Reforms insufficient in preventing future disasters

At another key point in the report, the Shin Bet wrote that even as it was implementing its own vast reforms for its massive failures on October 7 these would be insufficient in preventing future disasters, barring changes in the interface between the political and defense echelons.

Most of the report, however, was about the Shin Bet’s own failures:
1. it did not warn about an invasion,
2. it misinterpreted Hamas’s intentions – both before October 7 and on the day –
3. it failed to adjust to Hamas as a sophisticated military entity,
4. allowing Hamas to massively arm itself,
5. and it did not recognize the depth of the harm being done to Israeli deterrence.

Another blind spot was the agency’s belief on the eve of October 7 that Hamas might be focused on an attack in the West Bank, partially because its leaders carried out an unusual terrorist attack there on October 5

Conceptually wise, the Shin Bet said:
1. it had far too much confidence in the IDF’s hi-tech border fence,
2. was too invested in quiet and stability,
3. and was too worried about miscalculations in pressuring Hamas
4. that could lead to instability or an “unnecessary” war – as the 2014 conflict was viewed.