The three assassinations that changed the Middle East - analysis
The Jerusalem Post By Yonah Jeremy Bob 05 August 2024

Extracts:
Taking out Hamas political chief Ismail Haniyeh while he was in Tehran was an unmistakable signal to disabuse Iran of the notion that it has immunity when it uses proxies to harm Israel

In a dizzying three weeks, Israel has assassinated three titans of terrorism although only officially taking credit for two

These operations, in and of themselves, have altered the trajectory of the ongoing war and of the Middle East even beyond the current war. Jerusalem’s hope has been to reshape the balance of power to restore a more secure ceasefire and regional quiet
But these moves have also put the region closer to spiraling into a larger war than at any other moment to date

  • Hamas military chief Mohammed Deif 13 July 2024
The first was Hamas military chief Mohammed Deif who was assassinated by Israel by airstrikes in Khan Yunis in southern Gaza on July 13 although the IDF only officially confirmed his death last Thursday

Intelligence information, likely from human spying or electronic spying – even though the IDF declined to divulge details – picked up the key confirmation on Thursday morning.

Deif’s killing is not only a body slam to Hamas’s morale for the immediate future as he was their most “heroic” military figure for more than the last decade but there is a much more significant long-term impact. Deif’s death, more than any other Hamas official, leaves the Gazan terrorist group without a national military manager to retrain and reconstitute its forces if and when the current war ends

Being that the IDF has killed between two-thirds to 75% of Hamas’s senior and mid-level management in its military, Deif had become more important than ever as one of the few remaining Hamas military strategists who would have had the capability to quickly retrain the next generation of Hamas commanders

Hamas could still reconstitute itself as a military force if Israel fails to replace it as a political force in Gaza but the process would take much longer, possibly years longer, without Deif

  • Hezbollah military chief Fuad Shukr 30 July 2024
Last week, Israel took credit for assassinating Hezbollah military chief Fuad Shukr by a drone strike in Beirut
Shukr was Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah’s main military adviser

As with Hamas, Israel has eliminated more than half of Hezbollah’s commanders in southern Lebanon
In addition, around 90% of Hezbollah’s forces in southern Lebanon have fled and close to 100% of its lookout posts there have been eliminated – some of them multiple times when Hezbollah tried to rebuild

So, killing Shukr was not just a blow to Hezbollah’s morale and immediate operations; it also damaged its long-term capabilities for rebuilding its forces in southern Lebanon near Israel’s border

Moreover, killing Shukr was a message to Nasrallah that he could easily be next and that Beirut will no longer be an area receiving immunity if Hezbollah kills any sizable number of Israeli civilians This lays much clearer redlines down for Hezbollah for what kinds of attacks Israel will or will not “tolerate” on its soil in the current low-intensity conflict standoff

  • Hamas political chief Ismail Haniyeh 31 July 2024
The third assassination was Hamas political chief Ismail Haniyeh who was killed within hours of Shukr while visiting top Iranian officials in Tehran

While Israel has not taken credit for the assassination formally, many Israeli officials commented on the killing in a way that left little doubt about who was responsible

Unlike the killings of Deif and Shukr which also could have made an Israeli-Hamas hostage deal and ceasefire more likely by taking off the board two senior officials of Hamas and Hezbollah who were seen as potentially being against a deal, killing Haniyeh delays any deal and ceasefire