed wing of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)— detonated IEDs targeting an Israeli military vehicle in central Khan Younis.[40] The IDF said its forces have fought in Palestinian fighters deep Khan Younis for the past two weeks.[41] The Israeli forces have destroyed tunnel openings, launched dozens of attacks with precision munitions, and raided Hamas outposts during the operation.

The IDF officially began operations against Palestinian militias in Khuzaa south of Khan Younis on December 27. IDF Gaza Division Commander Brigadier General Avi Rosenfeld issued a statement acknowledging that the IDF began operating in the town southeast of Khan Younis to pursue fighters and subterranean infrastructure.[43] Rosenfeld said fighters from Khuzaa participated in the October 7 assault on Nir Oz.[44] Palestinian media reported that Palestinian fighters clashed with Israeli forces advancing southward in the adjacent town to Khuzaa on December 26.[45] The al Qassem Brigades attacked Israeli SOF in a building in Khuzaa on December 25.

The Israeli security cabinet discussed the first section of the Egyptian three-phase peace proposal on December 27. The Israeli security cabinet is a 14-person cabinet.The first phase of the agreement resembles the humanitarian pause and prisoner/hostage exchange Israeli and Hamas completed in late November.[48] The first phase of the agreement would have Hamas release 40 Israeli hostages in exchange for Israel releasing 140 Palestinian prisoners and force the IDF to withdraw from residential areas in the Gaza Strip.[49] The Israeli security cabinet is only discussing this first phase of the proposal. The Israeli security cabinet is not discussing the subsequent phases of the proposal that would release Israeli soldiers from Hamas custody and determine the form of a transitional government in the Gaza Strip that would include “various Palestinian factions, including Hamas.”[50] The security cabinet did not vote on the plan.[51]

Hamas officials have said repeatedly in recent days that they would refuse to release any hostages prior to a complete ceasefire that forces Israel to withdraw from the Gaza Strip and leaves Hamas in power.[52] The third phase proposal and Hamas’ counterproposal are incompatible with Israel’s stated war aims. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu restated his war objectives of destroying Hamas militarily and politically in Gaza on December 25.[53] Any agreement that maintains Hamas’ military and political role in the Gaza Strip would be tantamount to Israel’s defeat in this war because it would preserve Hamas as a governing body and military force, as well as provide Hamas safe haven to reconstitute itself and threaten Israel again in the future.

Palestinian political factions, including Hamas and PIJ, affirmed their unity against Israel on December 27. The Central Command of the Palestinian Forces Alliance met in Beirut to discuss joint goals of withdrawing Israeli forces from Gaza, swapping all Israeli hostages for all Palestinian prisoners, and attaining humanitarian aid for Gaza.[54] The groups that are part of the alliance include Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Palestinian Popular Struggle Front, and the Palestine Liberation Front. The political factions stressed the need for a reform of Palestinian governance after the end of the war but did not specify what reform would entail.[55] The meeting is notable in context of the Egyptian peace deal that Hamas and PIJ rejected on December 25.[56] A Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) executive committee delegation will travel to Cairo in the next few days for talks with Egyptian officials about the Egyptian three-phase peace proposal.[57] The PLO is expected to discuss the makeup of a potential, unified government that would run the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.

Palestinian militias conducted one indirect fire attack into Israel on December 27. The Quds Brigade fired mortars and rockets at Nahal Oz in southern Israel.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in six locations across the West Bank from December 26 through December 27.[60] The Israeli forces conducted a counterterrorism raid in Nur Shams refugee camp on December 26.[61] Israeli forces uncovered IEDs that had been buried under and next to roads its forces were operating on.[62] Palestinian fighters also threw IEDs at Israeli forces during clashes that lasted from December 26 through December 27.[63] Israeli forces ordered an air strike on fighters that it said were throwing explosives at its forces.[64]

Fatah—the political wing of the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades—called for strikes in the West Bank to mourn the death of six Palestinian fighters who were killed in the Israeli airstrike in Tulkarm.[65] The al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade claimed that the six fighters were members of its Rapid Response unit operating in the Nur Shams refugee camp.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
• Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) claimed six attacks targeting Israeli civilian and military targets on December 27.[67] LH conducted a combined drone, mortar, and rocket attack targeting Israeli military positions in the disputed Shebaa Farms.[68] The IDF said LH’s three drones did not hit their intended targets.[69] LH said that it launched 30 rockets at Kiryat Shmona in retaliation for an Israeli airstrike that killed three people in southern Lebanon.[70] Israel said that it struck several LH positions in southern Lebanon on December 27.

The IDF continued to discuss the threat that LH poses along Israel’s northern border on December 27. IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi held a situation assessment and approved “a variety of” future, unspecified plans in the Northern Command, which is responsible for northern Israel and the border with Lebanon.[72] Halevi stated that the military is “at a very high level of readiness,” and that the IDF needs to be ready for an offensive into southern Lebanon, if necessary.[73] Israeli officials agreed on December 19 to give the Biden administration time for a diplomatic solution between Israel and LH but added that they “wanted to see progress in the next few weeks.”[74] Israeli officials seek to use diplomatic measures to pressure the Lebanese state to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which bars LH military units from operating south of the Litani River.[75] The Israeli Army Spokesperson Daniel Hagari said that LH is endangering the stability of the region for the benefit of Hamas and compared LH to Hamas on December 26.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
• Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

An Israel Army Radio correspondent reported on December 27 that the IDF intercepted an Iranian-made drone over the Mediterranean Sea that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias launched from Iraq.[77] IDF Army Radio correspondent said that the drone appeared to be heading toward the Karish gas field.[78] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed on December 22 that it had attacked a “vital target” in the Mediterranean Sea.[79] The IDF did not confirm that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq conducted such an attack.

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed responsibility for a drone attack targeting US forces at Erbil International Airport in Erbil Province, Iraq, on December 27. Kataib Hezbollah, which is a member of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, also conducted an attack on US forces at Erbil International Airport on December 25 that wounded three US service members.

The Iraqi Army Chief of Staff announced plans to complete the transfer of security responsibilities from the Ministry of Defense to the Ministry of Interior in 2024.[82] The Iraqi Army has already transferred security responsibilities to local police in various southern and central provinces, including Babil, Najaf, Al Muthanna, and Wasit.

IRGC Quds Force officer Brigadier General Razi Mousavi, who was killed in Syria on December 25, oversaw logistics and acquisitions in Syria, according to former IRGC Quds Force Officer Mansour Hajit Pour.[84] Pour told IRGC-affiliated news outlet Tasnim that Mousavi started his career with the Quds Force in Lebanon 30 years ago.[85] Mousavi also worked closely with Syrian President Bashar al Assad and former IRGC Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani to combat ISIS.[86] Pour said that Mousavi’s primary responsibility in Syria was overseeing logistics and providing “strategic products.”[87] Pour’s description is consistent with Western and anti-regime media reporting that said that Mousavi headed Quds Force Unit 2250.[88] Unit 2250 manages Iranian weapons shipments to LH and Iranian-backed groups in Syria.[89] The IRGC Quds Force has coordinated the deployment of hundreds of Iranian-backed fighters in southern Lebanon and southwest Syria since the Israel-Hamas war began.[90] These fighters include military engineers and missile experts, among others.

The Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces held a funeral procession for Mousavi in Najaf, Iraq, on December 27.[92] Mourners carried Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba flags in the funeral procession.[93] Iranian Ambassador to Iraq and former IRGC Quds Force officer Mohammad Kazem al-e Sadegh attended Mousavi’s procession.[94] Iran will hold Mousavi’s official funeral ceremony in Imam Hussein Square, Tehran on December 28.

Atomic Energy Organization head Mohammad Eslami denied on December 27 that Iran has increased its production rate of highly enriched uranium to 60 percent. Eslami’s denial is in response to Western media reports on December 26 that said that Iran increased its production rate of highly enriched uranium to 60 percent.[97] Eslami stated that the reports show “nothing new” and insisted that Iran is operating within the International Atomic Energy Agency framework. Eslami stated that the leaked report is an attempt to turn attention away from the Israel-Hamas war.

Central Bank of Iran Governor Mohammad Farzin traveled to Moscow on December 26 to discuss banking and finalize trade agreements with Russian officials.[98] IRIB reported that the bank managers of the Bank of Russia and the National Bank of Iran established a credit line worth 6.5 billion rubles (approx. $70 million) to allow Iran to import basic goods from Russia. Iran and Russia finalized an agreement to conduct trade using their national currencies —rather than the US dollar— on December 27.[99] Iranian media said that this agreement allows previously established non-SWIFT messaging systems and bilateral brokerage relations to now be used by banks and economic operators.

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian traveled to Yerevan, Armenia, on December 27 to discuss peace talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan with Armenian officials.[101] Abdollahian met with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan, and National Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan.[102] Abdollahian stated that the United States must end its support for Israel if it seeks a “dignified exit” from the Israel-Hamas war during a press conference with Mirzoyan.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-27-2023

IRAN UPDATE, DECEMBER 30, 2023
Dec 30, 2023 - ISW Press

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Iran Update, December 30, 2023

Annika Ganzeveld, Ashka Jhaveri, Andie Parry, Amin Soltani, Peter Mills, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm EST

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Key Takeaways:

1. Palestinian militias continued to defend against Israeli clearing operations in Daraj and Tuffah neighborhoods of Gaza City. Israeli forces continued executing tasks consistent with holding operations in some areas of Gaza City. Israeli forces continued clearing operations in Beit Lahiya and Sheikh Radwan in the northern Gaza Strip.
2. Palestinian militias are launching attacks from civilian-populated areas of al Bureij as Israeli forces advance clearing operations in the Central Governorate. Palestinian militias claimed several attacks on Israeli forces north and east of al Bureij, which is consistent with CTP-ISW's observation that the IDF appears to be isolating Hamas’ Bureij Battalion and other Palestinian militias there before reducing them.
3. The IDF continued to make ground advances in and around Khan Younis. At least five Palestinian militias attempted to defend against Israeli advances into Khan Younis. Palestinian militia fighters attacked Israeli forces south of Khan Younis.
4. Hamas and PFLP officials messaged a unified and positive position on the Egyptian peace proposal and accused Israel of spreading disinformation about the negotiations.
5. Palestinian fighters conducted at least two indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into southern Israel.
6. Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in three locations across the West Bank.
7. Iranian-backed fighters, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted five attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
8. The Axis of Resistance may escalate further against US forces in the region around the four-year anniversary of the US killing Qassem Soleimani on January 3, 2024. The IRGC Quds Force is engaging with senior Iranian-backed Iraqi militia and political leaders likely to discuss their military and political campaign to expel US forces.
9. Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani ordered the opening of Celebration Square in Baghdad’s Green Zone for New Year’s Eve.
10. The Islamic Resistance of Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed responsibility for three attacks targeting US positions in Iraq and Syria.
11. The Shia Coordination Framework—a loose coalition of Iranian-backed political parties—is conducting a series of political maneuvers to try to increase its political influence in Basra.
12. Israel was likely responsible for a series of airstrikes targeting Aleppo International Airport and Iranian and Iranian-backed targets in Albu Kamal, Syria, to interdict Iranian weapons shipments to Lebanese Hezbollah.
13. The Houthi military spokesperson warned the United States against “escalating” with the Houthis and rallying other nations to protect Israeli shipping.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
• Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Palestinian militias continued to defend against Israeli clearing operations in Daraj and Tuffah neighborhoods of Gaza City on December 30. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced that it was operating in Daraj and Tuffah on December 21.[1] Palestinian militias have since then claimed several attacks on Israeli forces attempting to clear the remaining areas in the northern Gaza Strip. The al Qassem Brigades—the militant wing of Hamas—published footage on December 29 of its fighters firing rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) at Israeli tanks from destroyed buildings in Darraj and Tuffah.[2] The al Quds Brigades—the militant wing of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)—fired tandem charged anti-tank rockets and RPGs at Israeli tanks and troop carriers as Israeli forces advanced into the neighborhoods.[3] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades—the self-proclaimed militant wing of Fatah—fired tandem charged anti-tank rockets and RPGs at an Israeli tank and bulldozer in Tuffah.

Israeli forces continued executing tasks consistent with holding operations in some areas of Gaza City. CTP-ISW reported on December 20 that Israeli forces are transitioning from clearing operations to holding operations in some areas of the northern Gaza Strip.[5] Violence decreases during a hold phase but is not absent, as the holding force seeks the complete destruction of the enemy force.[6] Palestinian attacks in these areas demonstrate that the militias have retained some forces capable of targeting Israeli operations.

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters on December 30 in Sheikh Ijlin neighborhood for the first time since mid-November.[7] Israeli forces initially advanced toward the neighborhood in southern Gaza City in mid-November.[8] The al Qassem Brigades conducted several attacks, including a complex attack in which its fighters detonated improvised explosive devices (IED) in the path of two Israeli vehicles and subsequently engaged Israeli ground forces.[9]
Israeli forces identified Palestinian fighters operating near them in Shujaiya, according to an IDF report on December 30.[10] The IDF stated that it established “operational control” of Shujaiya on December 21 after dismantling Hamas’ battalion there.[11]
Israeli forces engaged in a multi-hour battle with Palestinian fighters in Gaza City, according to an IDF report on December 30.[12] Israeli air forces killed more than 15 Palestinian fighters in less than three hours.[13] Israeli ground forces engaged Palestinian fighters following the airstrikes.[14]
The al Qassem Brigades and al Quds Brigades conducted a combined operation firing mortars and rockets at an Israeli combat outpost southeast of Zaytoun neighborhood in Gaza City on December 30.[15] The Hamas Zaytoun Battalion commander is one of the three remaining commanders in the Gaza City Brigade, who held their current positions before the war began, according to Israeli reports on December 21.

Israeli forces continued clearing operations in Beit Lahiya and Sheikh Radwan in the northern Gaza Strip. Israeli forces destroyed two Hamas-affiliated buildings in Beit Lahiya and found a large quantity of weapons, including explosive devices.[17] The IDF identified two Palestinian fighters observing Israeli forces from a building and directed tank fire at their position.[18] The al Qassem Brigades claimed that its fighters clashed with Israeli special operations forces and detonated a Shawaz explosively formed penetrator (EFP) targeting an Israeli tank in Sheikh Radwan on December 30.[19] Palestinian militias have claimed nearly daily attacks in Sheikh Radwan neighborhood since the humanitarian pause expired on December 1, suggesting that it is one of the remaining areas with significant Palestinian militia defensive capabilities in the northern Gaza Strip.

Palestinian militias are launching attacks from civilian-populated areas of al Bureij as Israeli forces advance clearing operations in the Central Governorate. Israeli forces received intelligence on December 28 that Hamas fighters were hiding inside a school where civilians were sheltering in southern al Bureij.[20] Palestinian fighters fired RPGs and small arms at Israeli forces while hiding behind women and children inside the school, according to the IDF.[21] Israeli forces raided the school and cleared the building of Palestinian fighters.[22] US Secretary of State Antony Blinken has said that Hamas continues to use civilians as human shields, which intentionally puts these civilians in harm's way, to protect Hamas’ military infrastructure and weapons.[23] Israeli forces in a separate instance encountered Hamas fighters, who launched attacks from civilian sites in al Bureij.[24]

Palestinian militias claimed several attacks on Israeli forces north and east of al Bureij, which is consistent with CTP-ISW's observation that the IDF appears to be isolating Hamas’ Bureij Battalion and other Palestinian militias there before reducing them.[25] The al Qassem Brigades conducted several attacks on Israeli forces in the area, including claiming to use a Shawaz EFP to target an Israeli tank north of al Bureij.[26] Israeli forces face other Palestinian militias in the central Gaza Strip. The al Nasser Salah al Din Brigades—the militant wing of the Popular Resistance Committees—claimed that its fighters clashed with Israeli forces north of al Bureij.[27] The al Quds Brigades detonated an unspecified explosive device targeting an Israeli military vehicle east of al Bureij.[28] The Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades—the militant wing of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)—claimed to fire tandem-charge anti-tank rockets at Israeli forces east of Bureij as well.

The IDF continued to make ground advances in and around Khan Younis on December 30. The IDF said it began ground maneuvers deeper into southern Khan Younis on December 30, a day after it said it was expanding operations there.[30] The IDF 98th Division conducted around 50 airstrikes as part of shaping operations to enable ground force maneuvers.[31] Shaping operations conducted through airstrikes change the operational environment in urban areas to favor Israeli clearing operations on the ground.[32] The 7th Brigade Combat Team raided a Hamas military intelligence headquarters in central Khan Younis as part of the clearing operations.[33] Israeli forces also found an al Quds Brigades operations room inside the Hamas compound.[34] This raid could degrade the defensive capabilities of Hamas’ Khan Younis Battalion and al Quds Brigades forces in Khan Younis. Israeli forces separately clashed with Palestinian fighters as Israeli air support struck fighters, weapons manufacturing sites, and a Hamas stronghold in Khan Younis.[35] The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs said on December 30 that intensified clashes in Khan Younis and Deir al Balah have caused at least 100,000 internally displaced people to arrive in Rafah in recent days.[36]

At least five Palestinian militias attempted to defend against Israeli advances into Khan Younis on December 30. The al Qassem Brigades conducted several attacks on Israeli armor and dismounted infantry on December 30, including sophisticated house-borne IED and EFP attacks.[37] Fighters from the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades and the Martyr Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades fired anti-tank shells and small arms at Israeli armor and dismounted infantry on the advancing line in Khan Younis.[38] National Resistance Brigades fighters clashed with Israeli forces in central Khan Younis.[39] The al Quds Brigades mortared Israeli positions in north and east of Khan Younis.[40]

Palestinian militia fighters attacked Israeli forces south of Khan Younis on December 30. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, al Qassem Brigades, and National Resistance Brigades mortared Israeli forces in Khuzaa, southeast of Khan Younis.[41] The IDF began clearing operations in Khuzaa on December 27.[42] The al Qassem Brigades fired an anti-tank shell at Israeli armor in Khuzaa.[43] The al Qassem Brigades and al Quds Brigades each mortared Israeli forces east of Rafah as well.

Hamas and PFLP officials messaged a unified and positive position on the Egyptian peace proposal and accused Israel of spreading disinformation about the negotiations on December 30. Israeli media said that Hamas had “agreed in principle” to the release of further hostages in exchange for a month-long pause in fighting, in contrast to Hamas’ previous position requiring the complete cessation of the conflict.[45] Hamas political officials abroad, such as Osama Hamdan and Hossam Badran, and senior PFLP official Maher Mezher rebuked the claim from Israeli media.[46] Hamdan reiterated that Hamas will only release the Israeli hostages once Israel stops its operation in the Gaza Strip.[47] Badran said that Hamas is discussing all peace proposals with the various factions but that hostages will only be released after the war ends.[48] Mezher said that the Palestinian political factions will deliver an amended proposal to Egypt in the coming days after they met to discuss and revise the Egyptian peace deal proposal on December 27.[49]. Mezher said that the Egyptian proposal is “suitable to be a cornerstone” of a deal.[50] The Israeli security cabinet has indicated that it will not seriously consider the Egyptian three-phase peace plan, as the Egyptian plan would prevent Israel from achieving its stated war aims and is therefore tantamount to a defeat for Israel.[51] The Egyptian proposal would form a transitional government in the Gaza Strip that would include “various Palestinian factions, including Hamas.”[52] Mezher and Hamdan claimed that Israel leaked the story to harm the united Palestinian front against the war and mislead Israelis about the release of hostages due to internal political pressure.[53] The Palestinian leaderships‘ recent comments are consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that both Hamas’ political leader in Gaza Yahya Sinwar and Hamas’ external political leaders seek to use their Israeli hostages as leverage to maintain their influence in negotiations.

Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu reaffirmed his commitment to pursuing his stated objectives in the war against Hamas and his preparedness to fight for many months on December 30. Netanyahu held a press conference and declared that “the war will continue for many more months.”[55] He also reiterated that Israel would fight until the elimination of Hamas and the release of all hostages.[56] He stated the IDF is employing new methods in the northern, central, and southern Gaza Strip.[57] Netanyahu had further clarified his war objectives of destroying Hamas, demilitarizing Gaza, and deradicalizing “Palestinian society” in a Wall Street Journal op-ed on December 26.

Palestinian fighters conducted at least two indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into southern Israel on December 30. The al Quds Brigades claimed two rocket attacks targeting southern Israel on December 30.[59] The al Qassem Brigades published footage of its fighters firing approximately ten rockets into unspecified areas of Israel on December 29.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in three locations across the West Bank on December 30. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed that it detonated an IED against an unspecified target in Azzun, east of Qalqilya.[61] Hamas praised a car-ramming attack that injured an IDF soldier near Hebron.[62] Palestinian security forces dismantled planted IEDs in Jenin on December 30.[63] Israeli forces conducted raids to arrest wanted Palestinians near Ramallah.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
• Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed fighters, including Lebanese Hezbollah (LH), conducted five attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on December 30. LH fired rockets and anti-tank guided missiles toward three Israeli border positions.[65] LH also claimed that it attacked an Israeli military position in Shebaa Farms with one-way attack drones.[66] Unspecified fighters separately launched rockets toward Yiftah on December 30.[67]

Israeli politicians continue to emphasize that LH must withdraw from Lebanon’s border with Israel. Israeli war cabinet member and former Defense Minister Benny Gantz stated in a call with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz that Israel cannot tolerate the threat that LH poses and that LH must withdraw from the border for the sake of regional stability.[68] The chairman of Israeli political party Israel Beitenu and former Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman separately called for Israel to control southern Lebanon up to the Litani River until the Lebanese government can exercise its sovereignty over the area.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
• Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The Axis of Resistance may escalate further against US forces in the region around the four-year anniversary of the US killing Qassem Soleimani on January 3, 2024.The United States killed Soleimani and his top Iraqi lieutenant, Abu Mehdi al Muhandis, in an airstrike at the Baghdad International Airport in 2020.[70] Iranian leaders have vowed to expel US forces from the region as part of their revenge for the United States killing Soleimani.[71] Iranian-backed militias have conducted an abnormally high rate of attacks around the anniversary of Soleimani’s and Muhandis’ deaths ever year except for the anniversary in January 2023.[72] The absence of an Iranian-led escalation around January 2023 is unsurprising given that the Iranian regime was focused heavily on internal security in the aftermath of the Mahsa Amini protest movement at the time. Iranian proxy and partner militias have conducted a concerted attack campaign targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria in recent months as part of Tehran’s effort to expel US forces, as CTP-ISW has reported extensively. The coincidence of this campaign with the anniversary of Soleimani’s and Muhandis’ deaths presents an increased risk to American servicemembers in the Middle East during this period.

The IRGC Quds Force is engaging with senior Iranian-backed Iraqi militia and political leaders likely to discuss their military and political campaign to expel US forces. The Iranian Embassy in Baghdad organized a ceremony to honor Qassem Soleimani and Abu Mehdi al Muhandis on December 30.[73] The following senior Iranian and Iranian-backed Iraqi actors attended the ceremony:

• Iranian Ambassador to Iraq Mohammad Kazem al-e Sadegh[74]
• Former Kataib Hezbollah Secretary General and current Poplar Mobilization Forces (PMF) Chief of Staff Abdul Aziz al Muhammadawi[75]
• PMF Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh[76]
• Former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki[77]


The presence of al-e Sadegh is noteworthy given that he is a senior IRGC Quds Force officer. Iranian leaders have long appointed such officers as ambassador to Iraq, highlighting the degree to which the IRGC Quds Force controls and influences Iranian policy toward Iraq. These officers who dual hat as diplomats to Iraq serve as key liaisons between Iranian and Iraqi military and political leaders.

The presence of Mohammadawi and Fayyadh is noteworthy given their influential roles over Iranian-backed militias in Iraq. The PMF is an Iraqi security service containing numerous Iranian-backed Shia militias.[78] Several of these militias, such as Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, are members of the Islamic Resistance of Iraq which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. The Islamic Resistance of Iraq has conducted almost daily attacks on US forces in Iraq and Syria in recent weeks as part of their campaign to expel US forces.

IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani appeared to speak on behalf of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias in a speech on December 29. Ghaani warned that militias will “put aside their considerations” and “respond” to the United States if the United States continues its “irrational behavior” in Iraq.[79] Ghaani was likely referring to the self-defense strikes that the United States has conducted on Iranian-backed Iraqi militias when he referred to “irrational behavior.” Ghaani ignored in this statement that the United States has a legitimate right to self-defense as it operates in Iraq to fight ISIS at the invitation of the Iraqi federal government. Ghaani’s comment is especially noteworthy given that the IRGC Quds Force—and he as its commander—directs, manages, and supports the Iraqi Shia militias that have been conducting the attack campaign to expel US forces. The IRGC Quds Forces provide military equipment, funding, and training to its proxies and partners throughout the region to support Iran’s pursuit of its strategic objectives, which include expelling the United States from the region.[80] Ghaani’s remark belies repeated claims by Iranian officials that “resistance groups” in the Middle East act independently.[81]

Iranian-backed political actors continued to call for the removal of US forces from Iraq in statements on December 30. Iraqi militia leaders and politicians have increased their calls for the expulsion of US forces since the United States conducted self-defense strikes on three Kataib Hezbollah facilities in Hillah, Babil Province, on December 25.

• Nouri al Maliki claimed that US forces in Iraq have transformed “from advisory forces into killers” and that the Iraqi people will not accept the presence of foreign forces in Iraq during a speech at the Iranian Embassy in Baghdad.[82] Maliki’s claims echo similar ones from other Iranian-backed Iraqi actors that the presence of US forces in Iraq threatens Iraqi security and stability.[83] US advisory forces are currently deployed in Iraq for counter-ISIS operations at the invitation of the Iraqi government and provide planning, operational, intelligence, logistical, and fire support to the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).[84] CTP-ISW previously assessed that an Iraqi decision to expel US forces will very likely create space for ISIS to rapidly resurge in Syria within 12 to 24 months and then threaten Iraq.[85] The ISF still faces significant deficiencies in logistics, intelligence, and fire support that inhibit its ability to defeat ISIS alone.[86]
• A member of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq’s political wing, Ali Turki, stated that “dirty American hands” cannot shed the blood of the PMF and ISF.[87] Turki called on the Iraqi federal government to expedite the expulsion of US forces from Iraq.
• A member of the Iranian-backed Badr Organization’s political wing, Faleh al Khazali, separately stated that the presence of US forces in Iraq is “unjustified” because of the presence of 1.6 million Iraqi security personnel in the country.[88] Other Iranian-backed Iraqi politicians, including Mohammad Shia Sudani, have similarly cited Iraqi forces’ “increased capabilities” as justification for the removal of US forces.

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani ordered the opening of Celebration Square in Baghdad’s Green Zone for New Year’s Eve.[90] Sudani ordered that the gates of the Green Zone, where the US Embassy and other government and highly sensitive facilities are located, remain open for an unspecified amount of time after midnight on December 31. PIJ and Hamas-affiliated Quds News Network separately called for demonstrations in front of US embassies across the world on New Year’s Eve to demand an end to “Israeli aggression” in the Gaza Strip.

The Islamic Resistance of Iraq claimed responsibility for three attacks targeting US positions in Iraq and Syria on December 29 and 30.[92] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed a rocket attack targeting US forces at al Shaddadi, Hasakah Province, Syria. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq also claimed two separate one-way drone attacks targeting US forces at al Harir airbase in Erbil Province, Iraq.

The Shia Coordination Framework—a loose coalition of Iranian-backed political parties—is conducting a series of political maneuvers to try to increase its political influence in Basra. Basra is an important Shia stronghold in southern Iraq. Current Basra Governor Asaad al Eidani’s political party, the Design Alliance, won 12 out of 23 seats in the recent provincial council elections.[93] Informed sources told an independent Iraqi news outlet that members of the Shia Coordination Framework are lobbying the Iraqi judiciary to rule that a majority of seats in Basra requires 13—not 12—seats.[94] Such a decision would deprive Eidani’s party of a majority. Iranian-backed Iraqi actors have historically co-opted elements of the judiciary to politically benefit themselves and disadvantage opponents, especially in recent years.[95] The independent Iraqi outlet reported that the Shia Coordination Framework is suspicious of Eidani’s ties to rival Shia cleric Muqtada al Sadr. Sadr has previously praised Eidani and members of the Design Alliance.

Israel was likely responsible for a series of airstrikes targeting Aleppo International Airport and Iranian and Iranian-backed targets in Albu Kamal, Syria, on December 29-30 to interdict Iranian weapons shipments to LH. Western and Israeli media reported and several social media accounts circulated reports of the airstrikes.[97] An unspecified American military official denied to Western media that the United States conducted any self-defense strikes.[98] The Syrian Defense Ministry claimed that the airstrike at Aleppo damaged the airport.[99] Israel has historically conducted airstrikes on major Syrian airports to prevent Iranian weapons deliveries to proxy and partner militias in Syria and Lebanon.[100] CTP-ISW has previously written on how the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) uses Iranian regime-affiliated airliners to transport military equipment and personnel to the Levant.[101] The likely Israeli airstrikes at Albu Kamal reportedly hit IRGC and Iranian-backed targets, including weapons depots and truck convoys as they crossed from Iraq into Syria. Those airstrikes killed several Iranian-backed militants, according to social media claims and Western and Israeli media reports. Israeli media reported that the airstrikes at Albu Kamal killed four LH members who were members of a unit responsible for transferring military technologies and weapons from Iran to Lebanon.[102] An Israeli social media account reported that Israel also targeted an IRGC Quds Force unit with similar responsibilities in the same strikes.[103]

The airstrikes follow reports that Israel has targeted IRGC and IRGC-affiliated actors that are trying to prepare LH for a wider conflict with Israel in recent weeks. Israeli media reported that an Israeli airstrike on the Damascus International Airport on December 28 was meant to interdict Iranian weapons transfers to LH.[104] An Israeli airstrike on the IRGC military headquarters in Sayyidah Zainab, Syria, on December 25 killed a senior IRGC commander who oversaw Iranian materiel support to LH.[105] Israeli media further reported that Iran has accelerated its weapons transfers to LH in anticipation of a wider war with Israel.[106]

The IDF stated that unspecified actors fired two rockets from Syria toward northern Israel following the most recent airstrikes on Albu Kumal.[107] This attack is unsurprising given that unspecified actors have repeatedly conducted small-scale indirect fire attacks into Israel immediately in response to Israeli airstrikes in Syria since the Israel-Hamas war began.

The Houthi military spokesperson warned the United States against “escalating” with the Houthis and rallying other nations to protect Israeli shipping on December 29. Brigadier General Yahya Sarea emphasized the Houthis’ defensive readiness and commitment to the Palestinian cause, which is consistent with prior Houthi rhetoric.[108] The Houthis have conducted an anti-shipping attack campaign around the Red Sea in recent weeks to disrupt commercial shipping to Israel and demonstrate both the willingness and capability of the Axis of Resistance to disrupt maritime traffic around strategic maritime chokepoints.[109] The United States announced Operation Prosperity Guardian on December 18 to counter Houthi attacks on international shipping.

Senior Iranian military and political officials attended a commemoration ceremony for IRGC Brigadier General Razi Mousavi, whom Israel killed in an airstrike in Syria, on December 30.[111] The Iranian regime previously held a funeral ceremony for Mousavi on December 28.[112] Western and anti-regime media have reported that Mousavi headed IRGC Quds Force Unit 2250, which manages Iranian weapons shipments to LH and Iranian-backed militias in Syria.[113] Many high-ranking IRGC officials attended the most recent commemoration ceremony, including:

• IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami;
• IRGC Aerospace Force Commander Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajji Zadeh;
• IRGC Ground Forces Commander Brigadier General Mohammad Pak Pour;
• IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani; and
• IRGC Quds Force Deputy Commander Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Fallah Zadeh.
Other notable attendees included Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian, Interior Minister and former IRGC Quds Force officer Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi, Law Enforcement Commander Brigadier General Ahmad Reza Radan, and former IRGC commanders Major General Mohammad Ali “Aziz” Jafari and Major General Mohsen Rezaei. The presence of such senior Iranian military and political officials at Mousavi’s commemoration ceremony and funeral highlights his prominence in the regime and its regional project.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-30-2023

Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu said Saturday that Israel’s war with Palestinian militant group Hamas will “continue for many months until Hamas is eliminated and the hostages are returned”.

https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20231230-%F0%9F%94%B4-live-us-government-bypasses-congress-with-emergency-munitions-sale-to-israel

https://apnews.com/article/israel-hamas-war-news-12-30-2023-5f475fb7221f7e97251f58c3aae1aeb8

“As the chief of staff said this week, the war will continue many more months,” he told a televised news conference Saturday. “My policy is clear. We will continue to fight until we have achieved all the objectives of the war, first and foremost the annihilation of Hamas and the release of all the hostages.”

More than 120 hostages remain in Gaza, after militants seized more than 240 in the Oct. 7 assault that also killed some 1,200 people, mostly civilians.

Netanyahu is also at odds with the Biden administration over who should run Gaza after the war. He has rejected the U.S.-backed idea that a unified Palestinian government should run both Gaza and parts of the Israeli-occupied West Bank as a precursor to eventual statehood. Instead, he has insisted on open-ended Israeli security control in Gaza, without saying what would come next.

They already took out Al-Arouri he was an important and charismatic leader !


Israel kills senior Hamas leader in drone strike near Beirut in Lebanon

Israel reportedly killed a senior Hamas leader in a drone strike near Beirut. According to Lebanese media, it would be Saleh al-Arouri.

He was seen as Hamas' second in command and also the leader of the Al-Qassam brigades in the West Bank. For example, he is said to be involved in the kidnapping of three Israeli boys in 2014. He is also said to have maintained close ties with both Hezbollah and Iran.

Arouri is said to be the highest-ranking Hamas person that Israel has managed to kill since October 7. Hamas has now announced al-Arouri's death, calling it "a treacherous Zionist attack."

Israel reportedly used a drone to attack an office of the movement in the southern suburb of Dahiyeh. That neighborhood is a stronghold of the Shiite terrorist movement Hezbollah, an ally of Hamas in the fight with Israel. Two other high-ranking members were also reported to have been killed.

There has been no response from Jerusalem to the drone attack yet. The Israeli government previously announced that all Hamas leaders are living 'on borrowed time'.

Lebanon's Prime Minister Mikati condemned the attack as a "new Israeli crime" in a statement. He speaks of an attempt to lure his country into a "new period of confrontation" with Israel. Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982 and occupied part of the neighboring country until 2000. In 2006, the Israeli army crossed the border again, then in a war with Hezbollah. Israel and Hezbollah have since regularly bombarded each other in the border area. Since the outbreak of the war between Israel and Hamas, the shelling has increased.

Following the news of Al Arouri's death, people in Ramallah took to the streets in protest. A general strike has been declared in the city for Wednesday, Al Jazeera reports.

IRAN UPDATE, JANUARY 4, 2024
Jan 4, 2024 - ISW Press

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Iran Update, January 4, 2024

Johanna Moore, Ashka Jhaveri, Andie Parry, Peter Mills, Annika Ganzeveld, Amin Soltani, Kathryn Tyson, Riley Bailey, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm EST

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Key Takeaways:

1. Iranian-backed actors in Iraq have intensified their effort to expel US forces from Iraq.
2. Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant reported that Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip “are completing the current mission” as part of their transition to a third phase of operations there.
3. The al Qassem Brigades—the militant wing of Hamas—claimed several attacks on Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip.
4. Israel moved the evacuation corridor running north-to-south from Salah al Din Road to the coastal road in the Gaza Strip.
5. Palestinian militias tried to defend against Israeli advances in the Central Governorate of the Gaza Strip.
6. Israeli forces have degraded the command-and-control capacity of Hamas’ Khan Younis Brigade, according to the Israel Defense Forces.
7. Hamas’ naval special operations forces have reinforced Palestinian fighters defending Khan Younis via tunnel systems.
8. The al Quds Brigades fired rockets at Ashkelon from the northern Gaza Strip.
9. Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters 10 times across the West Bank. Hamas called for continued and intensifying anti-Israel demonstrations in the West Bank in response to Israel killing senior Hamas official Saleh al Arouri.
10. Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted nine attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
11. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed that it conducted two drone attacks targeting US positions in Syria.
12. US NAVCENT Commander Vice Admiral Brad Cooper stated that the Houthis tried to conduct an unmanned surface vessel attack in the Red Sea, marking the first instance of them doing so since the Israel-Hamas war began.
13. The Afghan branch of the Islamic State—named Islamic State Khorasan Province—claimed responsibility for the recent terrorist attack in Kerman City, Iran. CTP-ISW previously assessed in August 2023 that ISKP terrorist attacks inside Iran will likely exacerbate tensions between Iran and the Afghan Taliban.
14. The New York Times reported that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei ordered his military commanders to exercise “strategic patience” vis-a-vis the United States on an unspecified date, citing unspecified sources familiar with internal regime discussions.
15.US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby stated that Russia has already launched ballistic missiles acquired from North Korea at targets in Ukraine and continues efforts to acquire similar missiles from Iran.

Iranian-backed actors in Iraq have intensified their effort to expel US forces from Iraq. CTP-ISW has assessed that Iranian-backed actors are using almost daily militant attacks and legal and political pressure to force US troops to leave. These Iranian-backed actors have disguised the reason for their attacks, framing them as responses to the Israel-Hamas war. These attacks trigger US self-defense strikes, to which the United States has a legitimate right to protect its servicemembers. The Iranian-backed Iraqi actors exploit these strikes, framing them as violations of Iraqi sovereignty and territorial integrity and thereby pressuring the Iraqi federal government to pursue the removal of US forces.

Iranian-backed actors in Iraq have accelerated these efforts in response to the United States conducting a self-defense strike on January 4, killing a senior official in Iranian-backed militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba (HHN).[1] The United States reported that the HHN official, whose name was Mushtaq Jawad al Jawari, was “actively involved in planning and carrying out attacks on US personnel.”[2] The Washington Institute for Near East Policy similarly reported that Jawari was also responsible for distributing Iranian-supplied advanced conventional weapons to client militias in Iraq and Syria.[3] Jawari was formally the commander of the Popular Mobilization Force’s (PMF) 12th Brigade and the deputy commander of the PMF Baghdad Operations Command.[4] HHN controls the 12th Brigade and has long participated in the Iranian-led attack campaign to expel US forces from Iraq. HHN—through the 12th Brigade—also advocated for sectarian cleansing as part of its counter-ISIS operations in Tarmiyah, referencing Kataib Hezbollah’s (KH) sectarian cleansing of Jurf al Saqr in 2014 as a model of success.[5]

Iranian-backed Iraqi actors are exploiting this most recent US self-defense strike in Baghdad to add further momentum to their effort to remove US troops. The Parliamentary Security and Defense committee, which is controlled by the Iranian-backed Badr Organization, called for an emergency parliamentary session to discuss repercussions for the strike and how to preserve Iraqi security and sovereignty.[6] The committee previously presented a draft resolution to expel US forces from Iraq to the Iraqi Parliament and its speaker, Mohsen al Mandalawi, on December 6.[7] Mandalawi has condemned the strike and said that the Iraqi federal government must act immediately to remove US forces, indicating his openness to supporting a parliamentary effort to this end.[8] Mandalawi replaced former Parliament Speaker Mohammad al Halbousi on November 15, after the Iraqi Federal Court removed Halbousi from his position.[9] Halbousi blocked a parliamentary motion to expel the US ambassador to Iraq immediately prior to his removal, suggesting that he was removed at least partly for that reason.[10]

The Mohammad Shia al Sudani administration has similarly begun criticizing the United States and indicating support for the removal of US troops, likely in response to pressure from Iranian-backed actors. The United States currently operates in Iraq at the invitation of the Iraqi federal government. Sudani announced on December 28 that his administration would begin steps to remove US forces.[11] Sudani’s military spokesperson responded to the latest US self-defense strike by describing it as being “akin to terrorist activities.”[12] The military spokesperson added that the strike was outside the mandate of the International Coalition, which is deployed to Iraq for counterterrorism operations.[13]

An Iraqi decision to expel US forces would very likely create space for ISIS to rapidly resurge in Syria within 12 to 24 months and then threaten Iraq. The US military mission in these countries is meant to enable the enduring defeat of ISIS and through cooperation with local partners.[14] The US support to its counter-ISIS partners in Iraq and Syria is instrumental to defeating ISIS.[15] US forces and military infrastructure in Iraq provide the logistical support that enables the presence of US forces in Syria. The expulsion of US forces from Iraq would necessitate a withdrawal from Syria, where ISIS is reconstituting itself in territory held by the Syrian regime.[16] CTP-ISW continues to assess that the United States and its partner in Syria have successfully contained but not defeated ISIS and that the US withdrawal from Syria will very likely cause a rapid ISIS resurgence in Syria within 12 to 24 months.[17] A resurgent ISIS would then be able to threaten Iraq again. The Iraqi Security Forces still face significance deficiencies in fire support, intelligence, and logistics that will impede their ability to defeat ISIS alone.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
• Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant reported that Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip “are completing the current mission” as part of their transition to a third phase of operations there.[19] Gallant said Israeli forces “are reorganizing with the intention of carrying out raids and airstrikes soon.”[20] This remark comes shortly after the IDF announced the withdrawal of five brigades from the Gaza Strip on December 31. The third phase of operations in the northern Gaza Strip will reportedly include the end of major combat operations, a “reduction in forces” in the strip, the release of reservists, a “transition to targeted raids,” and the establishment of a security buffer zone within the Gaza Strip.[21] CTP-ISW warned on January 2 that the third phase of operations as described will very likely enable Hamas to reconstitute itself militarily.[22] Israeli forces have degraded several Hamas units in the northern Gaza Strip. But Hamas’ military forces are neither defeated nor destroyed at this time.[23] Palestinian militias continued to operate in the northern Gaza Strip and have targeted Israeli forces in areas where Israel has degraded the local Hamas units.[24] Israel likely faces continued attacks in these areas in part because it is fighting several Palestinian militias, such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the al Aqsa Martyrs‘ Brigades, rather than just Hamas.

The al Qassem Brigades—the militant wing of Hamas—claimed several attacks on Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip on January 4.[25] The group fired mortars and rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) at Israeli armor and dismounted infantry in Tuffah, where Palestinian fighters have claimed almost daily attacks on Israeli forces since late December 2023.[26] The al Qassem Brigades published footage on January 4 of its fighters firing anti-personnel devices, RPGs, and small arms at Israeli forces in Gaza City.[27] The al Qassem Brigades also targeted Israeli forces in Mughraqa, south of Gaza City, where Israeli forces are continuing clearing operations.[28] The IDF reported on January 4 that it destroyed an underground military compound west of Mughraqa in the past week.

Israel moved the evacuation corridor running north-to-south from Salah al Din Road to the coastal road in the Gaza Strip on January 4.[30] The Salah al Din Road was the primary north-south humanitarian corridor that Israel designated early in the war.[31] Israel designating a new corridor comes as the IDF continues clearing operations in the central and southern parts of the Gaza Strip.

The IDF reported on January 4 that it killed PIJ’s “chief of operational staff,” who operated in the northern Gaza Strip.[32] The IDF stated that the PIJ official, Mamdouh Lulu, worked as an assistant to and was a close associate of PIJ leaders in the northern Gaza Strip. Lulu communicated with PIJ senior officials outside of the Gaza Strip and coordinated attacks on Israel before and during the Israel-Hamas war, according to the IDF. Hamas-affiliated media reported on January 3 that three civilians died in an Israeli airstrike in Rafah, including Lulu.

Palestinian militias tried to defend against Israeli advances in the Central Governorate of the Gaza Strip. The IDF stated that the PIJ official, Mamdouh Lulu, worked as an assistant to and was a close associate of PIJ leaders in the northern Gaza Strip. Lulu communicated with PIJ senior officials outside of the Gaza Strip and coordinated attacks on Israel before and during the Israel-Hamas war, according to the IDF. Hamas-affiliated media reported on January 3 that three civilians died in an Israeli airstrike in Rafah, including Lulu.

Palestinian militias tried to defend against Israeli advances in the Central Governorate of the Gaza Strip. A Palestinian journalist reported on January 4 that Israeli forces have surrounded Maghazi “from all directions.”[34] Another journalist reported on January 4 that Israeli bulldozers constructed sand berms in Maghazi.[35] The al Qassem Brigades detonated an explosively formed penetrator (EFP) targeting an Israeli tank west of Maghazi.[36] The group also targeted an Israeli tank with an anti-tank RPG there.[37]

Israeli forces continued operating in Bureij, north of Maghazi on January 4. The IDF located long-range rocket launchers at the center of the city.[38] The al Qassem Brigades detonated a house-borne improvised explosive device (IED) north of Nuseirat, which neighbors Bureij.[39] The group also mortared Israeli forces and vehicles in Bureij.[40] Israeli forces face other Palestinian militias in the central Gaza Strip. The al Quds Brigades—the militant wing of PIJ—mortared Israeli dismounted infantry and vehicles in Bureij.[41] The National Resistance Brigades—the militant wing of Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)—claimed that its fighters clashed with Israeli forces in Bureij and Maghazi.[42] The groups’ fighters detonated an explosive device as Israeli vehicles advanced southeast of Bureij.[43] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades—the self-proclaimed militant wing of Fatah—fired an RPG at an Israeli vehicle as it advanced in Bureij.[44]

Israeli forces conducted airstrikes targeting buildings containing anti-tank elements from the Hamas Deir al Balah Battalion, according to an IDF report on January 4.

Israeli forces have degraded the command-and-control (C2) capacity of Hamas’ Khan Younis Brigade, according to the IDF. The IDF said that it has significantly damaged specifically the C2 of the brigade’s northern and eastern battalions.[46] This statement is consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that these battalions are under active and intense IDF pressure.[47] The IDF reported on January 4 its fighters killed two company commanders from the northern and eastern battalions of the Khan Younis Brigade.[48] The IDF 98th Division has similarly degraded Hamas’ combat effectiveness in Khan Younis by destroying Hamas military sites and an underground tunnel system hundreds of meters long.[49] Israeli forces conducted airstrikes on Hamas weapons depots in Khan Younis as well.[50] The IDF 4th Brigade commander said his forces are fighting on the southern flank of the Hamas Khan Younis Brigade, demonstrating how Israeli forces have surrounded Khan Younis to fight Hamas there.

Hamas’ naval special operations forces (SOF) have reinforced Palestinian fighters defending Khan Younis via tunnel systems. Five naval SOF fighters surrendered themselves to the IDF 55th Brigade Combat Team in Khan Younis, according to the IDF on January 4.[51] This incident suggests that Hamas continues to draw fighters from less active areas to support battalions under active and intense pressure from IDF clearing operations.

At least four Palestinian militias tried to defend against Israeli advances in central Khan Younis City on January 4. The al Qassem Brigades fired anti-tank rockets and mortars at Israeli armor and dismounted infantry in four separate attacks around Khan Younis.[52] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fired mortars and RPGs at Israeli forces in separate attacks as well.[53] The National Resistance Brigades targeted Israeli forces with RPGs, and the al Quds Brigades clashed with Israeli infantry in central Khan Younis City.[54] Israeli fighter jets struck Hamas fighters firing anti-tank missiles and planting IEDs near Israeli forces in Khan Younis.

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant discussed on January 4 continuing IDF operations against Hamas and other Palestinian militias in the southern Gaza Strip. Gallant said during a visit to the central Gaza Strip border that Israeli operations above and below ground are getting stronger in the southern Gaza Strip.[56] He also said that Palestinian militants’ “countdown” for Israeli forces leaving the Gaza Strip is wrong.

The al Quds Brigades fired rockets at Ashkelon from the northern Gaza Strip on January 4.[58] IDF Home Front Command lifted civilian educational and workplace restrictions in Ashkelon on December 18 after a situational assessment regarding the threat of Palestinian indirect fire from the Gaza Strip.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters 10 times across the West Bank on January 4.[60] The al Quds Brigades and al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades engaged Israeli forces with small arms and detonated IEDs, including a ”car bomb,” targeting these forces in Tulkarm.[61] The IDF said that it concluded a 40-hour counterterrorism operation in the Noor Shams refugee camp in Tulkarm on January 4.[62] The IDF said that it destroyed militia infrastructure, detained hundreds of suspects for questioning, and seized weapons during the operation.[63] The IDF also conducted an airstrike on fighters who attacked IDF forces in the camp.[64] The Jenin Battalion of the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades separately attacked Israeli forces in Sir, south of Jenin.[65] Palestinian fighters engaged Israeli forces in small arms clashes in Sanur, south of Jenin as well.

Hamas called for continued and intensifying anti-Israel demonstrations in the West Bank in response to Israel killing senior Hamas official Saleh al Arouri.[67] Hamas called for an escalation in demonstrations and other “solidarity activities” in the West Bank in the upcoming days. Arouri was the deputy chairman of Hamas‘ political bureau and directed Hamas military operations in the West Bank.[68] Arouri also helped found Hamas’ military wing in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
• Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah (LH), conducted nine attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.[70] LH claimed that it conducted seven attacks targeting Israeli military positions in northern Israel on January 4.[71] This rate of attacks marks a decrease from the 13 attacks that LH claimed on January 3.[72] LH launched the uptick in attacks on January 3 likely in response to Israel killing senior Hamas official Saleh al Arouri in Beirut on January 2. LH acknowledged that nine of its fighters died fighting Israel on January 3.[73] Unspecified fighters separately launched rockets targeting Goren in northern Israel on January 3.The Economist reported on January 4 that LH withdrew an unspecified number of fighters two to three kilometers from the Israel-Lebanon border.[75]

The Economist reported on January 4 that LH withdrew an unspecified number of fighters two to three kilometers from the Israel-Lebanon border. The Economist suggested these withdrawals signal that LH seeks to avoid further escalation with Israel.[76] Israeli media previously reported that LH began withdrawing its “Radwan” special forces away from the border on December 24 due to high casualties inflicted by Israeli airstrikes.[77] The Economist reporting did not specify which LH units or how many LH fighters have withdrawn from the border, although it is possible that the Economist was referring to the same event that Israeli media covered. LH’s continued attacks into northern Israel on January 4 demonstrates that LH retains military forces along the border.

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant told a US envoy on January 4 that Israel needs a “new security reality” on its northern border so that its citizens can return to their homes in northern Israel.[78] Gallant stated that Israel prefers a diplomatic solution but that there is a "short window of time” to find one.[79] LH Deputy Secretary General Naim Qassem stated on December 31 that LH will not allow displaced Israeli civilians to return to their homes in northern Israel until Israel halts its military operations in the Gaza Strip.[80] Israeli officials have repeatedly expressed concern about the threat that LH poses to Israel in recent weeks. IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi met with IDF commanders and discussed Israel’s military readiness during a trip to northern Israel on January 3.

Hamas leaders mourned the death of former Hamas Political Bureau Deputy Chairman Saleh Arouri during his funeral in Beirut on January 4. Hamas Political Bureau members, including Ismail Haniyeh, Mahmoud Mardawi, and Hossam Badran, eulogized Arouri via recorded video at the ceremony.[82] Hamas West Bank deputy leader Zaher Jabareen spoke in-person at the ceremony.[83] The leaders' emphasized that Arouri’s killing would not weaken the resolve of Palestinian militias against Israel and that the war remains completely active. Several LH officials and Palestinian militia supporters attended the funeral in Beirut.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
• Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed that it conducted two drone attacks targeting US positions in Syria on January 4. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq targeted US forces at Rukban and al Omar oil field.

US NAVCENT Commander Vice Admiral Brad Cooper stated that the Houthis tried to conduct an unmanned surface vessel (USV) attack in the Red Sea on January 4, marking the first instance of them doing so since the Israel-Hamas war began.[86] The Houthi USV traveled around 15 miles before detonating within a “couple of miles” of US Navy and commercial vessels.[87] Cooper stated that the USV attack did not cause any casualties or damage to nearby ships. The attempted attack follows a statement from the United States and 12 of its international partners on January 3 warning that the Houthis will face unspecified consequences if the group continues to attack shipping in the Red Sea.[88] The Houthis conducted the USV attack likely to demonstrate their capabilities in response to the statement from the United States and its partners. The IRGC Quds Force has furnished the Houthi movement with explosive-laden drone boats in recent years, and the Houthis conducted their first waterborne IED attack on a Saudi naval frigate in January 2017.[89]

Cooper additionally discussed Operation Prosperity Guardian on January 4, stating that the United States has intercepted 19 Houthi drones and missiles and that around 1,500 vessels have transited the Red Sea since the formation of the maritime coalition on December 18.[90] The United States established Operation Prosperity Guardian to ensure freedom of navigation and bolster regional security.

Houthi Supreme Leader Abdul Malik al Houthi and senior Houthi official Mohammad Abdul Salam released statements calling for mass demonstrations across Yemen in support of Palestinians on January 5.[92] Both officials warned that the Houthi movement will “respond and punish” the United States for the killing 10 Houthi members on December 31. The United States killed the Houthi militants after they fired at US helicopters trying to aid a commercial vessel under Houthi attack in the southern Red Sea.

The Afghan branch of the Islamic State—named Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP)—claimed responsibility for the recent terrorist attack in Kerman City, Iran, on January 4.[94] Two ISKP members detonated suicide vests during a ceremony commemorating the anniversary of the United States killing Qassem Soleimani, killing at least 84 civilians and wounding dozens of others, on January 3.[95] This attack marks the third that ISKP has claimed inside Iran in recent years. ISKP previously conducted shooting attacks at a prominent Shia shrine in Shiraz in October 2022 and again in August 2023.[96] ISKP attacks beyond Afghanistan raise the group's profile among Salafi-jihadi organizations, helping ISKP attract financing and recruits.[97] ISKP attacks in Iran also support the group's efforts to undermine the Taliban government by exacerbating divisions within the Taliban movement, which remains divided between those who want to prioritize addressing domestic issues in Afghanistan versus those who wish to continue supporting jihadist movements internationally.[98]

CTP-ISW previously assessed in August 2023 that ISKP terrorist attacks inside Iran will likely exacerbate tensions between Iran and the Afghan Taliban.[99] Tehran has repeatedly pushed the Taliban to adopt stronger counterterrorism measures since the Taliban came to power in August 2021.[100] Iran and the Taliban have previously engaged in counterterrorism and intelligence cooperation vis-a-vis the ISKP, as CTP-ISW previously reported.[101] These attacks compound with additional Iranian grievances toward the Taliban, moreover. Tensions have risen between Iran and the Taliban over water resources in recent months.[102] Iranian state media claimed on January 4 that the enemies of Iran are trying to create tensions between Iran and other Muslim countries, such as Afghanistan and Pakistan, where ISKP operates.[103]

Iranian officials discussed the ISKP attack with regional states on January 4. Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi stated that terrorists will not be able undermine Iran’s security and unity with attacks during a phone call Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.[104] Raisi also accused Israel of trying to spread insecurity to Iran due to its failures in the Gaza Strip in a phone call with Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamid al Thani.[105] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian emphasized that fighting terrorism is the main priority of Iran and Pakistan during a phone call with his Pakistani counterpart, Jalil Abbas Jilani.

The New York Times reported on January 3 that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei ordered his military commanders to exercise “strategic patience” vis-a-vis the United States on an unspecified date, citing unspecified sources familiar with internal regime discussions. Khamenei reportedly stressed that Iranian military commanders should avoid any actions that would risk direct military confrontation with the United States. It is unclear when Khamanei issued this directive to his military officials, though the reporting is consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that Iran seeks to avoid a direct military confrontation against the United States and Israel.[108] CTP-ISW has recently assessed, however, that Iran and the Axis of Resistance are trying to exploit the Israel-Hamas war to fulfill Iran’s longstanding strategic objective of forcing a US military withdrawal from Iraq and Syria.[109] Iran will likely pursue this objective in a manner that seeks to avoid a direction confrontation with the United States, namely through proxy and partner militia attacks, exploiting legal mechanisms in host countries, and other coercive measures, consistent with Khamenei’s reported directive.

NOTE: A version of the following text appears in the ISW January 4, 2024, Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby stated on January 4 that Russia has already launched ballistic missiles acquired from North Korea at targets in Ukraine and continues efforts to acquire similar missiles from Iran. Kirby stated that North Korea provided Russia with ballistic missile launchers and an unspecified number of ballistic missiles and that Russian forces launched at least one of the North Korean missiles into Ukraine on December 30, 2023.[111] Kirby also stated that Russian officials continue efforts to buy ballistic missiles from Iran. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported earlier on January 4 that unspecified US officials stated that Russia could receive Iranian short-range ballistic missiles as early as spring 2024 but that the officials do not believe that Russia and Iran have yet completed a deal.[112]

Russia may be intensifying efforts to source ballistic missiles from abroad because these missiles appear to be more effective at striking targets in Ukraine in some circumstances. Russian forces routinely use short-range ballistic missiles to strike Ukrainian cities closer to the frontline, and these missiles appear to be more effective at penetrating or avoiding Ukrainian air defenses. Ukrainian air defenses have intercepted 149 of a reported 166 Russian cruise missiles in intensified attacks since December 29, 2023, but have only intercepted a handful of the ballistic missiles that Russia has launched at Ukraine in the same period, for example.[113] Russian forces have repurposed S-300 and S-400 air defense missiles for conducting strikes against surface targets in Ukraine, and Ukrainian officials have acknowledged that Ukrainian air defenses struggle to intercept these unorthodox missile attacks using their own S-300 and S-400 systems.[114] Ukrainian forces have also appeared to be less successful in intercepting Iskander ballistic missiles during recent strikes, although Ukrainian forces did intercept an Iskander-M missile during a less intense series of Russian missile and drone strikes on December 30.[115] Ukrainian forces reportedly intercepted all Iskander-M or S-300/S-400 missiles that Russian forces launched at Kyiv on December 12.[116] Ukrainian forces reportedly also intercepted all 10 Kinzhal missiles that Russian forces launched at Ukraine on January 2 with Western-provided Patriot systems.[117] The effectiveness of Russian ballistic missiles thus appears to depend in part on the configuration of Ukraine’s air defense umbrella in the target area and the strike package of which the missiles are part.

The relative success that Russian forces have had in striking targets in Ukraine with ballistic missiles in combination with cruise missiles and drones may be prompting an intensification of Russian efforts to source ballistic missiles from abroad. Russia can reportedly produce roughly 42 Iskander missiles and four Kinzhal missiles per month, although it is unclear how many S-300/S-400 missiles Russia can produce.[118] Russia‘s defense industrial base (DIB) likely cannot produce ballistic missiles at the scale required for a persistent strike campaign in Ukraine that relies on regularly expending a large volume of ballistic missiles, and Russia likely has to source ballistic missiles from abroad if it wishes to maintain large-scale missiles strikes against Ukraine.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-4-2024

IF, earlier this Month, attacks had been needed against Iran or whomever, and had to be coordinated through the US Sec. of Defense, it might not have happened as quickly as it could have, because Lloyd Austin, the Sec. of Defense, was in the Hospital, and at the time, the Biden Administration did not know that, and Lloyd Austin's next in Command was on Vacation in Puerto Rico.

US and UK carry out strikes against Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen

https://edition.cnn.com/2024/01/11/politics/us-strikes-houthis-yemen/index.html

Houthis vow to hit back after US and UK attack

The Houthis will hit back hard after the joint attack by the United States and the United Kingdom on their installations in Yemen. This is what several leaders of the movement that controls a large part of the country say. No retaliation has been reported so far.

The response to the bombings by the US and UK and four allies, including the Netherlands, will be the Houthis' largest operation yet, leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi promised. He calls on Yemenis to take to the streets on Friday and demonstrate against "American aggression".

“America and Britain will have to prepare to pay a high price and bear all the terrible consequences of this blatant aggression,” Hussein al-Ezzi, deputy foreign minister for the Houthis, also responded via X. The

Houthis had already threatened before the operation to take revenge by attacking American bases in Iraq, among other places. Although air raid sirens sounded around the US embassy in Baghdad, no attack was reported. Nor have any American ships in the Red Sea been hit by missiles or drones, American media report on the authority of the Pentagon.

Biden: Retaliation if 'outrageous' Houthis continue violence in Red Sea

US President Biden warns that the Houthis in Yemen will be attacked a second time if they continue their "outrageous behavior". The rebels attack ships in the Red Sea in a show of support for Hamas and the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.

The United States and the United Kingdom attacked dozens of Houthi targets during the night from Thursday to Friday. According to Biden, this was a success. “I don't think there were any civilian casualties and that's another reason why it was a success,” he further said.

The Iran-backed Houthis argue that US and British interests are now "legitimate targets". Due to the violence in the Red Sea and the attacks on the Houthis, there are fears of an escalation of the situation in the Middle East.

I found this explanation of what's going on in the Red Sea to be fascinating...

EU member states on Tuesday added Hamas political leader Yahya Sinwar to their ‘terrorist’ sanctions list, making him subject to the freezing of funds and financial assets and prohibiting EU operators from making economic resources available to him. The move comes in response to the deadly Hamas-led October 7 attack on Israel.

https://www.france24.com/en/middle-...own-in-southern-gaza-as-toll-tops-24-000

NOS News
•
Today, 12:05
Tensions between Iran and Pakistan: an overview of what we know now

Pakistan carried out air strikes on neighboring Iran last night, killing several people . An overview of what we know now.

What happened?
The Pakistani army carried out airstrikes last night on targets of two militant organizations in neighboring Iran. According to Iranian media, several rockets hit a village in Sistan and Balochistan province, which borders Pakistan. Nine people have been killed, Iranian authorities report. Pakistan says drones and missiles, among other things, were used in the attack.

Why these attacks?
The two countries accuse each other of harboring militant movements. According to the Pakistani military, the attacks targeted terrorist hideouts on Iranian territory. The action cannot be seen separately from the attacks that Iran carried out on Pakistani territory on Tuesday. Then the Iranian regime said it had carried out attacks on a militia in Pakistan.

This morning, Pakistan said in a statement that it has informed Iran several times about the presence of terrorists. “Pakistan has provided concrete evidence of the presence and activities of these terrorists,” the Pakistani Foreign Ministry said. The Pakistanis say that Iran, however, has done nothing about it. By the way, similar accusations are also being heard from Iran.

“The government and the military were under enormous pressure,” Abdullah Khan, an analyst at the Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies, told the AP. "The Iranian attacks were celebrated in the media and the image among Pakistanis of a strong army is no longer what it was. There had to be a response."

The attack was named 'Marg bar Sarmachar' by Pakistan. 'Marg bar' means 'death to' in Farsi and 'sarmachar' means 'guerrilla' in Baloch.

Has this conflict been going on for some time?
Insurgents have been active in the border region between Pakistan and Iran for more than twenty years. However, these are different groups. Iran carried out attacks on Tuesday on two bases of the Sunni separatist group Jaish al-Adl, a group that emerged from the former radical Islamist group Jundallah.

And on the other side there is the Balochistan Liberation Army and the Balochistan Liberation Front, which is where the Pakistani attacks have been focused today. That group would operate from Iran.

NOS
The group has no religious background, but fights for the secession of the Balochistan region. The liberation army is seen as a terrorist organization by Pakistan, the US and the EU, among others.

“Pakistan will pay a price for this,” the group warned today. “We will not be silent.”

What kind of area is the border region?
Iran and Pakistan share a border of about 900 kilometers. It is a largely lawless and deprived area. Smugglers and militants can cross the border without major problems. It is also an area that plays a major role in the global opium trade from Afghanistan.

What are the reactions?
The Pakistanis said in a statement that it "fully endorses" Iran's territorial integrity and sovereignty and that the sole purpose of this attack was to safeguard Pakistan's national security and interests.

Angry sounds are heard from the Iranian capital Tehran. Pakistan's attack is condemned by the Iranians and Iran also demands immediate clarification from Pakistan. China, which has good ties with Iran and Pakistan, has asked both countries to maintain calm. Turkey spoke with Iran and Pakistan this morning, saying the parties are not looking for escalation in an area already characterized by unrest.

The Pakistani army says it is on "very high alert" and warns that any new action from the Iranian side will be met. Both countries are also struggling with their own internal problems: Iran was recently hit by an attack that resulted in about a hundred deaths. There are elections next month in Pakistan and there are also economic problems.

At the same time, there is no shortage of tension: Iran is starting a major planned military exercise today.

Well known Pakistani journalist Hamid Mir is the only journalist in the world to have interviewed Osama bin Laden after the September 11 attacks.[9] During his career, Mir has also interviewed various world leaders.

In 2009, Mir compared the Hamas and the Taliban. According to Mir, "Hamas probably have more suicide bombers than Taliban, but they are different from each other". In an article titled "Hamas builds while Taliban bomb schools", Mir wrote that both Hamas and Taliban were born in refugee camps, and both were initially encouraged by the West. Mir claimed that some of the Hamas leaders were educated in Pakistani universities, and that many of them were part of the Afghan Jihad against the former Soviet Union, and close to Abdullah Azzam who was also a mentor of Osama bin Laden in early 1980s.[86]

Brave young woman

IRAN UPDATE, JANUARY 21, 2024
Jan 21, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF









Iran Update, January 21, 2024

Brian Carter, Andie Parry, Alexandra Braverman, Amin Soltani, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

CTP-ISW published abbreviated updates on January 20 and 21, 2024. Detailed coverage will resume Monday, January 22, 2024.

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel–Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Key Takeaways:

• The United States, Egypt, and Qatar are pushing a new, multi-part plan to end the Israel–Hamas war. The US-Egyptian-Qatari plan will enable Hamas to reconstitute and present a continued threat to Israel. This proposed plan, as reported, does not include any provisions to disarm Hamas.
• Israeli forces raided an underground tunnel in a civilian area of Khan Younis that previously held Israeli hostages.
• Palestinian militias conducted five indirect fire attacks targeting southern Israel on January 21.
• Palestinian fighters clashed with Israeli forces in four locations across the West Bank on January 20 after CTP-ISW's data cutoff.
• Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) conducted four attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel targeting Israeli towns and military facilities on January 21.
• The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed responsibility for two one-way drone attacks targeting US positions in Syria on January 21.

The United States, Egypt, and Qatar are pushing a new, multi-part plan to end the Israel–Hamas war.[1] The plan contains three parts that will occur over a 90-day period, according to the Wall Street Journal. Hamas would first release all civilian hostages in return for Israel releasing “hundreds” of Palestinian prisoners. Israel would also withdraw its forces from population centers in the Gaza Strip, allow freedom of movement throughout the Gaza Strip, end “surveillance,” and double the flow of humanitarian aid into the strip. Hamas would release all female Israeli soldiers and return the bodies of dead hostages to Israel in the second stage. Finally, Hamas would release the remaining Israeli soldiers and fighting-age males, while Israeli forces withdraw from the strip completely. An Egyptian official told the Wall Street Journal that the parties to the agreement are considering “safety guarantees” for Hamas’ political leadership and the formation of an “international fund” for the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip. After the 90-day period, the plan would lead to a permanent ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, the normalization of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia, and the relaunching of a process to form a Palestinian state.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reiterated his rejection of a “ceasefire” in exchange for the release of all Israeli hostages held by Hamas in a video published on January 21.[2] Netanyahu was not explicitly responding to the US-Egyptian-Qatari plan. Netanyahu noted that an end to the war that leaves Hamas intact means that the next October 7 attack is “a matter of time.” Netanyahu laid out the Israeli war aims—"deradicalization” of Palestinian society, demilitarization of the Gaza Strip, and the destruction of Hamas—in the Wall Street Journal on December 25, 2023.[3]

The US-Egyptian-Qatari plan will enable Hamas to reconstitute and present a continued threat to Israel. This proposed plan, as reported, does not include any provisions to disarm Hamas. Hamas will be able to rebuild its governance capabilities in the Gaza Strip, which allowed it to generate funds for its operations prior to its October 7 attack.[4] Hamas would essentially have access to the same resource pools that it had prior to the war. Hamas fighters are already reinfiltrating areas that Israeli forces cleared in the northern Gaza Strip, which will facilitate Hamas’ reconstitution.[5] This reinfiltration process would accelerate under the implementation of the first phase of the proposed plan, in which Israeli forces would leave Gazan cities and towns.[6] “Safety guarantees” for Hamas’ political leadership would protect some of the planners of the October 7 attacks, possibly including Yahya Sinwar. Sinwar is Hamas’ political leader in the Gaza Strip. He closely collaborates with Hamas military leaders Mohammad Deif and Marwan Issa.[7] Sinwar also founded and led Hamas’ internal security apparatus and is responsible for the deaths of many Palestinians and Israelis in that role.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
• Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Israeli forces raided an underground tunnel in a civilian area of Khan Younis that previously held Israeli hostages.[9] Palestinian fighters moved the hostages prior to the tunnel’s capture by Israeli forces. The IDF said that the tunnel entrance was inside the home of a Hamas fighter. Palestinian fighters placed boobytraps inside the tunnel and posted guards outside the tunnel. The IDF killed the guards to make entry into the tunnel system. Israeli forces discovered five prison cells where Hamas kept the hostages. Israeli forces also captured Hamas intelligence documents and weapons inside the tunnel. The IDF said that there were 20 hostages held in the tunnel system at a time, according to unspecified testimonies. The IDF said that Hamas held some of the hostages who it released in the November 2023 exchange deal inside this tunnel.[10] The IDF published children’s drawings as proof the hostages had been held there. Israeli media reported that the drawings belonged to five-year-old Emilia Aloni, one of the hostages freed in November 2023.[11] The IDF destroyed the tunnel after IDF forces searched it.

The Yiftach Brigade (assigned to the 99th Division) conducted clearing operations in Maghazi in the central Gaza Strip. Yiftach Brigade armor and engineers destroyed a Hamas weapons factory and a rocket launch site in Maghazi camp.[13] Palestinian fighters fired rocket-propelled grenades at the brigade during the operation. The IDF said that the brigade killed over 30 Palestinian fighters during the engagement.[14] The military wing of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the al Quds Brigades, conducted indirect fire attacks on Israeli armor and infantry advancing north from Bureij, roughly a kilometer north of Maghazi.[15] Al Quds Brigades “snipers” fired at Israeli forces northeast of Bureij camp.

Palestinian militias claimed attacks targeting Israeli forces in Jabalia on January 21. The al Qassem Brigades—the military wing of Hamas—fired anti-tank munitions at Israeli armor in Jabalia City. The al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades—the self-proclaimed militant wing of Fatah—and the National Resistance Brigades—the military wing of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)—claimed that it clashed with Israeli dismounted infantry east of Jabalia refugee camp.[17] The National Resistance Brigades also fired thermobaric rockets at Israeli infantry.

Palestinian militias conducted five indirect fire attacks targeting southern Israel on January 21. This is the largest number of indirect fire attacks into Israel since January 7.[19] Three Palestinian militias mortared Israeli armor at the Sufa military site near the southern tip of the Gaza Strip.[20] The al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades and the military wing of the Palestinian Mujahideen Movement, the Mujahideen Brigades, launched rockets at Nahal Oz in a combined operation on January 21.[21] The al Quds Brigades launched rockets at Kissufim.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there
• Palestinian fighters clashed with Israeli forces in four locations across the West Bank on January 20 after CTP-ISW's data cutoff.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
• Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) conducted four attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel targeting Israeli towns and military facilities on January 21.[24] LH said it fired rockets at a civilian area in retaliation for an Israeli strike in southern Lebanon that unsuccessfully targeted a senior LH field commander.

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed responsibility for a drone attack targeting an unspecified Israeli military site in the Golan Heights.[26] The group said that the attack occurred on January 20.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
• Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed responsibility for two one-way drone attacks targeting US positions in Syria on January 21.[27] The group claimed a one-way drone attack targeting US forces stationed at al Shaddadi in Hasakah Province and US forces stationed at al Omar oil field in Deir ez Zor Province.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-21-2024

Anyone heard something from @MeyerLansky? I hope he is alright since many Israeli reservists were killed during the past few days....

Last time he checked in was January 5. I think he was stationed at the Libanon border not Gaza which is becoming hell on earth.

Interesting Analysis from 2021 !

How Afghanistan Influences Hamas, PIJ, and Iran in their Approach to Israel
by Kobi Michael, Yoel Guzansky
Aug 24, 2021

Brief Analysis
As the Taliban takeover boosts Iranian proxies’ morale, Israel and the United States should develop a coordinated strategy against these groups to enhance Israeli security and restore confidence in American commitments to regional partners.

Although it was predictable, the Taliban’s rapid takeover of Afghanistan nonetheless shocked the West. This development and its outcomes are liable to tar the United States with the brush of defeat and paint it as a failure in its role as leader of the free world and the West. Moreover, the United States has long been viewed as the most bitter foe of fundamentalist Islamist movements and the most significant obstacle to the latter realizing its visions. Therefore, necessary and justified as it may have been, the disturbing images of the U.S. withdrawal—though no withdrawal ever looks good—are proving a tailwind in jihadists’ sails.

https://www.washingtoninstitute.org...hamas-pij-and-iran-their-approach-israel

Thanks @H and thats why I was asking because I received some info that Israel is allegedly hiding the real numbers of killed reservists....