Lessons unlearned, as Israel’s war against Hezbollah is starting to mirror its 2006 defeat
Extracts: Tel Aviv has spent nearly two decades supposedly learning from past mistakes in planning its next major confrontation with Hezbollah
"Convinced Israel could force Hezbollah to disarm and withdraw from southern Lebanon by initiating an effects-based air campaign, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) began pounding targets across Lebanon
Although initially taken aback by the destructive air strikes, Hezbollah unleashed its own attack within 24 hours, launching an extensive rocket barrage from southern Lebanon into Israel
Despite Israel assuring the United States of a “quick and decisive” resolution to the conflict, Hezbollah’s short-range Katyusha rockets continued to rain down on the Israeli population
As days went by, it became increasingly apparent to both the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and western military analysts that the IAF was having little effect on Hezbollah’s rockets
When the IDF reluctantly moved its ground forces into southern Lebanon, the apparent ineffectiveness of the operation and the stubborn resistance of Hezbollah fighters stunned military observers worldwide"
Although the above excerpt could well have been written about the current war on Lebanon by the US-backed Israeli army, it is, in fact, an analysis of the 2006 July war fought between the occupation state and the Hezbollah resistance movement
"We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War" by Matt M. Matthews Originally published two years after the war by the US Army Combined Arms Center (USACAC) Matthews also notes,
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By the time the United Nations (UN) cease-fire went into effect on 14 August 2006 many military analysts were convinced the IDF had suffered a significant defeat
