Extracts: Contrary to claims that no strategic framework can be discerned in Israel’s various actions, it appears that even if no formal policy document describing this was issued, there are guiding principles for Israel’s action, some probably shaped during the war:
A - Israel's directive
Israel isn’t operating as in previous wars for “threat postponement” on its borders but based on the understanding that threats must be destroyed (Hamas) or at least drastically change their intensity (Hezbollah)
Before entering Gaza, the cabinet’s directive to the military made this very clear
B - Israel's war strategy
Israel prefers to concentrate on one arena as much as possible
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Therefore Israel decided not to attack a very tempting target in Lebanon in the war’s first week, understanding that priority should be given to fighting in Gaza
For this reason, Israel also didn’t hurry to respond strongly to Iran after the significant Iranian attack in April 2024 – because the IDF was very busy in Gaza and the fate of the war in Lebanon wasn’t clear
Even for intensive war in Lebanon, the IDF only entered after dismantling Hamas’s military wing, meaning the end of the intensive campaign in Gaza
Still, once Israel did, all of Hezbollah’s leadership was destroyed with full force
C - Israel's plan
The third principle is not to determine what Israel will do in the future before current achievements enable the implementation of the discussed plan
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Therefore who would be responsible for the civilian system in Gaza “the day after” wasn’t determined because such a determination would have added an opinionated partner to Gaza’s complicated complex and anyway, no entity can / wants to enter Gaza as long as Hamas isn’t drastically weakened inside the Strip
Also, Lebanon’s force that could deal with Hezbollah has yet to rise
Therefore due to the same principle, Israel has yet to publish any information about the future of southern Lebanon or what it wants to achieve in the north beyond returning its residents
A declaration that outlines a clear direction for the IDF but doesn’t indicate any political characterization The only public declaration was that negotiations would be conducted under fire and no ceasefire for talks
Nevertheless Amidror tries to outline what Israel needs to achieve in the end, after the war, despite calls for formal Israeli initiative in Lebanon or Gaza being called into the void without addressees
